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Abstract 
This dissertation examines a series of efforts by the Canadian state to silence and 
censor the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM), particularly activism engaged in the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, in the years following the second 
Palestinian uprising (Intifada) of 2000. Following a delineation of the broad contours of 
Canada's official multicultural policy, the dissertation seeks to interrogate multicultural 
policy's inability to·accommodate Palestinian narratives relating to the struggle for 
Palestinian self-det~rmination. The analysis explores the central contradiction between 
the multicultural st*e's self-construction as accommodating and even celebrating cultural 
difference, and Canada's adoption and deployment of the discourse of clash of 
civilizations and the War on Terror. 
Rooted in a critique of liberal theories of the state and an understanding of Canada 
as a racial state embedded in neoliberal global hierarchies as a second tier imperialist 
state, this study reveals the ways in which notions of "tolerance" may be used to establish 
boundaries and markers of belonging. Moments of erasure and silencing are analyzed as 
racializing moments, whereby the state reveals its class and racial character in both 
domestic and international spheres. Specifically, the manifestations of anti-Arab, anti-
Muslim racism in Canada are interrogated. 
The silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement demonstrates 
the role official multicultural policy has played in obfuscating this racism. Multicultural 
rhetoric is used to enact the erasure and silencing of the Palestinian narrative; under the 
guise of "respecting; diversity," the Palestinian narrative is cast out as it makes some feel 
11 
"uncomfortable." 
Relying on a textual analysis of state records, parliament proceedings, public 
speeches, media reports, journalistic reports, op-eds, and documents obtained through 
freedom of information requests, three specific case studies are examined: the attack 
against Israeli Apartheid Week; the defunding of Arab/Palestinian ethnocultural 
organizations, as well as development organizations and research bodies deemed pro-
Palestinian; and the campaign to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from marching in 
Pride Toronto. Close attention is given to three interrelated silencing discourses that rely 
on historical forms of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism: the accusation of anti-Semitism, 
calls for balance and dialogue, and the distinction between extremists and moderates. 
1ll 
Acknowledgements 
"I don't decide to represent anything except myself. But that self is full of collective 
memory. 
- Mahmoud Darwish 
The silencing and censorship we faced as Palestinian and Palestine solidarity 
activists in Canada, a country that prides itself on its tolerance and multiculturalism, 
prompted me to pu~sue the questions in this dissertation. This work is an attempt to 
I 
record some of the 1 collective memory of a young movement: its key moments, its 
inspiration, the can)paigns to silence it, and the resistance to this silencing. This 
movement, however, would not exist in Canada if it were not for the courage of the 
I 
Palestinian people in its entirety-who have not surrendered their existence to the Israeli 
I 
state despite decades of military aggression. I can only hope this work sheds some light 
on the Palestinian struggle for freedom and justice. 
I would like to thank my dissertation supervisor, Ananya Mukherjee-Reed, for her 
support during my PhD studies and her wholehearted belief in this project, Professor 
David McNally for encouraging me to pursue a topic many would shy away from, and for 
taking the time to introduce me to the complicated debates within Canadian political 
economy, and fina11y Professor Karren Murray, for her invaluable help in strengthening 
the text and highlighting key ideas. A special thanks to Angela Pietrobon for her editorial 
assistance, professi:onalism, and immaculate attention to detail. 
On a personal note, my eternal gratitude is to my sisters, brother, aunts, uncle, and 
cousins who have cilways been my anchor, helping me keep perspective and remain 
IV 
l''' : 
grounded when the 1world of academia becomes disconnected from our history as 
I 
refugees in exile. Thanks especially to my parents for knowing how to enjoy life despite 
I 
its "50/50 chances." Above all, I would like to acknowledge the tremendous support that 
I 
my partner Adam ~anieh gave me during this process. It is to him that I dedicate this 
I 
dissertation, as without his love and calmness this work would not have seen the light of 
day. My dear friend Andrew Hugill was a pillar of support throughout this work and one 
of the most commit~ed activists I have had the pleasure of working with, and Issam Al-
Yamani supported me as a father would at all stages of my studies. Finally, I want to 
thank Alan Sears and Mary-Joe Nadeau for all the dissertation-writing survival tips, 
• I gmdance, and support. 
I 
I 
Inspiration for this project has come from many individual activists (too many to 
I 
name here) and gra~sroots collectives. I continue to learn from and be inspired by 
colleagues active aqross movements for social and economic justice and hope this 
dissertation can be a useful resource for them. 
v 
Table of Contents 
I 
Abstract ................. , ............................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv 
Table of Contents .. '. ............................................................................................................ vi 
List of Tables ........ : ............................................................................................................. x 
Chapter 1. Canada's Multicultural Policies and Practices: Erasure, Silencing, and the 
I 
I 
Palestine Solidarity; Movement ........................................................................................... 1 
I 
Research Focus: iWhy the Palestine Solidarity Movement ............................................. 4 
I 
I 
Tracing Canada's Official Multicultural Policy ............................................................. 9 
I 
Major Critiques qfMulticultural Policies and Practices ............................................... 23 
I 
Assuming the neutrality of the liberal state .............................................................. 24 
I 
The elision of the connection between the racial management of domestic groups 
and imperialis1!1 ......................................................................................................... 30 
I 
The obfuscatioh of race: Naturalizing whiteness and culturalizing race .................. 35 
Discourses of Erasure and Silencing ............................................................................ 41 
I 
Methodological Considerations .................................................................................... 45 
Chapter Outline .. : ........................................................................................................... 48 
Chapter 2. Canadia~ Imperialism and the "Special Relationship" with Israel: A 
Framework for Sile1:iJ.cing and Erasure .............................................................................. 53 
Canadian Capitalism and the Neoliberal World Market ............................................... 54 
Canadian Militari1sm ..................................................................................................... 59 




Canada and Imperialism in the Middle East.. ............................................................... 65 
Canada's Special Relationship with Israel. ................................................................... 69 
Empire, Racism,• and the War on Terror ....................................................................... 81 
Palestinian Racialization: Erasure and Silencing .......................................................... 85 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 88 
Chapter 3. Silencing Dissent on Campus: the Case oflsraeli Apartheid Week ............... 91 
Silencing Palestine on Campus ..................................................................................... 94 
Origins and Hist0ry of Israeli Apartheid Week .......................................................... 100 
Pro-Israel Lobby, Approaches to IA W ........................................................................ 108 
Israeli Apartheid'Week and University Administrations ............................................ 112 
State Officials and Discourses of Silencing ................................................................ 118 
I 
Accusations of anti-Semitism ................................................................................. 119 
"Singling out", Israel. .............................................................................................. 121 
Diversity, civility, and respectful dialogue ............................................................. 123 
Setting the limits on criticism oflsrael. .................................................................. 125 
Finding the balance between occupier and occupied .............................................. 126 
Safety, inclusivity, and comfort .............................................................................. 127 
Motions and Statements Condemning IAW ............................................................... 127 
Provincial motions to condemn IA W: Mixed results ............................................. 129 
Canada and Isrflel's "common values" paradigm: "democracy and women's rights." 
································································································································· 130 
The A-word and hate speech ................................................................................... 133 
Vll 
Other Provincial Legislatures Try to Follow Suit.. ..................................................... 135 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 136 
Chapter 4. Mechanisms of Disciplining Dissent: Funding Cuts and the Silencing 
Campaign ........................................................................................................................ 13 9 
Questioning the State Funding Paradigm ................................................................... 141 
Multicultural Policy and State Funding ...................................................................... 148 
Funding Cuts to Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House .............................. 155 
Funding Cuts to pevelopment NGO .......................................................................... 178 
Federally Funded "Arm's-Length" Institutions? ........................................................ 186 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 195 
Chapter 5. Queers Against Israeli Apartheid: Organizing Against the Silencing Campaign 
......................................................................................................................................... 199 
A Note on Pinkwashing, Silencing, and Erasure ........................................................ 203 
Canada's Official Multicultural Policies and Homonationalist Inclusiveness ........... 206 
Commodified Queer Identity ...................................................................................... 208 
Pride A-Political? ........................................................................................................ 211 
The Beginnings of a Silencing Campaign .................................................................. 215 
Keeping pride under control. ................. · ................................................................. 220 
Excluding you to be inclusive ................................................................................. 222 
Defunding pride: banning the term Israeli apartheid .............................................. 225 
Silencing Motions in City Council Begin ................................................................... 226 
Pressing Ahead with Motions to Defund Pride Toronto ............................................. 229 
Vlll 
Backlash Against Pride Toronto's Decision ............................................................... 230 
City Continues ~n Defunding Track ........................................................................... 233 
The City Manag~r Report: "Israeli Apartheid" does not Contravene 
Anti-Discrimination Policy ......................................................................................... 235 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 239 
Chapter 6. Challenging the Silencing Campaign: Counter-Narration and Anti-Racist 
Politics ............................................................................................................................. 241 
Outside the Multicultural: Limits to "Tolerance" ....................................................... 241 
Framing Canada,'s Official Multicultural Policy ........................................................ 246 
"Canadian Core Values" and Civilizational Camps ................................................... 247 
"Crisis of Multiculturalism" Debates ......................................................................... 250 
Canada, Israel, and a "Shared Liberal Values" Paradigm .......................................... 252 
A Focus on Silencing Palestine Solidarity Activism .................................................. 257 
Using Multicultural Language as a Silencing Tool .................................................... 259 
Legalizing Cens0rship: Inventing a New Anti-Semitism ........................................... 260 
Anti-Muslim and Anti-Arab Racism in the Silencing Campaign ............................... 270 
Balance, Dialogue, and the Constant Quest for Moderates ........................................ 272 
Anti-Racist Alliances vs. Settler Solidarities .............................................................. 275 
Shifting the Paradigm: Palestine Solidarity Anti-Colonial and Anti-Racist.. ............. 281 
References ....................................................................................................................... 285 
IX 
I',-- -,~.---
List of Tables 
Table 1. Multiculturalism Timeline ................................................................................ 144 
I 
Table 2. Shifts in t~e Stated Objectives of Multicultural Policy .................................... 146 
Table 3. Organizat~onal Loss of Funding ....................................................................... 15 8 
x 
Chapter 1. Canada's Multicultural Policies and Practices: Erasure, Silencing, and 
the Palestine Solidarity Movement 
"The ideologies that gain currency in society reflect and reproduce the interest of the 
dominant classes" (Loomba, 1998, p. 2). 
"The story of Canada's tolerant nationhood has often been framed in terms of its policy 
and mythology of 'multiculturalism ', a policy defined in official government ideology as 
'a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity'" (Mackey 2002, p. 2). 
This dissertation examines the Canadian state's attempt to silence and censor the 
Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) in the years following the Palestinian uprising of 
2000 (the second Intifada). The PSM is a global grassroots movement which advocates 
for Palestinian rights and has regionally specific demands and dynamics. It brings 
together a wide range of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian activists. 1 In Canada, as 
elaborated upon more fully below, this movement has largely cohered around the 
adoption of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, launched in 2005 
by 170 Palestinian ,civil society organizations active among Palestinian communities in 
the Palestinian Occupied Territories (OPT), as well as Palestinian refugee networks 
outside the OPT, and among Palestinian citizens of Israel. 2 
1. For a sociological analysis of the PSM, see the first chapter of David Landy, Jewish Identity 
and Palestinian Rights: Diaspora Jewish Opposition to Israel (2011, p. 20-39). 
2. In 1948, the ethniG cleansing of Palestine by the Zionist military forces turned ca. 750,000 
Palestinians into refiigees. The establishment of Israel divided Palestine along the armistice line. 
1 
My central argument is that Canada's official multicultural policy, established in 
the seventies of the twentieth century and persisting in modified forms into the twenty-
first, has played a key role in this silencing and censorship. This study therefore unsettles 
the common way of understanding official multicultural policy as being a neutral and 
progressive-some even say anti-racist-tool for managing "diversity." The silencing of 
the Palestine Solidarity Movement provides a clear illustration of the ways in which 
official multicultural discourses serve to maintain social relations of domination 
embedded in Anglo-normativity and structured around a "white multiculturalism" (Hage, 
2000).3 
More specifically, in the case of the PSM, official multicultural policy was at 
times used as a tool to exclude and silence voices that did not fit within the dominant 
narratives. These practices of exclusion and silencing are not only illiberal in the sense 
that they erode the liberal tenet of freedom of expression, but also inherently violent as 
Ca. 160,000 Palestinians left within the borders of the new state were granted citizenship and put 
under a military regime that lasted until 1966; thereafter, they have continued to suffer various 
forms of repression and discrimination. The remaining Palestinian territories, the West Bank and 
Gaza, were under respective Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty until 1967, when Israel occupied 
these areas, placing the population under a regime of military occupation that is still in force 
today. This is the historical origin of the division of Palestinians between refugees, those living 
under occupation, and those holding Israeli citizenship. For a general history, see Khalidi (1992), 
Masalha (2003), and Pappe (2006). The BDS call and the list of its signatories has been published 
on the website of the BDS National Committee that was formed to implement it (see 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/call). 
3. In the case of Australia, Hage (2000, p. 84) maintains that, despite policies of multiculturalism, 
social relations have "remained marked by intolerance, prejudice and racism." In Canada, a 
"white multiculturali~m" helps to obscure power relations. Henry and Tator sum up the current 
state of the Canadian body politic succinctly when they state: "Canada suffers from historical 
amnesia. Its citizens and institutions function in a state of collective denial. Canadians have 
obliterated from their collective memory the racist laws, policies, and practices that have shaped 
their major social, cu,ltural, political, and economic institutions for three hundred years" (2009, p. 
2). 
2 
they support and extend myriad forms of oppression and domination against the 
Palestinian people. I situate my analysis within the larger context of domestic and foreign 
policy orientations of the Canadian state marked by the so-called War on Terror. Within 
this context, Arabs and Muslims have been subjected to a heightened, racialized 
visibility. This racialized visibility and its effects are ignored within dominant liberal 
articulations of the problem of racism. Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism is at times 
acknowledged, but this tends to be limited to moments of overt discrimination, which are 
presented as aberrations. As Nadine Naber noted: 
within liberal discourses on tolerance and diversity, the privileging of individual 
hate crimes over the institutionalization of state violence facilitated official US 
narratives that sought to reduce the post 9/11 backlash against persons perceived 
to be Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslims, or South Asian to the acts of a "few bad 
apples" and to cover up the systematic institutionalized nature of the violence. 
(2008, p. 3) 
This dissertation aims to go beyond the moments of overt discrimination that 
mark the "excesses" of the War on Terror to more subtle moments of erasure, silencing, 
and censorship of the Palestinian narrative and to consider the broader ramifications of 
these processes. Sociologists Mary-Joe Nadeau and Alan Sears (2011) describe the goal 
of the silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement as the attempt, 
quite simply to shut down political activism and scholarly exchange that explores 
Palestinian experiences and/or criticizes the Israeli state. This silencing project 
echoes that of the Israeli state itself, which has systematically clamped down on 
3 
all aspects of Palestinian life while trying to eliminate signs and memories of 
Palestinian existence. (2001, p. 1) 
The silencing campaign targeting pro-Palestinian advocacy efforts provides, in short, an 
emblematic illustration of the ways common sense racism operates within a context of 
I 
official multicultur<;ll policy. Such silencing works to exclude and marginalize specific 
voices and cast them out of the multicultural altogether-delegitimizing them before they 
are even heard. I argue that these moments of silencing constitute an essential part of the 
structuring and perpetuating of a racialization that articulates the official multicultural 
policy's limits of tolerance for oppositional narratives. Such racialized silencing 
discourses act to set the parameters of tolerable diversity acceptable within the 
multicultural logic. 
With the aforementioned themes in mind, I seek to address several interrelated 
questions. First, what are the broad contours of Canada's official multicultural policy and 
why is it unable to accommodate Palestinian narratives relating to the struggle for 
Palestinian self-determination? Second, how does the Canadian state maintain/construct 
itself as accommodating and even accepting of cultural difference, while being fully 
enmeshed in the discourse of clash of civilizations and the War on Terror? And finally, 
what are the racialized discourses and mechanisms that are deployed by the Canadian 
state to silence dissent within the multicultural framework and what are the implications 
of these processes? 
Research Focus: \YhY the Palestine Solidarity .Movement 
During the years of the so-called Oslo peace process (beginning in 1993 ), the 
4 
greater part of solidarity organizing that emphasized the historical injustice against the 
Palestinian people fell dormant. The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, reconfigured the political struggle 
for Palestinian rights from a collective struggle for self-determination against a colonial 
settler state (Rodinson, 1973) to a struggle within a framework that equalized two sides in 
a "conflict zone." Demand for Palestinian self-determination morphed into a "state-
building" project on ever-shrinking slivers of land managed by a narrow coterie of 
Palestinian officials in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see Said, 2000, and Usher, 
1999). Palestinians were thus stripped of their collective voice while decisions were made 
at secret negotiating tables. But even with the Palestinian people agreeing to give up 78% 
of historic Palestine, Israel remained invested in holding ultimate power over the area. 
The years immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords were marked by 
heavy funding of projects promoting reconciliation, dialogue, and peace-building. This 
contributed to what some authors have termed the peace industry (Bishara, 2001, p. 142). 
These initiatives often emphasized the need for Palestinians and Israelis to "co-exist," 
while ignoring power relations and deemphasizing history. 
The failure of the negotiations at Camp David and the beginning of the second 
Palestinian Intifada in 2000 was a clear challenge to the formulations of the Oslo process. 
The violent military reinvasion of the West Bank reinserted "power" as a concept, 
emphasizing that Israel-even during the "Oslo years"-continued to hold power over 
Palestinian lives by retaining structural power in the region (Hanieh, 2003). Critically, 
Israel also retained ideological power within Western circles that quickly laid the blame 
5 
for the failed negotiations on the Palestinian side, claiming it was the Palestinian 
leadership that refused to accept a "generous" final offer.4 
The second 'Intifada, a mass uprising that began in the West Bank and Gaza, 
spread to Palestinian citizens of Israel and led to mass demonstrations across the Arab 
world. 5 Within two years of the second Palestinian Intifada, political economist Sara Roy 
argued: 
Palestinians1 unquestionably face the deterioration of their economy, a 
humanitarian crisis that is characterized in large part by levels of impoverishment 
and social d~cline that have no parallel during Israel's 36-year occupation of 
WB/G, and ~he destruction of ordinary life. Not since 1948, perhaps, have 
Palestinians1 faced such conditions of loss and dispossession. (2004, p. 366) 
She emphasized, however, that the "present state of Palestinian life - be it economic, 
social, or political - derives fundamentally from dynamics institutionalized during and by 
4. See, for example, rhe Missing Peace (2005) by Dennis Ross, the U.S. Middle East Envoy at 
the time of the negotiations. Historian Norman G. Finkelstein wrote a rebuttal to Ross's book 
arguing that "Israeli ~eeds, in Ross's calculus, systematically trump Palestinian rights" (2007). 
While dominant perceptions laying the blame on the Palestinian leadership remain largely 
unchallenged, glimpses of the actual story did appear in the media. In 2001, Deborah Sontag 
reported in the New York Times on the disconnect between the wide-ranging disagreements 
between the paiiies about the negotiations and the simplistic narrative that came from the very top 
of U.S. power: "at the end, Mr. Clinton praised Mr. Barak's courage and vision and said Mr. 
Arafat had not made an equivalent effort." A month later, an even more critical account of the 
negotiations came from two participants, who wrote that, "in accounts of what happened at the 
July 2000 Camp David summit ... we often hear about Ehud Barak' s unprecedented offer and 
Yasser Arafat's uncompromising no .... For a process of such complexity, the diagnosis is 
remarkably shallow. It ignores history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationships 
among the three parties. In so doing, it fails to capture why what so many viewed as a generous 
Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer" 
(Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, 2001). 
5. For an analysis of the situation within the Palestinian Occupied Territories post the second 
Intifada, see Saree M~kdisi, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, (2008). 
6 
the Oslo peace process" (2004, p. 366). 
The second Intifada breathed life into the solidarity movement internationally. As 
Israeli human rights abuses against the Palestinian people intensified, the solidarity 
movement began to orient itself towards mass education, teach-ins, and public meetings. 
Demonstrations were organized and, importantly, contingents focused on Palestine took 
place within the broader anti-war movement that emerged over the invasion of Iraq. 
The 2005 call from all sectors of Palestinian society for Boycotts, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS) provided a strategic impetus to the growth of the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement in Canapa. The BDS call made an explicit connection between South African 
Apartheid and Israel, emphasizing a direction for action similar to that taken by people 
around the world to end South African racism (Barghouti, 2011, p. 63-84). The Unified 
BDS Call gave the needed push for a reorientation of the Palestine Solidarity Movement, 
away from educational events that left attendants unclear about what to do next to a very 
specific call for action-and an analysis that included all demands that pertained to the 
entire Palestinian people, not just those living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The three 
demands of 1) ending the occupation, 2) equality for Palestinian citizens oflsrael, and 3) 
right of return, were a reclaiming of the Palestinian collective narrative, against erasure 
and segmentation (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). 
The main difference between the BDS movement and earlier forms of solidarity 
was that it directly questioned and challenged the corporate and state relations that 
sustain Israeli actions. It appealed directly to people to act in their own capacity, in their 
workplaces, universities, etc., to challenge specifically the role of corporations and the 
7 
state in sustaining Israel's policies against the Palestinian people. The BDS call did away 
with the Oslo paradigm of equalizing both sides and looked directly at the root causes of 
the conflict in the region-not seeing Palestinians and Israelis as two peoples that have 
some intractable disagreement, but rather viewing the conflict as a colonial conflict 
between a native population and settlers. 
Once the solidarity movement began to articulate demands around concepts of 
achieving justice for the Palestinian population, ending systemic discrimination, and 
challenging the conception of Israel as a democratic state, the silencing campaigns began 
to emerge. The new movement was not merely contesting Israeli state actions; it was 
tackling the underlying international diplomatic, economic, and corporate support that 
normalizes Israel's actions and positions it as a state above the law, while at the same 
time holding up standards of international law as a whip by which to discipline other 
regimes. 6 The BDS Call was not appealing to the benevolence of states that have acted to 
support Israel; rather, it put the onus on ordinary people to hold governments 
accountable. In a state like Canada, this entailed a serious challenge to the mainstream 
image of Canada as a peace-loving nation state that only intervenes to protect people in 
failed states. The concept of state neutrality is stripped away when various prime 
ministers (whether liberal or conservative) continue to insist that Israel's values are 
Canada's values. 
From 2005 to 2009, the BDS movement took hold on university campuses, within 
6. For specifics on tht:! various ways European states and corporations support Israel, see David 
Cronin, Europe's Alli~nce with Israel: Aiding the Occupation (2010). 
8 
some trade-unions, and among Arab community organizations in Canada. However, 
during this time, the movement began to face a severe curtailment of freedom of 
expression and the qbility to engage in normal political and cultural practice. Examples of 
this included cuts to funding to the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) and Palestine 
House, threats to Pride funding if Queers Against Israeli Apartheid were to march in the 
yearly parade, bans against Israeli Apartheid Week posters on university campuses, and 
condemnations by local government of the terminology of Israeli apartheid. 
In addition to these state-backed forms of repression, organizers within the PSM, 
among other obstacles put in their way, had to contend with cancellations of room 
bookings and impositions of security fees on events, as well as respond to condemnations 
I 
over the use of the term "Israeli apartheid." In short, "[t]hose who speak about Palestinian 
rights agree that they are excluded, silenced, censored, and/or erased from nearly every 
progressive political sphere by the systematic, institutionalized attempts to exclude and 
de-legitimize all critiques oflsrael" (Naber, Desouky, & Ba.roudi, 2001, p. 6). 
Tracing Canada's Official Multicultural Policy 
Canada's official multicultural narrative comprises a set of policies and discourses 
that espouse a shift away from exclusivist nationalism by recognizing Indigenous rights, 
substate groups, and ethnic communities. As the Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
website notes on its page titled "Canadian Multiculturalism: An Inclusive Citizenship," 
Canadian multiculturalism is based upon the affirmation of "the value and dignity of all 
Canadian citizens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their 
religious affiliation": (2013). As part of this process, Canada's 1971 Multiculturalism 
9 
Policy explicitly referred to the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the status of English and 
French as the two official languages. Successive governments have viewed 
multiculturalism thi;ough this positing of an alleged equality of all citizens, in which 
everyone "can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of 
belonging" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013). Through this narrative, the 
Canadian government claims that Canadians will gain "a feeling of security and self-
confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian 
experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and 
cross-cultural unde~standing" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013). 
An historical approach offers a lens for disrupting this dominant narrative. My 
particular historical approach draws upon critical political economy, which focuses on 
social relations of the production of power and politics. This perspective seeks to reveal 
the very real inequalities of power and wealth that necessarily underlie the formal 
equality claimed for all citizens within the liberal framework of the official multicultural 
narrative. As Ellen Meiksins Wood noted, liberal assertions of equality act to 
conceptualize away the problem of capitalism, by disaggregating society into 
fragments, with no overarching power structure, no totalizing unity, no systemic 
coercions-in other words, no capitalist system, with its expansionary drive and 
its capacity to penetrate every aspect of social life. (1995, p. 245) 
In contrast, a critical political economy perspective aims to explore the structural 
inequalities that characterize all capitalist societies-including class, race, gender, and 
the position of states within the capitalist world market-and the differential access to 
10 
political power that results from these hierarchies (Bannerji, 2000; Clarke, 1991; Harvey, 
1999). This study places emphasis on the analysis of multicultural policy, as other 
authors in the political economy tradition have done, on the historical dynamics of 
immigration, settlement policies, labour inclusion/exclusion policies, and class relations 
(which are both gendered and racialized), as well as on the role of the state (Bolaria & Li, 
1988; Castles & Kosack, 1973; Collins, 1991; Miles, 1982; Satzewich, 1990). Bringing 
history back into the conversation begins to disrupt the Canadian imaginary that official 
multicultural polic)' helped gamer. As anthropologist Evelyn Kallen (2003) noted, 
techniques of domip.ation and social control have existed since the origin of the idea of 
Canada. 
Since a political economy approach is concerned with the social relations of 
production, property, and power, the starting point for a discussion of official 
multicultural policy must be rooted in Canada's colonial history, and principally in the 
subjugation of Indigenous peoples from first contact onward. Aligning with the political 
economic lens, I am particularly interested in delineating the relationship between 
processes of class formation, racialization, and the subordination of Indigenous peoples. 
On the importance of rooting any analysis of Canada's history in its colonial past, noted 
Marxist historian Bryan Palmer argued that, 
whatever the points of difference separating out the experience of Indian removal 
or marginalization, 19th-century Canada is connected, across time and space, by 
the ultimate resolution of class formation's initial act of subordination: native 
people's displacement made proletarianization of other subordinate groups 
11 
possible. (1996, p. 22) 
The Canadian state's transition from an indigenous mode of production to a 
capitalist one ushered in the formation of a new class structure that was embedded in 
racial hierarchies. Similar to other settler colonies, Canada's political and economic 
development depended on replacing the indigenous population with a new population of 
workers needed to sustain the new society. Bonita Lawrence explains this process of 
settlement as one that included policies which caused "diseases and alcoholism" to be 
"deliberately introduced" in addition to the following outcomes: 
wholesale land appropriated, resource plundering practices, the deliberate use of 
starvation tactics, settler violence and organized military violence to subjugate 
communities and suppress resistance, centuries of widespread and concerted 
attacks on Indigenous spiritual and ceremonial life, anCI finally the theft of Native 
children, first into residential schools and then into the foster care system. (2004, 
p. 17) 
The development of a modem capitalist liberal democracy was dependent on the 
dispossession of Indigenous lands, commodification of the land, and the reliance on 
migrant labour for extraction of resources. This reliance on migrant labour was 
negotiated in a context of keeping Canada a white-settler colony connected to the British 
Empire (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The Canadian state has thus always had to grapple 
with the issue of articulating a Canadian identity while relying on immigration to sustain 
economic expansion. In an article comparing Australia and Canada, historians Franca 
Iacovetta, Michael Quinlan, and Ian Radforth argued that both countries "shared, too, a 
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history of paradox-. receiving societies with strong anti-immigration traditions, 
especially regarding non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants" (1996, p. 90). For these reasons, non-
Euro-Anglophone migrants in Canada have had to contend with a racial hierarchy since 
the inception of the Canadian nation state. Yet this racial hierarchy was not static; it 
developed and morphed over time. Thousands of Irish, for example, as opposed to 
English and French settlers, were sent to North America in the late eighteenth century as 
indentured servants and were not considered white; in fact, there was a long process of 
subjugation before ~hey were accepted into "whiteness" (Ignatiev, 1995). In his study on 
the origins of slave~y, Eric Williams argued that the forms of indentured labour the Irish 
endured "was the h~storic base upon which Negro slavery was constructed" (1964, p. 7). 
In The Invention ofthe White Race, Theodore Allen ( 1994) traced the transition that 
Williams alludes to; explaining the ways in which racial categories emerged in the 
Anglo-American colonies in relation to resistance by European indentured servants and 
Indigenous peoples. Divisions along racial lines were promoted and used by ruling 
classes in a manner that stratified the labour force and assured that no alliances emerged 
that could be disruptive of the status quo. Policies of racial ordering affected all groups 
coming into Canada. Some Blacks entering Canada, for example, were given access to 
land on the basis of a "license of occupation but not ownership" (Bolaria & Li, 1988, p. 
168). 
This process of imposed and managed racial hierarchies was refined over time 
and used against various groups. As Stasiulis and Jhappan argued, "Non-European 
would-be immigrants would be excluded unless their cheap labour was needed" (1995, p. 
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98). East Asian and South Asian immigrants, for example, began to arrive in Canada in 
larger numbers in the late 1800s, entering the economy mainly through low-paid, 
unskilled jobs. Many worked laying the tracks for the railroad in the West, while others 
found work in mining. The increase in immigrants led to the implementation of 
exclusionary immigration policies. For example, while Chinese immigrants were 
welcome to work on the building of the railway between 1881 and 1885, the Chinese 
Immigration Act es.tablished the "head tax" (a fixed fee charged to every Chinese person 
entering Canada), with the purpose of excluding Chinese workers from the labour market. 
South Asians faced similar restrictions, and were required to pay two hundred dollars in 
entry fees (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Jakubowski, 1997). The 1908 Continuous Passage Act 
required that immigrants make non-stop journeys from India to Canada, refusing East 
Indians right of entry if their ship either stopped at a port en route to Canada or if the 
tickets were not issued in India (Buchignani & Indra, 1985). Similarly, in an agreement 
with the Japanese government, the Canadian state agreed not to discriminate against 
Japanese immigrants already in Canada, in return for Japan's restriction of migration 
from its territories to Canada (Ujimoto, 1985, p. 352). 
Restrictions on entry were further institutionalized in the 1910 Immigration Act, 
which imposed severe restrictions on immigration based on standards of education and 
even matters like the ability to adapt to the Canadian climate. Immigration policies were 
based on a list of preferred nations and white settlement was, of course, encouraged 
(Bolaria & Li, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Under such restrictive immigration 
policies, Canada's ·doors were closed to European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution (Abella 
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& Troper, 1991). 
In short, Canada's immigration policies operated on a principle that meant, as 
Abu-Laban and Gabriel described, "historically, people were welcomed who best 
conformed to the 'ideal citizen' of a white settler society whose very identity was 
underwritten by a shared order of being. This commonality was premised on imperialist 
racial hierarchies, British values, and British institutions" (2002, p. 42). This White 
Canada policy continued, more or less intact, until the period following the end of the 
Second World War. 
White Anglo-Eurocentricity began to transform in the wake of the economic 
boom that followed the war. Seeking to widen its immigration base, the Canadian 
government began fo embrace greater ethnic diversity in immigration practices. 
Beginning in the 1950s, family and village-based migration from Italy and Greece was an 
important source of new immigrants. This was later extended to southern Europe, 
Turkey, and the Bal~ic countries. In the 1960s, immigrants began to come from the 
Caribbean, India, and Africa. However, even during the period of Canadian postwar 
welfare state expansion, an explicitly racist immigration policy was maintained (Bolaria 
& Li, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In urban areas such as Toronto, Vancouver, and 
Montreal, Asian immigrants began to arrive in increasingly large numbers from the late 
1970s onwards. 
Canada's multicultural policy developed in and through a specific set of social 
relations of power both domestically and internationally. Up until the 1950s, Canadian 
identity was structu~ed around a White Anglo/British normativity. This configuration, 
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however, was challenged and undermined during the 1960s in the wake of the massive 
wave of postwar European immigration, the growing militancy of Canada's indigenous 
population, the rise of Quebecois nationalism, decolonization in the third world, and the 
civil rights movement in the United States. These developments all worked to challenge 
hegemonic power relations. The following section traces the emergence and development 
of Canada's official multicultural policy, its closer realignment with neoliberal policies, 
and finally its reconfiguration into an integrative multiculturalism under the conservative 
government of Stephen Harper with an emphasis on shared Western values.7 
The emergence of an official multiculturalism policy dates back to 1963 when, in 
response to rising French-Canadian nationalism (Quebec's Quiet Revolution), Liberal 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism (Bannerji, 2002; Hawkins, 1989; Mackey, 2002; Palmer, 1975). The 
Commission's initial focus was on two languages and two cultures, but it nevertheless 
created an opening for migrants from non-French and non-English backgrounds to begin 
to contest the established racial hierarchies and argue for their own contributions to be 
recognized. These early struggles were known as the so-called "third force" (Breton, 
1986, p. 44). Ukrainian migrants especially took the lead in fighting for the recognition of 
I 
other groups within Canada. In response to this, the Commission released Book JV, The 
Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups in 1970. 
The election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968 set the stage for the adoption of an 
7. See Saad-Filho an~ Johnston, Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (2004 ), and Harvey, A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism (2005) for further discussion of neoliberal ideology. 
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official multicultural policy that gave recognition at the federal level to Canadians whose 
origins were not British, French, or indigenous. Thus, it served to shift Canadian identity 
and concepts of nationhood to include what were termed "minority cultures." Trudeau 
argued for and secured a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. He 
explained the policy of multiculturalism as involving four main aspects: 1. the allocation 
of state funding to ethnocultural groups for cultural maintenance; 2. the removal of 
cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society; 3. the promotion of cultural 
interchange; and finally, 4. the provision of official language training for migrants to 
Canada (Gabriel & Abu-Laban, 1999, p. 107). As Gabriel and Abu Laban pointed out, 
"multiculturalism joined other areas (and groups) which received funding from the 
Canadian state as part of the post-war, Keynesian-inspired idea of what it meant to be a 
citizen of Canada" (2002, p. 108). Funding was given through the Multiculturalism 
Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State. From its inception and until 
1981, this funding meant support for folklore activities and heritage languages (Abu-
Laban, 1999, p. 468-472). 
By the 1980s, multiculturalism' s focus on folklore and language, as promoted by 
Trudeau, came under pressure, particularly from migrant groups facing racism and 
institutionalized discrimination (Abu-Laban & Stasiulis, 1992). The number of migrants 
who were non-French and non-English had grown significantly because of the post-1967 
shift towards third world immigration. In response to this pressure, the Multiculturalism 
Directorate established a race relations unit in 1981 (Stasiulis, 1988, p. 90). In 1982, 
when the constituti0n was "patriated" from Britain, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
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officially recognized multiculturalism. A few years later in 1988, under the Progressive 
Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was 
passed. The Act set multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society 
and a policy of the C:::anadian state, making Canada the first country to adopt 
multiculturalism as state policy codified in law. The Act committed the state to 
"recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and 
racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of 
Canadian society to preserve, enhance, and share their cultural heritage" (Government of 
Canada, 1988). Going even further, in 1991 the Mulroney Conservatives advanced 
legislation that created a separate Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship within 
the federal bureaucracy (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). Whereas earlier multicultural 
programs emphasized cultural preservation through the promotion of arts festivals and 
foods, the 1991 legislation that created the new department emphasized integration into 
federal institutions, anti-discrimination, and affirmative action. This new focus was due 
to pressure from below, including anti-racist organizing. 
Interestingly, it was also in the 1980s, as ethnic communities demanded that 
multiculturalism deal with issues of racism, that the policy also began to be tied more 
closely to business interests: "starting with the Liberal minister James Fleming in 1981, 
the federal liberals began to try to make multiculturalism attractive to business 
associations and also to strengthen the entrepreneurial segments of ethnocultural 
minorities" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 110). This pattern "continued during the 
time of Prime Minster Mulroney (1884-1993) and was symbolized by the 
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'Multiculturalism Means Business' conference organized by the Progressive 
Conservatives in Toronto in 1986." (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 110). 
The institutionalization of multiculturalism did not fit neatly into the federal 
structure; responsibility for it therefore moved between ministries and its priorities were 
changed several times. For instance, the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship 
did not last long; in the fall of 1993, it was dismantled and the programs integrated into 
the new Department of Canadian Heritage. The Liberal government announced that 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada would be split along its two main components: 
the multiculturalism programs would be merged within the Department of Canadian 
Heritage, and citizenship programs would be amalgamated with the newly established 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 
Following much criticism of the multicultural programming in place, the 
Department of Can~dian Heritage launched a review of its activities in 1995. In 1997, a 
renewed program w.as announced with a focus on three objectives: social justice in 
building a fair and equitable society, civic participation, and identity. This shift meant 
that multiculturalism was no longer about promoting cultural heritage-rather, it was to 
"inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) and to create 
what is referred to as active citizens" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 114). 
In October of 2008, the responsibility for implementing the multiculturalism Act 
was fully transferred from the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada. Program grant priorities placed focus on "promoting integration, 
youth-at-risk" and irpportantly on "promoting inter-cultural understanding and Canadian 
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values (democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law) through community 
initiatives, with the objective of addressing issues of cultural social exclusion (parallel 
communities) and radicalization" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009). This shift 
consolidated another major change in the orientation of Canadian multicultural policy, 
linking it to the policy concerns that emerged in the context of the War on Terror. 
Official multicultural policy thus completed a trajectory that began in preserving 
minority cultures and ended-for the moment-in an emphasis on creating a new identity 
commensurate with "Canadian values" as defined by the state. Noting the importance of 
the War on Terror context, Arnn Kundnani argues that a similar process of fortifying a 
national identity through a discourse of shared core values took place in Britain as well: 
[the] new conventional wisdom is that a national story of Britishness must be 
promoted in order to bind the nation together around a set of core values, to which 
minorities must assimilate. This integrationism draws on a wider anti-Muslim 
political culture associated with the 'war on terror', in which the focus is on 'self-
segregation', alien values and forced assimilation, rather than on institutional 
racism. (2007a, p. 25) 
In Canada, changes to the federal government's citizenship guide, the citizenship test, 
and language requirements, as well as changes to the priorities of the Multiculturalism 
Program, emphasized integration and reorganized citizenship even further in the direction 
of requiring immigrants and people of colour to seek acceptance and adopt a set of core 
values. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper (first elected in 2006) 
has gone the furthest in redefining official multicultural policy itself as "integration" into 
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a core culture rather than as the preservation/recognition of various cultures. In a speech 
titled "Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate," Minister of Citizenship, Immigration 
and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney explained, 
our immigration program, our citizenship program, our multiculturalism program 
must increasingly focus on integration, on the successful and rapid integration of 
newcomers to Canadian society, and on a deepening understanding of the values, 
symbols and institutions that are rooted in our history, not just for newcomers but 
for all Canadians. (2009c) 
I 
Canada's official multicultural policy is consistent with the ideas of liberal 
multiculturalism put forward by Western theorists, and is intertwined with liberal 
conceptions of individual freedom and political equality, as well as with a specifically 
liberal view of the state and pluralism (Kymlicka, 1995; Raz, 1994; Spinner, 1994; 
Tamir, 1993; Taylor, 1994). Theorists have argued the case for multiculturalism on many 
different grounds, including "egalitarianism," "impartiality," and "rectifying historical 
injustices" (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 108-115; Nagel, 1991, esp. Chapter 14, p. 154-168; 
Tully, 1995, p. 3). 
In the Canadian context, Charles Taylor advanced a key defence of 
multiculturalism, arguing that "recognizing" and valuing subaltern groups is a necessary 
and critical element. ofliberal democracy. Recognition of a person's culture is an 
important constituent in valuing all people with equal respect. Taylor described this belief 
in "the equal status of cultures and of genders" as the "politics ofrecognition" (1994, p. 
27). He posited that:this type of world outlook is a relatively new phenomenon, and that it 
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needs to be distinguished from the earlier patterns of individual and group identity that 
characterized pre-modem societies. 
Older societies were stratified by hierarchies and held associated notions of 
honour that were based on exclusion rather than universalist or egalitarian beliefs. In 
contrast, the liberal, modem notion of dignity is something that applies to all people 
equally. From the end of the eighteenth century onward, this politics of equal recognition 
was reinforced with a sense of individual identity, through which "we become full human 
agents, capable of understanding ourselves" (Taylor, 1994, p. 33). Taylor argued that this 
identity is something that develops in a "dialogic" manner-i.e., in a continued 
interaction with the'"other." He wrote, 
[m]y discovering my own identity does not mean that I work it out in isolation, 
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt internal, with others. That is 
why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new 
importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical 
relations with others. (1994, p. 34). 
Will Kymlicka developed Taylor's ideas and connected them to liberalism in a 
systematic way. Kymlicka stressed that multiculturalism is not a question of symbolic 
recognition only, but that at its most basic the "multicultural state is to be seen as 
belonging equally to all citizens" (2007, p. 65). Proponents of liberal multiculturalism 
such as Kymlicka view it in opposition to and as a rejection of "earlier models of the 
unitary, homogenous nation-state" (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 61). In other words, 
multiculturalism is where the state is "no longer the possession of a dominant national 
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group" pursuing policies "to centralize all political and legal power in forums dominated 
by the majority group" (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 63). Likewise, theorists of liberal 
multiculturalism do not posit any dichotomy between building a national identity and 
accepting multiculturalism as policy. Thus, Kymlicka asserted that 
[i]n reality ... the sort of multiculturalism that has emerged within the west has 
transformed nation-building, not replaced it. ... Where multicultural polices have 
been adopted they operate to supplement and transform these nation-building 
policies so that the latter are less likely to marginalize or stigmatize minorities. 
(2007' p. 84) 
Kymlicka further stipulated that, regardless of the original intention state officials had in 
recognizing symbolic minority rights, "non-dominant groups used multicultural reforms 
as a springboard for negotiating significantly enhanced access to public resources, powers 
and officers" (2007, p. 83). 
The theoretical underpinnings of official multicultural policy have been critiqued 
from various perspectives, three of which I discuss in this section: 1. liberal 
multiculturalism's conceptualization of the state as neutral relative to racial divisions and 
other power relations in society; 2. its elision of the connection between racial policies of 
managing domestic groups and imperialism; and 3. its obfuscation of whiteness and 
culturalization of race. Throughout this dissertation, each of these points is interwoven 
within the analysis of the specific ways racialized discourses and disciplining measures 
have been used to silence and censor speech critical oflsrael. 
Major Critiques of Multicultural Policies and Practices 
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Assuming the neutrality of the liberal state. 
The first major critique of the theoretical underpinnings of multicultural policy 
challenges its understanding of the role of the state as a neutral arbiter that guarantees a 
pluralist society. Pluralist approaches to multicultural policy emphasize the state as a 
neutral arbiter of competing interest groups lobbying for power. This view postulates that 
the political system is characterized by openness and that power is widely dispersed 
among interest gr01.~ps, rather than being controlled by just one group (see for example, 
Pluralist Democracy in the United States by Dahl, 1967). Liberal multicultural theory 
expands pluralism tp include recognition of cultural communities, articulating a cultural 
pluralism based on the basic premises of liberal plural democratic theory. According to 
this theory, a liberai'-multicultural state "accepts that individuals should be able to access 
state institutions, and to act as full and equal citizens in political life, without having to 
hide or deny their ethnocultural identity" (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 64). Moreover, supporters 
of official multicultural policy assert that it presents a "dramatic transformation in the 
relationship between states and ethnic groups," a transformation that involves a 
"significant redistribution of economic resources and political power - something close 
to a genuine sharing of power - as well as giving non-dominant groups enhanced access 
to state institutions" (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 81 ). 
Many scholars have however noted that, within a society stratified by different 
relations of power, the state cannot be seen as simply the neutral arbiter between various 
communities acting as equal groupings vying for recognition. The state is instead 
embedded in capitalist social relations and international financial hierarchies. Far from 
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being a neutral entity that migrants can relate to, participate in, and contest, the capitalist 
state plays a specific role in constructing racialized identities and 
marginalizing/exclu,ding narratives that are outside its interests. Critical accounts thus see 
pluralist notions as obfuscating the reality of how capitalist states function as well as the 
social relations within society. Arguments that liberal multiculturalism leads to a more 
dispersed distribution of power in society and to cultural groups gaining greater access to 
state institutions, and therefore greater equality, can be refuted by looking at the 
structures of Canadian political economy. These display a telling story of the 
concentration of we~lth and decision making in the hands of the few. As Political 
Scientist Jerome Klassen argued, "at an institutional level, the Canadian capitalist class 
thus forms an East-West network of corporate power, which is formed around an 
industrial financial axis" (2009, 183). Therefore, this class holds disproportionate power 
in Canadian politics. An article by scholars from the department of economics at the 
University of British Columbia, titled "Canadian Inequality: Recent Developments and 
Policy Options," concluded that "in 1980 the top 20 percent of income earners received 
45 percent of total income earnings, while by 2007 they received 52 percent" (Fotin, 
Green, Lemieux, Milligan, & Riddell, 2012, p. 123). Looking at individual income, the 
article noted that: 
in the late 1970s, about 8 percent of total income in Canada was concentrated in 
the hands of only 1 percent of the population. Things have changed dramatically 
since then. The top income share almost doubled to reach 14 percent in recent 
years. Such an uneven distribution of income has not been seen since the dark 
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days of the Great Depression. (p. 127) 
In Canada's Economic Apartheid, Grace-Edward Galibuzi (2001) described the 
growing racialization of the gap between the rich and poor. Using statistical data, he 
pointed to the persistent overrepresentation of racialized groups in low-paying 
occupations and low-income sectors, their higher unemployment, and their poverty and 
social marginalization. In the report that preceded the book, Galibuzi noted: "While 
Canada embraces globalisation and romanticizes cultural diversity, there are persistent 
expressions of xenophobia and racial marginalisation that suggest a continuing political 
and cultural attachment to the concept of a white settler society (2001, p. 3 ). 
In a report titled Canada's Colour Coded Labour Market, drafted by Galbuzi and Block, 
the findings show a continuation of these patterns of exclusion: 
even in the best of economic times, the pay gap between racialized and non-
racialized Canadians is large: Racialized Canadians earn only 81.4 cents for every 
dollar paid to non-racialized Canadians. Poverty rates for racialized families are 
three times higher than non-racialized families. In 2005, 19.8% ofracialized 
families lived in poverty, compared to 6.4% of non-racialized families. (2011, p. 
3-4) 
The report also noted that racialized workers find themselves in the lowest paying, 
unsecure jobs. As Lance Roberts and Rodney Clifton observed, official multicultural 
policy advances a "symbolic ethnicity" that you can opt in or out of, but that does not, 
however, constitute different, equal cultures living side by side (1982, p. 91 ). 
The above iµdicates that cultural pluralism makes assertions about equality 
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without a serious interrogation of the persistent racialization of poverty. Howard Brotz 
explained that no matter how much multicultural Canada claims to be equal, the society 
still stands for a bourgeois way oflife (1980, p. 42). Thus, cultural pluralism enables 
capitalist states to perpetuate inequalities while simultaneously inculcating an acceptance 
of these inequalities as "natural" under a guise of state neutrality and equality of interest 
groups. Wood has particularly emphasized this characteristic of capitalism, arguing that 
the division of the political and economic allows the state to promote political "equality" 
while eschewing an analysis of economic, racial, and gender inequalities (1995). 
Canada's multicultural policy plays a similar role-advancing the "equality of cultures" 
while simultaneously denying political and economic status to the marginalized (Peter, 
1981, p. 65). 
Official multicultural policy and discourse is thus a powerful mechanism in 
maintaining the status quo, particularly in the face of challenges from mass oppositional 
movements. Bannerji makes this point forcefully, arguing that there is an 
"insider/outsider relation" to power within multiculturalism: those in the core of power 
get to both define and manage the surrounding outsider cultures and their relations with 
the mainstream, while all the time appearing as equals (2000). Another critical aspect is 
the role of multiculturalism in developing the state's capacity for engineering society. 
According to Day, multiculturalism is a "bureaucratic project"-organized and carried 
out by the state-that acts to recognize and discipline officially constructed identity 
categories in order to manage the problematic Other (2000). Moreover, using liberal 
discourses of equality and tolerance enables the state to exclude and racially order 
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members of society (Dei, 2008; Goldberg, 1993; Mackey, 2002). 
This dissertation challenges the pluralist view by focusing on integrating the 
insights of critical race theory with anti-racist Marxist theories of the state, arguing that 
each set of literatures can complement one another and help to reveal the linkages 
between state formation, class formation, and racialization. One starting point for this 
approach is the critical race theorist Theo Goldberg's conception of "racial states." 
Goldberg noted that "the theoretical literature on race and racism, given the culturalist 
tum of the past two decades, until very recently has largely avoided in an comprehensive 
fashion the implication of the state in racial formation and racist exclusion" (2002, p. 2). 
In addressing this occlusion, Goldberg suggested that all modern nation states are racial 
states. State power, manifested in various ways, allows modem states to exclude and 
include in racially-ordered terms. 
In his book, Racist Culture, Goldberg argued that "race is one of the central 
conceptual inventions of modernity" and that "we have come, if often only silently, to 
conceive of social subjects foremost in racial terms" (1993, p. 3). Western philosophy, in 
Goldberg's account, is complicit in this, with both empiricism and rationalism facilitating 
racism from the seventeenth century onward. Goldberg further stresses the specific ways 
that liberalism perpetuated these notions by promising liberty and equality while at the 
same time rationalizing racial inequality. In his work on the racial state, he takes this 
theme further and focuses on the role of the state in creating racial categories. The 
modem state, according to Goldberg, is a homogenizing state that excludes to construct 
homogeneity, while·at the same time appropriating difference through the discourse of 
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liberal multiculturalism (2002). 
In addition to Goldberg's insightful analysis of the racial state, anti-racist Marxist 
theories of the state help to explain the connections between capitalism, class formation, 
and racialization. Unfortunately, there is a serious weakness in classical Marxist theories 
of the relationship between the state, racism, and racialization. The state theory debate 
produced a range of competing theories including instrumentalism (Miliband), 
structuralism (Poulantzas ), derivationism (Altvater), systems analysis (Offe ), and 
organizational realism (Skocpol), all of which treated race as external to class formation 
and the functioning of the state. In general, these theories ignored the ways in which state 
formation and state ,rule take place alongside processes of racialization (Gordon, 2007). 
In doing so, race is kept out of the description of ruling class strategies and treated as an 
external or separate sphere of social relations. 
More recently, however, there have been other powerful contributions to the 
theorization of the state and racialization by anti-racist Marxist theorists who look at class 
as a social relation (see Bannerji, 2000; Kelley, 1994, 1997; McNally, 2002; Roediger, 
1994). These authors helped pave the way for an understanding of racial states that is 
rooted in class formation and political economy rather than in notions of modernity. The 
state, according to these theorists, cannot be abstracted from its role in constituting 
racialized/classed and gendered identities, managing them, and structuring the ideologies 
that preserve them. Thus, racism in the context of official liberal multiculturalism should 
not be thought of in abstraction from broader power relations in society, and without 
considering the role of the state. This goes against the typical way in which racism is 
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thought of in the discourses of official multiculturalism, where it is turned into an 
individualized problem or tension between communities that needs to be resolved 
through "recognition" and "tolerance." As Thobani noted, "most public discussions of 
racism focus only on its individualized and interpersonal aspects and do not include the 
concept of power, institutional and state practices, and the centrality of these practices to 
national formation" (2007, p. 160). Both Himani Bannerji (2000) and Richard Day 
(2000) focus on how the state produces racial and cultural difference, and how present-
day multicultural policy is linked to the history of colonialism and the management of 
populations in Canada. 
This study focuses on the level of the state and its disciplining actions and 
discourses towards the Palestine Solidarity Movement, highlighting the state's role as an 
active agent in racialization and silencing. It aims to reinsert the concept of power into 
the discussion of racism, imperialism, and the state, stressing that anti-Arab, anti-Muslim 
racism is not simply an individual problem, but a form of systemic racism that takes place 
at the level of the state and society. As Harvey noted: "One of the principal tasks of the 
capitalist state is to locate power in the spaces which the bourgeoisie controls, and 
disempower those spaces which the oppositional movements have the greatest potential 
to command" (1989, p. 237). The Canadian state's role in disempowering the spaces 
where the Palestine Solidarity Movement has, as Harvey described, the "greatest 
potential to command" will be analyzed throughout this work. 
The elision of the connection between the racial management of domestic 
groups and impedalism. 
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A second critique of official multiculturalism extends the critique of state 
neutrality. In this view, it is not only necessary to understand Canada's domestic relations 
of power as undermining any claim to the neutrality of the Canadian state, but also to link 
the role of the state in maintaining internal relations of domination to Canada's foreign 
policy and the state's location within the world market. Since Canada is an imperialist 
state, its domestic policies need to be seen in relation to, and as extending into, the 
international sphere. The interaction between internal social divisions and international 
relations bears directly on how we understand multiculturalism. As Moallem and Boal 
argued, multiculturalism "consistently evades engagement with three pressing issues: the 
enduring heritage of Eurocentrism, the question of justice, and the connections between 
national and global domains." Multiculturalism, they pointed out, "contrives to efface all 
historicity in its consumption of the present" (1999, p. 244). 
When the idea of multiculturalism is discussed within Canadian official discourse, 
it is divorced from the ways in which the Canadian state acts in the rest of the world, 
creating an artificial internal/external sphere. In this way, the state presents itself as 
tolerant of domestic "outsiders" while at the same time acting in the international sphere 
to support and reinforce relations of domination that contribute to the dispossession, 
displacement, and subjugation of these communities in their countries of origin. 
The discourse of inclusivity is rooted in and partly came as a response to the 
changing role of newly decolonized states and the struggles of peoples around the world 
to gain self-determination. As Hawkins explained, multiculturalism-as a reversal of the 
"white Canada poltcy"-was not a result of 
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parliamentary or popular demand, but was instead motivated by a growing 
recognition among bureaucrats that Canada could not operate effectively within 
the United Nation, or in a multiracial commonwealth, with the millstone of a 
racially discriminatory policy around her [sic] neck. (1989, p. 258) 
The internal/external connection in policies is thus evident from the beginning of the 
notion of multiculturalism; it was both a solution to an internal problem of labour, and 
also a response to the external pressure of decolonization. 
Since the 1970s, a rich theoretical debate about Canada's political economy has 
developed around tracing the evolution of Canada's imperialist position and its 
relationship with the United States (see Carroll, 1985-; Laxer, 1973; Levitt, 1970; 
McNally, 1981; Panitch, 1981; Teeple, 1972). As Canadian imperialism developed in the 
postwar period, Can'ada took an increasingly interventionist role militarily around the 
world at the same time that its role in international financial markets grew in prominence. 
The Canadian state today plays a major role on all fronts of the "new imperialism" 
(Harvey, 2003). Its role in Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia reveals the militarization 
of Canadian foreign policy and a close alignment with the United States under the guise 
of the War on Terror. However, as recent literature indicates, while Canada is highly 
integrated economically with the United States, it is not a dependent of the U.S. (Klassen, 
2009); rather, there is in Canada an independent corporate elite with effective control 
over the national economy (Carroll, 2004; Carroll & Klassen, 2010). Given Canada's 
prominent role in financial hierarchies, Canada is best viewed as a secondary imperialist 
power (Gordon, 2019). For the purposes of this work, a critical point of departure is the 
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interconnection between Canada's role in the world market and the racialization and 
discipline of migrant communities within the borders of the nation state. 
The progressive veneer of official multicultural policy allows the state to portray 
itself to both domestic and international audiences as a tolerant society, while at the same 
time continuing and advancing imperialist policies internationally. More specifically, 
Canada's imperial policies in the Middle East can be traced to the continued interest of 
Western powers in the control and financialization of the resources of the Arab World. 8 
This interest manifests itself in direct military interventions (in the case of Iraq), in a 
sustained effort to shape the internal ruling classes of states in the region in support of 
Israel. This int"erest in the Middle East, as with other imperialist projects, has reused and 
updated racial constructions of Arabs and Muslims as uncivilized, backward, violent, and 
lacking in democratic virtues.9 This racial gaze is not confined to the "outsider/other"; it 
8. The exact theorization of the role of the Middle East in global imperialism, including the very 
application of the term imperialism, has long been a topic of debate and discussion, even as the 
actual significance of the Middle East to imperial foreign policy has always been unquestionably 
clear. Ellen Meiksins Wood read the so-called "Bush Doctrine" as a straight enunciation of the 
principle that control of oil is primarily about dominating allies and competitors (2003, p. 159). 
Both these interests had already been cited as paramount earlier, for example, by Noam Chomsky 
in his The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (1999; seep. 17). 
Simon Bromley's work outlines the relationship between oil and U.S. hegemony in the post 
second world war period: American Hegemony and World Oil (1991); "The United States and the 
Control of World Oil" (2005, p. 225-255); American Power and the Prospects for International 
Order (2008). Also see Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (2011, 
Chapter 2). 
9. The history of the racialization of Arabs, of course, far precedes the War on Terror. It emerged 
in the nineteenth century with the rise of colonial interest in the region as the "Road to India" and 
the underbelly of the Ottoman Empire (see Edward Said's Orienta/ism, 1979), with all the themes 
of wilderness, irrationality, violence, polygamy, and exoticism already present (see, for example, 
Montesquieu's Persian Letters). This oriental racial imagery has been ubiquitous in popular 
culture throughout the twentieth century as well, as demonstrated by the study of almost a century 
of Arab stereotypes in Hollywood films (see Jack Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood 
Vilifies a People, 2009). 
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continues organically within the boundaries of the liberal state. Citizens who are Arab or 
Muslim do not escape the racial formation simply by virtue of citizenship. The "other" is 
then constructed as the Arab outsider, not allowing "Canadians" to enjoy their diversity, 
"politicizing Canadian universities," and "bringing their troubles to Canada from back 
home." Sherene Razack made a powerful contribution to this debate, studying the 
categories of "Muslim" and "Arab" as racially marked outside of whiteness and showing 
how racialization is 1 used to exclude the internal outsider from legal rights and civil 
liberties (2002; 200,8). As Jasmine Zine wrote, "increasingly positioned as anti-liberal, 
anti-democratic anq unnameable to the requirements of modernity, Muslims represent the 
'anti-citizen'" (2009, p. 148). This importantly calls for an expansion of how we study 
imperialism. Too often, imperialism is referred to as simply "wars and occupation"; 
however, imperial ambitions are dialectically linked to internal racial projects. They are 
reflected back to the core through repression of civil liberties, through silencing dissent 
against the imperial, project, and through the construction of various "emergencies" that 
legitimize foreign policies and increases in state power. The rushing through of anti-
terror legislation, mainly aimed at Arabs and Muslims, and the curtailment of civil 
liberties post the World Trade Center bombing in 2001, illustrated the connections 
between internal "tolerance" and external imperial ambitions. Discourses that justify 
imperialist intervention also justify internal disciplining of migrant communities and anti-
. . 10 
racist, anti-war movements. 
10. For the impact of the War on Ten-or on immigration and civil rights in the U.S., see Tanya 
Golash-Boza, Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and Deportations in Post-9111 America 
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In short, the relationship between Canada and the Middle East and North Africa 
puts citizens of Arab and/or Muslim origin right at the intersection of imperialist foreign 
policies. Imperialist intervention (both military and economic) is intimately connected to 
disciplined migrant communities unwilling to challenge the state's foreign policies. This 
is the context in which a critique of multiculturalism must be advanced-it is not simply 
a question of how Canada treats its "minorities" domestically-but, perhaps even more 
I 
centrally, it is inextr1icably linked to the ways in which Canada acts within the world. 
The obfuscation of race: Naturalizing whiteness and culturalizing race. 
A third, highly important critique of multiculturalism involves the various ways it 
works to obfuscate both institutionalized and common sense racism, rather than 
alleviating them. It does this in two ways: 1. by sustaining the dominant racial hierarchies 
through a process of naturalizing "whiteness" as tolerant; 2. by culturalizing race under 
ossified labels that make anti-racist solidarities difficult to construct. 
This dissertation considers race, following the work of Omi and Winant, as a fluid 
social construct that underpins a hierarchy of power "organized and enforced by the 
continuity and reciprocity between [the] micro-level and macro-level of social relations" 
(1986, p. 67). "Micro-level" social relations refers to "the ways in which we understand 
ourselves and interact with others, [and to] the structuring of our practical activity in 
work and family, as citizens and as thinkers" while the macro-level refers to social 
structures and common ideologies, including media, public institutions, and the state 
(Omi & Winant, 1986, p. 66-67). Importantly, this study takes seriously Omi and 
(2012). 
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Winant' s point that "race is an unstable and 'de-centred' complex of social meanings 
constantly being transformed by political struggle" (1986, p. 68). 
If race is unstable and transformable, then it is critical to understand the role of 
official multicultural policy, practices, and discourse in the history of the racial projects 
in Canada. Racial projects are not only about the construction of "otherness"; they are 
also very much about solidifying whiteness. Official multiculturalism helps to 
accomplish this by articulating whiteness as tolerant in a way that makes speaking of 
I 
institutionalized raoism at the state level difficult. As Day has illustrated, in the most 
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celebrated works 011 Canadian multiculturalism, both Kymlicka and Taylor adhere to a 
normative "we" that does the tolerating and accepting (2000, p. 219-220). Kymlicka, 
Day argued, reproduced the notion of a "silent, Invisible Self group that chooses to give, 
or not to give, gifts of recognition and self-government to noisy, Visible Others" (2000, 
p. 216). Taylor produced implicitly a distinction between "we" and "they," while at the 
same time reducing "demands for justice, autonomy, and the reform of existing social 
structures to a call for recognition" (Day, 2000, p. 221 ). Official multicultural policy thus 
acts to sustain a common sense racism through which "everybody learns some 
combination, some ~ersion, of the rules of racial classification, and of their own racial 
identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcations" (Omi & Winant, 
1986, p. 60). It also sets the limits for what anti-racists can demand: recognition and 
tolerance, but not necessarily justice. 
Artist and author Coco Fusco wrote that "racial identities are not only black, 
Latino, Asian, and Native American and so on; they are also white. To ignore white 
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ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalizing it" (cited in Hooks, 1989, p. 39). 
White hegemony is constructed in relation to the Other. Official multicultural policy has 
a key role to play here because it solidifies whiteness as tolerant, while explaining other 
societies as intolerant. As Thobani noted: 
multiculturalism was to prove critical to the rescuing of Euro/white cultural 
supremacy: white subjects were constituted as tolerant and respectful of 
difference and diversity, while non-white people were instead constructed as 
perpetually and irremediably monocultural, in need of being taught the virtues of 
tolerance and cosmopolitanism under white supervision. (2007, p. 148) 
She continued on to state that, "[a]s in Australia and Britain, the embrace of 
multiculturalism allowed Canadians to resolve the crisis of whiteness through its 
reorganization as tolerant, pluralist, and racially innocent, uncontaminated by its previous 
racist history" (2007, p. 154). Throughout the cases of silencing and censorship analyzed 
in this dissertation, tolerance is seen to be used as a virtue and held up as an ideal of 
multicultural societies, even as it is being utilized to repress a specific politics of 
solidarity. Beverly Skeggs pointed out that the upper and middle classes have been able 
to utilize their support for a multicultural politics as cultural capital in the age of 
globalization (2004, p. 90-95). This added cultural capital solidifies a unique nationalism 
that can use formulations like tolerance for its own benefit. Ghassan Hage, in discussing 
Australian multiculturalism, argued that those Australian nationals who conceived of 
themselves as tolerant and cosmopolitan were able to gain ground over nationals who 
were overtly racist (1998). 
37 
Along with solidifying whiteness by claiming its tolerance, official multicultural 
policy helps to obfuscate racism by inserting culture as the organizing unit of migrants 
along ethnic/culturalist lines. Himani Bannerji explained that multiculturalism constitutes 
differences in cultural terms and seeks to govern through policy. Multiculturalism thus 
sought to constitute people of colour as politically identifiable by their cultural 
backgrounds (as summarized in Thobani, 2007, p. 145). Bannerji contended that such 
"invented ethnicities" mirror "those employed by racist/colonial discourses of modem 
Western nations" (2002, p. 3). It is useful here to note the work done by Sherene Razack 
in pointing to the culturalization of race. Modem racism, she explained, is: 
distinguished from its nineteenth-century counterpart by the vigour with which is 
it consistently denied. In its modem form, overt racism, which rests on the notions 
of biologically based inferiority, coexists with a more covert practice of 
domination encoded in the assumption of cultural or acquired interiority. This 
"culturalization of racism", whereby black inferiority is attributed to "cultural 
deficiency, social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment", thrives in a 
social climate that is officially pluralist. (1998, p. 60) 
Culture, taken as a static concept, is ossified and made to be both the identifier of 
communities and the way by which the state organizes services to them. Newcomers seek 
out their community organizations to receive services, and veteran migrants have to 
identify with their community along traditionalist ethnic lines-rather than identifying 
with other migrants of the same class or race, for example. The establishment of "cultural 
communities" as the identity by which people view themselves has drastic implications 
38 
on how anti-racist organizing can take shape in society and on what forms of 
solidarities/alliances can be built. 
Culturalizing migrants also allows for a specific class within these migrant 
communities to become the spokespeople and managers of communications with the 
state. They gain privilege from becoming the go-betweens, are then invested in 
maintaining migrant community acquiescence, and thus acquire an investment in 
reproducing multicultural policies and selling them to their respective constituencies. Das 
Gupta has argued that multicultural policy empowered "middle-class people of colour to 
appropriate anti-racist activism from their working-class counterparts, smoothing out its 
critical edge in the process" (1999, p. 187). Defining individuals by a pre-conceived and 
static notion of culture works to obscure class difference and cross-community racial 
alliances along non-communal lines. As Karl Peter stressed, multiculturalism has worked 
to deny both political and economic status (1981, p. 65). Thobani took this argument 
further, arguing that "[m]ulticulturalism co-opted and derailed the explicitly anti-racist 
activism of people 6f colour, splitting their cross-racial alliances as it worked to contain 
the demands for racial equality that sought to ransom the very basis of economic, social, 
and political power" (2007, p. 160). This derailment of genuine anti-racist activism was 
largely organized through the state arranging its relations with migrant communities 
through communal leaderships, thus retaining the power to discipline recalcitrant 
"community leaders" through the vehicle of funding. 
The ghettoization and segregation of migrants into cultural communities 
minimizes the ability of migrants themselves to point out how racialization works 
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because they are constantly retold the story of Canadian tolerance. Bruno Ramirez and 
Sylvie Taschereau suggested that multicultural policy serves the function of defining 
class issues in ethnic terms (1988, p. 400). For example, employment problems are 
outsourced from the state to community organizations. This in tum increases the 
dependence on those communal structures and assures that migrants identify along 
ethnic/communal lines (rather than building coalitions of the unemployed across migrant 
communities, for example). Any problems that racialized migrants may be having in 
finding jobs, for example, are explained away as personal incompetence or migrant 
community weakness in providing opportunities of employment, rather than being 
addressed as class issues to do with the structure of the Canadian economy and the 
significant obstacles new migrants face entering the job market. 
Taking its cues from this analysis of the role of official multiculturalism in 
producing Anglo-normativity and culturalizing race, this work looks specifically at the 
manifestations of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism in Canada and the way the silencing 
campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement demonstrates the role official 
multicultural policy played in obfuscating this racism. At times, it is multicultural 
rhetoric itself that is used to enact the erasure and silencing of the Palestinian narrative; 
under the guise of "respecting diversity," the Palestinian narrative is cast out as making 
some feel "uncomfortable." "Tolerance" is circumscribed to those "cultural" practices 
that do not disrupt the status quo, whereas political speech that challenges the dominant 
perspective (as does the apartheid analysis oflsrael, for example) is questioned, 
disciplined, and censored; at the same time, the virtues of multicultural pluralism and 
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respect for freedom of expression are celebrated. The Palestine Solidarity Movement 
(PSM) and the silencing campaign waged against it provides an excellent case study 
through which to test the claims of multicultural policy and the critiques outlined above. 
Moments of erasure and silencing are analyzed as racializing moments, whereby the 
Canadian state reveals its class and racial character within both the domestic and 
international spheres. 
Discourses of Erasure and Silencing 
Processes of racialization, because they are often organized around the erasure, 
silencing, and demonization of specific narratives, require an analytical centering of 
silencing moments as a critical part of determining how racism is reproduced in the 
context of official multicultural policy. 
There are four clear discourses that are highlighted through this dissertation as 
being central to the way in which the Canadian state operates in relation to the PSM. 
Each of these discourses acts to exclude and silence the Palestinian voice. An analysis of 
these discourses shows how multicultural discourse may itself be utilized to enable 
silencing and erasure, acting to discipline certain voices and uphold power relations. 
The first of these discourses is the attempt to cast pro-Palestine advocacy as racist 
by claiming it is antisemitic. This strategy is part of a long process of instrumentalization 
of the concept. After a century of devastating virulence, antisemitism, because of the 
shock of the Nazi genocide and the association with the defeated political enemies of 
Western liberal democracies, had been the earliest racist discourse to be vehemently 
repudiated by Western elites. This process took place simultaneously with the emergence 
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of the so-called "special alliance" between the U.S. and Israel (for the emergence of the 
alliance, see Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade o,f Transition, 1998). According to Norman 
Finkelstein, it is in this context that the thesis of the "new antisemitism" appeared in the 
seventies, at once arguing that U.S. society was rife with antisemitism and attacking 
leftists, critics of U.S. imperialism, anti-racists (particularly African-American activists), 
and, most importantly, critics oflsrael, as the promoters of a new kind of hatred of Jews 
(2008, p. 21-31 ). Furthermore, spurious and overblown accusations of antisemitism have 
been used by many states, including the U.S., to justify ignoring or undermining 
institutions and fora that threaten imperialist domination, or that demand domestic 
reparation against racism. 11 The boycotting of the Durban process provides a prime 
example of that strategy. As Richard Kuper argued, this deployment of the "new anti-
Semitism [represents] an attempt to reframe the debate, not so much to exclude certain 
voices as to render them suspect before they even speak" (2008, p. 106). The ability to 
label Palestinian solidarity activism as racist ensures the silencing and exclusion of 
Palestinian narratives. In other words, at its core, the state retains the power to shape what 
is and what is not deemed racism. 
The second discourse uses essentializing and racialized constructions to present 
Arabs and Muslims as anti-democratic, as supporters of terrorism, and as opposed to 
"civility." As Sunera Thobani noted, "the Bush Administration has described Western 
societies as gravely threatened by the murderous violence of the Islamists, and in effect, 
11. See Naomi Klein, "Minority death match; Jews, blacks, and the 'post-racial' presidency" 
(2009, p. 53-67), and Gabriel Ash, "Honest anti-racists lose out to Zionist lobby" (2009). 
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whiteness has been recast as vulnerable, endangered, innocent and the subject of 
irrational hatred of this fanatic non-Western Other" (2007, 169-170). The roots of this 
discourse can be traced to the images of the Orient that permeated modem Europe, and in 
particular European political theory. Another component of this discourse is the notion of 
modernization that undergirds the self-representation of settler colonial societies. Zionism 
is no exception, and the idea that the Jewish settlers brought with them modernity to both 
the land and to the indigenous peoples has been fundamental to it since inception (Sa' di, 
1997, p. 25-48.) Th~s construction thus relies heavily upon specific understandings of the 
Palestinian-Israeli c9nflict, in which Israel is cast as the eternal victim in a war fuelled by 
an atavistic hatred of modernity. This narrative completely dehistoricizes the conflict, 
erasing its real origins in the late nineteenth century, while producing an image of 
Palestinians as quintessential anti-modem terrorists. This discourse also emphasizes an 
interconnection between Canada and Israel, both in terms of the two countries' core 
liberal values, and in terms of their narrative of colonization, while at the same time 
acting to cast Palestinians as the uncivilized enemies outside of such core values. 
The third discourse revolves around the division of communities within the 
multicultural logic of communal segmentation, between "moderates" and "extremists" 
and the constant search for the "good," namely moderate, Palestinians, Arabs, and 
Muslims. For a recent example, Joshua Roose "explores the concept of moderate Islam 
and the proposition that strong government support for multiculturalism encourages its 
development ... lead[ing] to improved cultural and political participation and loyalty to 
the state amongst witler Muslim communities" (2010). This discourse has certain specific 
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effects when it intersects with projects of racialization. As Nickels, Thomas, Hickman, 
I 
and Silvestri (2012) have demonstrated, one of the primary functions of this discourse is 
to demand ethnic communities actively display their loyalty to the state by taking on their 
"own extremists." This places the communities simultaneously inside and outside the 
national collective, and constructs their belonging as a problem to be solved by particular 
forms of community compliance. In this manner, the division of the community 
contributes to and is part of its racialization. 
Closely linked to the search for "moderate" Palestinians, the fourth discourse 
articulated by the state towards Palestine solidarity activism rests on the demand for 
"dialogue and balan'ce." This discourse promotes dialogue, civility, and tolerance while 
criticizing any social justice activism that "takes sides." This theme echoes the logic of 
Canadian liberalism, which suggests that all viewpoints must be given equal space and 
overly critical ones designated as "offensive" and "illegitimate." In reality, what such 
arguments tend to assert is that non-mainstream political arguments are not legitimate 
unless they are balanced by the dominant perspective. This argument is particularly 
common on Canadian university campuses and finds an echo in mainstream media. For 
example, in Michael Ignatieff s (2009) public condemnation of Israeli Apartheid Week, a 
week-long series of activities on campuses promoting the BDS campaign, he claimed that 
the week "betrays the values of mutual respect that Canada has always promoted." 
In an important article, Palestine solidarity activist Ben Saifer has analyzed 
"dialogue" initiatives established by Canadian universities and Israel advocacy groups on 
campuses. He explains that: 
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The language of dialogue and the implementation of "dialogue initiatives" have 
become cen~ral pillars of Israel advocacy on university campuses and must be 
addressed strategically. The language of dialogue appeals to proponents of liberal 
multiculturalism; it avoids confrontation, eschews anger and emotion in favour of 
"civil discourse," and addresses personal narratives rather than systemic relations 
of power. (2009) 
Demand for "dialogue" and "civility" in this context can be understood as an official 
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strategy of deploiticization of political antagonisms. This specific usage and reliance 
upon an idea of "common Canadian values" underlies the ways in which "civility," 
"tolerance," and "mutual respect" are applied selectively to fit within a specific ideal 
Canadian nationalism. Thus, multicultural language of "tolerance" and "respect for 
diversity," which at face value seems neutral, cannot be understood in isolation outside of 
existing social relations and power structures. 
Methodological Considerations 
Methodologically, my approach focuses on official multicultural policies and 
practices from the perspective of those marginalized and cast out, a viewpoint that is 
generally absent in the scholarly literature. This analytical stance has been systematically 
marginalized in academic discussions in part because, as Political Scientists Yasmeen 
Abu-Laban and Abigail Bakan assert, "Israel's close association with Zionist ideology 
has created an informal atmosphere of surveillance in the Western academy" whereby 
critical voices "can face intense scrutiny of their motivations" (2011, p. 279). 
In order to fill this lacuna, I limit my temporal scope to particular silencing and 
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censorship campaigns against Palestine solidarity activism that took place in Canada 
from 2003 to 2011 under the banner of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign. 
In analyzing the discourses used to marginalize pro-Palestine advocacy in Canada, I rely 
on: 1. media reports, including op-ed and editorials; 2. official correspondence between 
organizations and government departments; 3. statements from party leaderships and key 
government figures; and 4. freedom of information requests. 
In examining these materials, I look at the ways in which government 
spokespeople, pro-Israel lobby organizations, university administrators, and the media 
have discursively justified silencing and repression. I particularly focus upon the 
analogies they use, the ways in which they characterize and describe Palestinian activists 
and movements, and, most importantly, their references to multiculturalist tropes and so-
called Canadian 'values' as a means used to buttress repressive measures. In addition, I 
look at how these ideological justifications intersect with 'harder' institutional 
mechanisms aimed at disciplining solidarity activities (such as restrictions on government 
funding or use of space). Throughout this analysis, I attempt to assess the interplay of 
these measures with Palestinian activism, in order to draw some tentative conclusions 
about the possibilities and challenges of overcoming these dominant narratives. 
The analysis of such a wide range of data sources is one of the first, if not the 
first, of its kind in studies on the BDS campaign in Canada. I do not purport to record 
every instance of silencing and censorship of the Palestine Solidarity Movement across 
Canada. Rather, I focus on a number of case studies, including the intimidation campaign 
against a week of ac~ivities on university campuses titled Israeli Apartheid Week, cuts to 
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funding to ethnocultural and development organizations, as well as the campaign to ban 
the group Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) from participating in the yearly 
Pride Toronto march. These particular case studies were chosen because they highlight 
the severity and durability of the silencing campaign, as well as a variety of mechanisms 
that have been deployed in different circumstances to both silence and oppose the 
silencing campaign. My objective is to draw conclusions about the types of racialized 
discourses and disciplinary tools deployed to silence the Palestine BDS campaign. 
This analysis takes a multi-disciplinary approach, which, as discussed above, 
focuses on four essential sets of literatures in political science specifically, and in the 
social sciences more generally: critical studies of Canada's official multicultural policy 
(such as Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Bannerji, 2000; Day, 2000; Mackey, 2002; 
Thobani, 2007); situating the critique within the new political economy of Canadian 
imperialism and foreign policy (Gordon, 2010; Klassen, 2009); and a growing body of 
work on anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism in North America (Cainkar, 2009; Gualtieri, 
2009; Naber, 2006, 2008; Razack, 2008; Salaita, 2006; Zine, 2012); as well as literature 
on Palestinian racialization (Lentin, 2008) and the global Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions movement (Barghouti, 2011; Nadeau & Sears, 2010; Wiles, 2013). These four 
sets of literature capture both the external and internal dynamics and the political-
economic and ideological factors that shape Canadian state responses to the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement. By combining the insights of these key literatures to focus on the 
specifics of erasure and silencing against the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada, 
this dissertation breaks new empirical ground while also contributing to critical research 
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in the above three scholarly fields. 
Analyzing racialized discourses and disciplinary mechanisms against the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement from this subaltern stance allows me to move beyond simplistic 
notions of multicultural inclusivity to restart conversations about (re )building anti-racist 
solidarities. My aim is to open a space for a counter-narration so that racialized groups 
can organize to gain meaningful recognition that disavows official practices based upon 
mere tolerance. 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation focuses on the enactment and discourses of silencing and 
exclusion at the levei of state institutions relating to the PSM. As explained above, liberal 
multiculturalism constructs the state as a "neutral arbiter" between communities. This 
dissertation provides a critique of this approach, adding to the critical literature on the 
nature of the Canadian state. As such, much of the research for the various cases of the 
silencing campaign relies on textual analysis of state records, parliament proceedings, 
public speeches, and legal proceedings pertaining to the ways in which public officials 
intervened in the case of the PSM. This is not to say that other institutions do not also 
play an important role in the silencing campaign. The case studies reveal that university 
administrations and the media play a key role as well, and that all these various roles 
have to be considered together as they reinforce a dominant narrative that allows for the 
silencing of pro-Palestinian voices. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
focus is on highlighting the role of state institutions in the hope that further research can 
be carried out on the interactions and intersections between the various institutions. 
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With this methodological framing, Chapter 2 sets the overall theoretical approach 
to understanding Canadian state policy towards Palestinians, and the relationship between 
state ideologies, racial formation, political economy, and imperialism. The chapter looks 
closely at the ideological underpinnings and geopolitical interests that underlie the 
relationship between Canada and Israel, tracing how these reflect back on local activists 
that undertake Palestine solidarity work. The chapter begins by contextualizing Canadian 
imperialism as part of the "new imperialism," and then maps the development of the 
relationship between the Canadian and Israeli states. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of racial formation in the Canadian context, with a specific analysis of anti-Arab, 
Anti-Muslim racism and its connection to the broader imperialist project. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine specific case studies of state involvement in the 
silencing campaign, and the different intersections of racialized/racializing discourses 
that take place in the context of each case study. Chapter 3 focuses on the example of 
Israeli Apartheid Week. The chapter describ.es the roots to the analysis of Israel as an 
apartheid state and gives a history of Israeli Apartheid Week in the context of repression 
against student Palestine solidarity activism more generally on Canadian campuses. 
Exploring the specific state actions and government discourses used to "cast out" the 
week from "Canadian civility," the chapter outlines how anti-Arab and anti-Muslim 
racism is ever present in the denunciation of the week. 
Chapter 4 deals with how the Canadian government intervened to cut funding or 
grants to organizations deemed pro-Palestinian. The chapter focuses on the politicization 
of state funding and its use to influence the direction of non-governmental organizations. 
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The final case study in Chapter 5 outlines the attempts to exclude Queers Against 
Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) from marching in Pride Toronto in solidarity with 
Palestinians. This chapter follows the story of the various attempts to ban QuAIA from 
marching in Pride, analyzing both the racialized discourses used around the "intolerance" 
of Arabs and Muslims and the threats to cut funding to Pride, as well as the intervention 
of state officials and the organized fight back against this silencing. 
The final chapter analyzes how the contradictions that beset the official 
multicultural discourse of inclusivity are contested by the Palestine Solidarity Movement. 
Inevitably, the concepts of tolerance and recognition are tested against oppositional 
movements challenging state policies. The increasing support of labour unions, student 
movements, and religious organizations for the Palestinian people is a powerful 
confirmation that the legitimacy of Canadian state ties with Israeli policies does face 
challenges from the Palestine Solidarity Movement. The interplay between state 
repression and the grassroots responses to it reshape concepts of anti-racism and 
multiculturalism daily. 
The campaign to discredit, censor, and silence the BDS campaign in Canada 
shows the workings of a society ordered by a racial project and a state that is anything but 
neutral. Official multicultural policy posits that the state will deal with all "communities" 
equally, that freedom of expression is a cornerstone of liberal democracies, and that such 
freedom functions through a serious respect of diversity. However, in the case of 
Palestinian rights, the Canadian state is not a neutral actor, and nor are its policies in the 
Middle East region. , 
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At an ideological level, the alliance between Canada and Israel is strengthened by 
the similarities between Canada and Israel's founding myths. Both states were brought 
into being as Europeanized settler nation-states through the violence, eviction, and 
erasure of the indigenous population. 12 The Canadian state identifies historically with 
Israel as a settler colony, and accepts the dominant imperial claim that Israel is an ally of 
the West. Israel is also accepted as a democracy, and described repeatedly as the "only 
democracy in the Middle East" to emphasize its belonging to an imagined civilizational 
geography of the West. Both the material and the ideological relationships between the 
Canadian and Israeli states collude to narrow the space for Palestine solidarity organizing 
in Canada-especially the type of solidarity organizing that would challenge this very 
relationship. 
Studying both the material underpinnings of Canada's relationship to Israel and 
its ideological constructions allows for an understanding of the relations between the 
internal racial project in Canada around the suppression of Palestinian narratives and the 
broader imperial one. This method dismisses completely the idea that multicultural 
policies can be seen in isolation simply by looking within a state, without bringing 
attention to that state's role in global dominance patterns. This work thus seeks to root the 
silencing of Palestinian narratives and activism in the everyday and unquestioned racism 
that pervades Canadian society, explaining its relationship to the macro-processes of 
global accumulation and the specificity of the imperialist project in the Middle East, and 
12. For more on this see Patrick Wolfe, "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native" 
(2006). 
51 




Chapter 2. Canadian Imperialism and the "Special Relationship" with Israel: A 
Framework for Silencing and Erasure 
"As I said on the 60th anniversary of its founding, the State of Israel appeared as a light, 
in a world emerging from deep darkness. Against all odds, that light has not been 
extinguished. It burns bright, upheld by the universal principles of all civilized nations -
freedom, democracy, justice" (Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper's 2010 
conference speech on combating anti-Semitism). 
"As someone who lived in apartheid South Africa and who has visited Palestine I say 
with confidence that Israel is an apartheid state. In fact, I believe that some of the 
atrocities committed by the erstwhile apartheid regime in South Africa pale in 
comparison to those committed against the Palestinians" (Willie Madisha, President of 
Congress of South African Trade Unions, quoted in Bodoni, 2006). 
The Canadian state projects an image for domestic and international consumption 
as a benign, honest broker that prioritizes international law and human rights. This image 
helps to solidify a uniquely Canadian nationalism positioned against the aggressive image 
of the United States. Canadian official multiculturalism-with its emphasis on the respect 
of different cultures and valuing of diversity-plays a key role in differentiating Canada 
from the U.S. melting-pot model. Yet much of this narrative is founded upon an 
assumption that Canada's role in the world is aimed at "peace making" and building 
stronger institutions :of global civil society. This chapter presents a counter-narrative to 
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this official discourse, situating Canadian approaches to race and multiculturalism within 
Canada's positioning in a neoliberal world market and its partnership in a U.S.-led global 
imperialism. As Klassen noted, "the last two decades have witnessed an important 
transformation in Canada's economic and political standing in the world. During this 
period, there has been an internationalization of Canadian capital and a militarization of 
Canadian foreign policy" (2009, p. 163). Building upon this insight, this chapter begins 
by highlighting the role of the Canadian state in the "new imperialism" (Harvey, 2003), 
especially across the Middle East region. The first section is focused on Canada's 
position in the world market and its advancement of neoliberalism internationally, as well 
as its role in increasing international militarism. The second part turns towards the 
important role Israel plays in securing Western hegemony over the Middle East region 
and traces the specifics of Canada's increasingly close diplomatic, military, and trade 
relationship with Israel. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the way racialized 
discourses and disciplinary silencing tools are connected to Canada's positioning in the 
world market and its relationship with Israel. In this manner, the chapter forms an 
overarching framework in which to situate an analysis of the Canadian state's approach 
to the Palestine Solidarity Movement. 
Canadian Capitalism and the N eoliberal World Market 
The advent of the neoliberal era has seen a significant shift in the nature of the 
world market. With its origins in the global downturn of the 1970s, neoliberalism became 
the dominant policy framework for most governments across the world from the mid-
l 980s onwards (Saad Filho & Johnson, 2004). Advocating measures such as 
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privatization, cutbacks to social spending, the reduction of barriers to capital flows, and 
the commodification of many social goods previously outside the sphere of the market, 
neoliberalism was an attempt to address falling profit rates through reconstituting the 
power of dominant classes (Harvey, 2005). One of the major effects of these policies was 
the deepening internationalization of capital, with virtually all comers of the globe linked 
into global circuits of accumulation dominated by firms located in the advanced capitalist 
countries. The process of restructuring economies in the South was facilitated through the 
debt crises of the l 980s-which saw the rise of international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the key arbiters of national 
economic policy. Through the 1990s and 2000s, the internationalization of capital took a 
further qualitative deepening with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of 
markets in China and the former Soviet bloc to foreign investment flows. 
The global expansion of capital that typified the neoliberal era also marked a re-
articulation of forms of imperialism. Ellen Meiksins Wood has described this as an 
"Empire of Capital," which would 
be sustained by political and military hegemony over a complex state system, 
consisting of enemies who had to be contained, friends who had to be kept under 
control, and a 'third world' that had to be made available to western capital. 
(2003, p. 130) 
This was not an arbitrary policy choice based on a more aggressive right wing agenda 
(such as the Bush Doctrine, or Harper's conservatism), but was rather embedded in the 
nature of capitalism itself, which sought expansion of capitalist social relations for the 
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sake of accumulation on a global scale (Hanieh, 2012). The growing interdependencies of 
capital accumulation that marked this system did not bring about the decline of nation 
states, but rather brought the development of a "unique mode of economic domination 
managed by a system of multiple states" (Meiksins Wood, 2003, p. 52). Atop these global 
hierarchies stood the United States as the predominant global power-but the U.S. was 
not the exclusive guarantor of accumulation. Each individual nation state had a 
responsibility "for managing its domestic capitalist order in a way that contributes to the 
managing of the international capitalist order" (Panitch & Gindin, 2004, p. 17). 
The nature of Canadian capitalism was profoundly affected by these trends. 
Canada has long been one of the wealthiest states in the world market-a status 
confirmed by its 1976 entry to the G7, an institutional gathering of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, Italy, and France in the G8). But with the 
deepening of neoliberalism and the new forms of imperialism, Canadian capital has also 
expanded globally, particularly in the sectors of mining, banking, and finance. This 
expansion was given a decisive push by the signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFT A) in 1994, which tied Canadian foreign policy interests very closely 
to U.S. imperialism. By the 2000s, many Canadian firms were to be ranked among the 
largest in the global economy, dominating foreign investment flows across key regions 
such as Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Jerome Klassen and William Carroll (extending the work of R.J. Richardson, 
1982, 1988, and William Carroll, 1986, 2004) have tracked the subsequent changes in 
Canadian capitalism'as a result of these processes, demonstrating that through the 
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neoliberal era, the Canadian capitalist class has come to be dominated by a tightly-linked 
network of Canadian-owned finance capital, bringing together industrial and financial 
firms, which operate "independent of US imperialism and expand autonomously into 
world markets" (Klassen & Carroll, 2011, p. 381). Klassen and Carroll mapped the 
weight of this class and its relative strength at the global scale, noting that, since the 
1990s, Canada has become a net exporter of capital overseas. Their detailed study of 
corporate director interlocks led them to conclude that "the corporate network in Canada 
is largely dominate~ by nationally owned firms, in particular, by leading TNCs under 
Canadian ownership" while simultaneously, there has been "a growing set of directorship 
interlocks between Canadian-owned TNCs and the largest foreign-based firms in the 
world ... as they eX!pand operations beyond the US into Europe and other regions of the 
world economy" (2011, p. 398). 
Elsewhere, Klassen has noted that Canadian capitalism is characterized by one of 
the most pronounced levels of concentration of any advanced capitalist state-with the 
top 19 Canadian firms making up 36.3% of the total assets in the Canadian economy 
(2009, p. 181). These firms range across banking, finance, manufacturing, mining, and 
energy, with these sectors being the major focus of the internationalization of Canadian 
capital. While Canadian investments abroad typically focus on the U.S. and Europe-two 
geographical zones that were the target of 70% of all Canadian Direct Investment Abroad 
(CDIA) in 2007 (Klassen, 2009, p. 178)-Canadian corporations play an important role 
in many peripheral regions as well. Klassen documented that Canadian firms were among 
the top three nationalities of corporate activity in Barbados, Chile, Guyana, Costa Rica, 
57 
Trinidad & Tobago, Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Bolivia, and 
Surinam, and operate among the top ten in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru (2009, p. 
178). Of particular significance is the banking and finance sector, where Canadian firms 
dominate many markets in the Global South. Todd Gordon, for example, noted that 
Canadian firms were the fourth largest financial sector investors in the Latin America 
region from 1990 to 2003, acquiring banks in Peru, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and the 
Cayman Islands (2013, p. 217). In the English-speaking Caribbean region, Canadian 
banks controlled the three largest banks by 2011, with assets more than four times that of 
the forty locally owned banks in the region (Gordon, 2013, p. 217). 
Alongside this growing internationalization of Canadian capital, the Canadian 
state has come to play an increasingly important role in ensuring the conditions of capital 
accumulation globally. Canada is now "a secondary power among the top tier of states," 
not simply a dependency of the U.S. (Klassen, 2009, p. 163-190). 13 As Adam Hanieh 
13. The debate on whether Canada is an imperialist power or a dependency of the U.S. is a 
longstanding one in Canadian political economy (Kellogg, 1989). From an elites theory 
perspective, in The Vertical Mosaic, Porter argued that Canada was an unequal society with elites 
at the top of a vertical mosaic (1965). In two other collections on Canadian political dependency, 
theorists argued that Canada was a dependency of the U.S. (Teeple, 1972; Laxer, 1973). Another 
version of this argument is the Staples School (associated with Harold Innis), which explained the 
Canadian political economy by exploring the role of staple exports on capitalist development. 
Dependency school theorists argued that Canada was a "colonial economy" (Levitt, 1970). And 
Clement explained that there was a division whereby Canadian elites provided financial services 
to U.S. manufacturing firms that dominated the Canadian economy (Clement, 1975). The 
Canadian state was thus understood as a sub-imperial power incorporated into the U.S. empire 
(Laxer, 1973, p. 127). Critiques of dependency theory were captured in a special edition of 
Studies in Political Economy (Special Issue: Rethinking Canadian Political Economy, 1981 ), 
which contained articles by Leo Panitch, David McNally, and Ray Schmidt. This edition 
highlighted the Marxist critique of Canadian political economy and a lengthier discussion of the 
classical theories of imperialism. According to Panitch, for example, dependency theorists took 
"the absence of indigenous entrepreneurial innovation as the guidepost to Canadian dependency 
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explained, "Canadian capitalism ... pursued its overseas expansion, however, as a junior 
partner with the US - often using the rhetoric of 'humanitarian intervention' to enter 
markets that were closed to its neighbor" (2012, 179). In line with this expansion, the 
Canadian state would play an important role among the institutions of the World Bank 
and IMF, promoting structural adjustment programs and supporting the neoliberal 
paradigm within these institutions (Gordon, 20 I 0). Concurrently, Canadian foreign policy 
interests would bec0me very closely tied to those of U.S. imperialism, with international 
institutions providing a framework that sustained "Canada as a subordinate ally of U.S. 
imperialism, but with Canada's own imperial interests also being advanced within them" 
(Albo, 2006). 
Canadian Militarism 
Despite Canada's growing economic and political weight in the world market, the 
country's involvement in the Global South is typically portrayed as benign and 
analytically distinct from the more overt forms of imperial intervention that characterize 
the U.S. and European states. The country's official image of itself draws upon notions of 
rather than the form and rate of exploitation" (1981, p. 13 ). Moore and Wells critiqued 
dependency theorists for focusing on internal and continental relations rather than framing 
Canada within the broader world market (1975, p. 33). McNally argued that the relationship 
between Canadian and U.S. capital and the shift in ownership of Canadian manufacturing to the 
U.S. should be analyzed in terms of the concentration and centralization of capital, rather than 
dependency (1981, p. 38). Building from this perspective, Carroll's study of the circuit of capital 
traced Canadian finance capital. He found that "above all, modem imperialism is the historical 
culmination of the tendencies of capitalist concentration, centralization and internationalization" 
( 1985, p. 32). His work emphasized the combination between industrial and banking interests into 
finance capital in the Canadian context, explaining that: "At the apex of this finance capital stood 
the dominant fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie, small elite of monopoly capitalists whose 
interlocking investments and corporate positions effectively fused big industry with high finance" 
(1985, p. 35). 
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liberal internationalism, in which Canada contributes to the construction of "good 
international citizenship" through initiatives such as development assistance programs, 
involvement in peacemaking missions, and lobbying for UN resolutions on issues such as 
landmines and the small-arms trade, and so forth (Nossal, 1998/1999, p. 99). Described 
by one set of scholars as an academic concept of "near mythical proportions," 
internationalism has been seen to guide the making of Canadian foreign policy since the 
era of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent (1948-1957) and his successor, Lester Pearson 
(Munton & Keating, 2001, p. 519). Although academic debate has questioned to what 
extent internationalism continues to guide Canadian foreign policy, particularly in an era 
of austerity and cutbacks to foreign spending, the notion of internationalism remains the 
normative pivot around which all government policy is measured and assessed (see Black 
& Smith, 1993; Carroll, 2004; Melakopides, 1998; Molot, 1990; Stein, 1994). 
This perspective of liberal internationalism is at odds, however, with the 
increasingly pronounced projection of Canadian military power abroad-a trend, which, 
as Michael Skinner has observed, is "insufficiently studied and ... virtually ignored by 
political-economists" (2008, p. 10). Canada's military-industrial complex is a highly 
significant component of the Canadian economy-employing over 70,000 workers in 
over 177 federal ridings and making Canada the sixth largest military exporter in the 
world (with most exports going to the U.S.) (Skinner, 2008, p. 10). A report by the 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives noted that, in 2011, at nearly $23 billion, 
Canadian military spending had reached its highest ever level since the end of the Second 
World War-18% more than the peak year of spending during the Cold War (1952-53) 
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(Robinson, 2011, p. 1 ). This large increase in military spending began in the late 1990s 
and expanded rapidly through the early 2000s-with the Canadian mission in 
Afghanistan contributing around half of the extra $30.1 billion in military spending since 
9/11 (Robinson, 2011, p. 1). 14 
This increase in Canadian military spending parallels a growing trend of 
militarism globally, which was initially codified in the second Bush administration's 
'War on Terror,' announced by George W. Bush on 20 September 2001. As part of this 
militarist trope, Canada has played a major role in expanding and legitimating the notion 
of military intervention. Indeed, Canada was the lead government in establishing the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission 
set up in 2001 that developed the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P)-a liberal 
notion that provides an international legal justification for military intervention in the 
case of potential "mass atrocities." Skinner noted that both the War on Terror and R2P 
provide a means of widening the scope of what is seen as legitimate intervention-a 
feature confirmed in the Canadian case through the country's involvement in military 
campaigns in Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and the Balkans (2008, p. 4), and, 
more recently, in Libya and Mali. This expansion of Canada's military role at the global 
scale is "also matched by a shift in Canadian military doctrines toward 'networked joint 
capabilities' and 'inter-operability' for 'multi-force, multi-country' operations. This 
essentially means improved capacity to support U.S. military operations in pursuit of its -
14. This figure is calculated by taking into account what spending would have been if it had 
remained at the 2000/2001 level (figures in 2010 dollars). 
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and Canadian - imperial ambitions" (Albo, 2006). 
For all of these reasons it is necessary to challenge the standard picture of Canada 
as simply a "middle power" that acts to mediate and moderate the actions of larger global 
states. Instead, Canada needs to be seen as an imperialist power in its own right, with its 
own set of interests and a conscious projection of power that sits in a relationship of both 
rivalry and continuity of interests with those of other larger powers. The expansion of 
Canadian capital and corporate interests abroad is connected to the concomitant 
projection of Canadian militarism. Both of these aspects of Canada's position at the top 
ranks of global hierarchies are critical to understanding Canada's role in the Middle East, 
its relationship with Israel/Palestine, and the construction of an internal order that fits 
these external relations. 
Imperialism and the Middle East 
The Middle East has been a particularly significant geographical zone within 
these broader global changes. The region produces around one quarter of the world's oil 
and is the major location for cheap, relatively easy to extract reserves (Hanieh, 2011). 
Since the end of the Second World War, and the transition from coal to oil as the world's 
key energy source, the region's hydrocarbon supplies have made it a central pivot of 
global power (Bromley, 1991; Chomsky, 2003). According to Hanieh, oil "supplied the 
necessary energy for industrial production and also formed the basic feedstock for new 
industries such as petrochemicals and transport. This shift in the global energy regime 
brought the importance of the Middle East into sharp focus" (2012, 180). Hanieh noted, 
however, that the 1970s saw yet another transition that reinforced the importance of the 
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Middle East to the world market-the increased significance of financial flows to global 
capitalism. This meant that the "petro-dollar" revenues accruing to oil-producing states, 
specifically the Gulf Arab States, took an important role within global financial markets 
(Hanieh, 2011). Crucially, the interests of imperialism in the Middle East region focus on 
"securing a stable environment for the supply of oil, U.S. investment in the wider region, 
and surplus capital from states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Khalidi & 
Samour, 2011, p. 11 ). In Resurrecting Empire, author Rashid K.halidi described both the 
W estem drive to control the Middle East region and its resources, as well as the 
resistance by peoples of the region to such domination (2004). 
The geo-political strategic significance of the region has meant that the peoples of 
the area have had to live under and resist imperial dominance and interests from the times 
of British and French colonialism. With the shift from British and French dominance to 
the United States' dominance in the postwar period, the strategy came to rest upon three 
key pillars of support that would guarantee guardianship of U.S. interests: Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and, since the late 1960s, Israel. First, in Iran, the U.S. dominated through the 
Shah after a CIA-orchestrated coup against Mossadegh in 1953 (Abrahamian, 2001). The 
Iranian revolution of 1979, however, came as a blow to U.S. dominance in the region, 
making it more heavily reliant on the other two pillars. The Saudi ruling family was, and 
continues to be, heavily dependent upon the U.S. and developed a close relationship 
through its oil companies; however, the rise of nationalist movements in the region at the 
time also highlighted the extent to which Saudi Arabia could be affected by nationalist 
sentiments in the region, and to which the population could not be relied upon for 
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complete adherence to U.S. interests (Ashcar, 2002; Halliday, 1974). 
The importance of Israel to Western powers should be assessed within this 
changing regional backdrop. The U.S. relies on the acquiescence of Arab dictators that 
owe their hold on power to the United States because they have little popular support 
from their own people (as evidenced in the wave of uprisings in 2011 across the region). 
But, much more centrally, Israel, as a settler-colonial entity owing its existence to outside 
aid and military armament, provides a perfect outpost for imperial dominance over the 
land, resources, and: peoples of the region. Chomsky described how Israel has been 
moving since 1967 towards 
international' isolation apart from pariah states, dependence on the U.S. with the 
concomitant pressure to serve U.S. interests, militarization of society, the rise of 
religious-chauvinist fanaticism, the internal 'feed-back' from the policies of 
oppression and domination, an increasing sense of the inevitability of permanent 
conflict and with it, the perceived need to disrupt the region and establish a form 
oflsraeli hegemony under the U.S. aegis. (1999, p. 462) 
Bashir Abu-Manneh has described the relationship of U.S. Empire and Israeli colonialism 
as 
circular: U.S. support reinforces Israeli colonialism and occupation, which 
bolsters Israeli militarization of state and society, which generates new 
ideological and political justifications and breeds new religious fanaticisms, 
leading to further indigenous resistance and to more U.S. interventions in the 




Israel's role in supporting imperialism was confirmed in 1967 when its army 
defeated the Arab militaries from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This devastated the pan-Arab 
and other progressive movements that sought to bring the region's resources under 
greater popular control. Understanding the important role that Israel could play, the U.S. 
built this relationship by fortifying the country with U.S. made military hardware. For 
this reason, the basis of Israel's "special relationship" with Wes tern powers has to do 
with Israel's central role in guaranteeing Western interests--not a supposed Israel lobby 
that guarantees Western support for Israel (although the Israel lobby plays a very specific· 
role when it comes to attacking Palestine Solidarity Movement activities through 
intimidation and organized campaigns to discredit individuals). Thus, the lobby may 
influence particular configurations of Middle East policy, but not its overall trajectory. 
Canada and Imperialism in the Middle East 
In this overall context of the Middle East's importance to the configurations of 
Western power, the policies and discourses of the Canadian state have been very much in 
tune with the interests of U.S. imperialism in the region. Canada's role in the Middle East 
is manifested through the military support and training it offers towards the 
implementation of the overall imperial policy in the region, as well as its support for the 
advancement of neoliberal market economics. Although its role may not be as prominent 
or well publicized as that of the U.S. or Britain, the Canadian state does, nonetheless, 
participate in easing the process of direct military occupations and in bolstering support 
for Israel as a key Western ally in the region. This role stems from the analysis provided 
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above-beginning from the needs of Canadian capital to expand geographically, and the 
significance of the Middle East region to a wider extension of Western power. While 
there have been differences of emphasis between successive Liberal and Conservative 
governments, these should not obscure the larger continuities in the evolution of 
Canadian foreign policy in the age of neoliberal globalization. 
The attacks of 9/11 saw a substantial reorientation of Canadian foreign policies to 
being in line with those of the U.S., most significantly towards the Middle East region. 
As Albo noted at the time, this included: 
a new Cabinet National Security Committee; budgetary increases for all the 
agencies involved in policing, anti-terrorism and security work; extension of 
funds and powers for policing borders and airports, linked to a new Smart Borders 
Act; new legislative powers in the form of an Anti-Terrorism Act, which widened 
the definition of terrorism and scope for investigation, allowed for preventive 
detentions apd issuing of security certificates, and extended the range of the 
Official Secrets Act; and an immediate increase in the military budget, 
particularly for the JTF2 special forces for rapid deployment and to deploy troops 
to the Gulf and Afghanistan as a direct contribution to the U.S. War on Terror. 
(2006) 
Through the 2000s, Canada's Middle East policy was to include the deployment of 
Canadian troops in Afghanistan, where the country took the lead role in the occupation of 
the Afghani province of Kandahar. By 2011, Canadian troops were widely reported to 
have been implicated in "civilian casualties, the torture of prisoners by Afghan 
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authorities, aggressive military tactics and failures of aid delivery" (Klassen, 2013, p. 9). 
Approximately 150 Canadian soldiers were to have been killed and 2000 wounded by 
2011 (Klassen & Albo, 2013, p. vii). Despite an initial public perception of Canadian 
involvement in Afghanistan as contributing to a "good war," by the late 2000s, there was 
widespread disquiet over the nature of the Canadian military presence. 
Canada's role in the Middle East was not limited to Afghanistan during this 
period. Despite an 0fficial announcement that Canada would not join the U.S. invasion of 
I 
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Iraq, in 2003, Canada played a significant behind-the-scenes role in supporting the U.S.-
, 
led military action. ,Indeed, a 2011 Wikileaks document has revealed that, on the same 
day that then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that Canada would not 
join the "Coalition of the Willing," a Canadian Foreign Affairs official, James Wright-
now the Canadian High Commissioner in London, England-told U.S. diplomats that 
Canada would nevertheless support U.S. efforts regardless of the government's public 
stance. According to the U.S. briefing note, Wright 
emphasized that, despite public statements that the Canadian assets in the Straits 
of Hormuz w[ ould] remain in the region exclusively to support Enduring 
Freedom, they w[ ould] also be available to provide escort services in the Straits 
and w[ ould] otherwise be discreetly useful to the military effort. 
The note continued: 
The two ships in the Straits now are being augmented by two more en route, and 
there are patrol and supply aircraft in the U.A.E. (United Arab Emirates) which 
are also prepared to be 'useful' .... This message tracks with others we have 
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heard. While for domestic reasons ... the GOC (Government of Canada) has 
decided not to join in a U.S. coalition of the willing ... they are also prepared to 
be as helpful as possible in the military margins. (Weston, 2011) 
This promise was largely fulfilled, with Canadian forces taking on logistical support 
(transportation of provisions and heavy machinery, securing of supply lines), training 
Iraqi police in Jordan, and even taking on leadership positions within the U.S. military 
(Canadian General Walt Natynczyk commanded 35,000 U.S. and other troops in Iraq). 
As reported in the National Post, the U.S. ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, confirmed 
this in 2003 when he noted: "ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel 
... will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly ... than most of those 46 
countries that are fully supporting our efforts there." This military support was 
accompanied by the entry of Canadian companies into Iraq following the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein-at least 15 Canadian-based companies signed some form of 
exploration, production, or production-sharing contract for Iraqi oil between 2004 and 
2009 (Fenton, 2009). 
In summary, as a junior partner to U.S. imperialism, the Canadian state fully 
works to uphold, support, and perpetuate U.S. goals in the region, not least through the 
increasing projection of its own military power. Most significantly for the purposes of 
this dissertation, however, Canada's role in the Middle East has been increasingly marked 
by its support oflsraeli state policy. This has involved turning a blind eye to Israel's 
human rights violations, as well as suppressing any internal dissent that would question 
Western imperialism's special relationship with Israel. 
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Canada's Special Relationship with Israel 
Close relations with Israel are central to Canada's overall imperial strategy. These 
ties with Israel manifest on the diplomatic, military, economic, and discursive levels. On 
the one hand, there is the oft-repeated mantra by Canadian politicians regarding Canada's 
"special relationship" with Israel. On the other hand, there is the Canadian state's 
relationship with the Palestinian Authority (PA), structured around assuring PA 
acquiescence to Israel as well as PA dependence on security training and aid from the 
Canadian state, among other Wes tern states. 
I 
Canada's relationship with Israel began in 1947, when Canada was represented on 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Canada was one of the 
33 countries that voted in favour of the 194 7 UN partition resolution, which led to the 
establishment of the State of Israel. Despite this, the Canadian state was able to maintain 
an image of neutrality for decades by voting with the majority of states at the United 
Nations when regular motions regarding Israel and Palestine were presented. In the 
1980s, the Canadian state did not support Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and at the outset 
of the first Palestinian Intifada (an uprising that began in 1987-1988) they did not 
uncritically support Israel in all its actions-especially as world public opinion was 
shifting when media reports began showing the brutal manner and "break the bones" 
policy of the Israeli army in dealing with the unarmed popular uprising. This did not take 
Canada outside the general sphere of promoting Israel's overall interests, but-in these 
earlier decades-criticism of Israeli state policies was permissible in political debate. 
It was the sharper realignment with U.S. policies through the 1990s that saw 
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Canadian prime ministers, starting with the Liberal Party's Paul Martin, overtly 
supporting Israel in international fora, and increasing security and military ties under the 
guise of the War on Terror. Speaking at the opening of the United Jewish Communities 
2005 General Assembly, where Israel's then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was slated to 
speak, Martin professed: "Israel's values are Canada's values -- shared values --
democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights" (United Jewish 
Communities (UJC), 2005). This trend of uncritical and overt identification with the 
Israeli state only increased under Stephen Harper's Conservative administration: 
An article in Israel's Jerusalem Post described how, under Stephen Harper, 
Canada went from being a middle-of-the-road friend of Israel - somewhere 
between the US and the European Union - to setting the gold standard for support 
of the Jewish state. There is not a government on the planet today more 
supportive oflsrael than Harper's Canada. (Keinon, 2012b) 
The relationship today between Canada and Israel is perhaps best described on the 
website of the Israeli embassy in Canada, in the Israel-Canada Relations section: 
Israel and Canada have long stood side-by-side as partners on the world stage. 
Economic, cultural, political, and security ties reflect our mutual interests in peace 
and prosperity. Our friendship is rooted in the shared values of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. 
This description encapsulates the discursive view of the relationship between Israel and 
Canada as being based in notions of a joint civilizational camp of liberal states with 
shared values. It also points to the extensive connections between the two states on both 
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economic and political fronts, and importantly, in terms of security coordination. 
On the diplomatic level, there has been a change in voting patterns in support of 
Israel, including a vote against the Palestinian Authority bid for recognition as an 
observer member state at the United Nations at the end of 2012. Not only did Canada 
vote against the bid, it actively campaigned for a no vote and called its heads of mission 
to Israel and the West Bank, along with its United Nations representatives in New York 
and Geneva, to protest when the statehood bid was successful. Palestinian chief 
negotiator Saeb Erekat commented, "I believe this government is more Israeli than the 
Israelis, more settler than the settlers, I think they have disqualified themselves from 
playing any role in the Middle East peace process" (Clark, 2012). 
This was not a sudden policy shift of the Canadian state only on the issue of the 
statehood bid; there had been ample signs of uncritical support for Israel long before. For 
example, Canada uncritically supported Israel's wars on Gaza in 2008 and 2012, and the 
assault on Lebanon in 2006. Moreover, Canada was the only country at a United Nations 
human rights council to vote against a motion calling for an investigation into human 
rights violations by the Israeli army during the 2008 bombing of Gaza. Much of this 
trajectory, however, was determined before Harper's time. Canada and Israel began 
negotiating trade agreements in the 1990s, resulting in the Canada-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement (CIFTA) and increased collaboration through the Canada-Israel Industrial 
Research and Development Fund (CIIRDF). 
The "War on Terror" saw a further deepening of this relationship, as Israel placed 
itself as a key West~rn ally and as a leader in anti-terror innovation (practiced on the 
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populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for decades). Since the World Trade Center 
attacks, Israel has pounced on the identification of Islam with terrorism and worked hard 
to foster an image of Palestinians as Islamic fundamentalists, with the rise and growing 
popularity of Barnas (an openly Islamic movement) within the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories providing the discursive justification of this process. When asked by a New 
York Times journalist in 2001 about the effect of the attack on the World Trade Center on 
U.S./Israel relations, Benjamin Netanyahu replied: "it will generate immediate sympathy" 
(Bennett, 2001). This sympathy, Netanyahu appeared to believe, would be a good result 
because it would translate to an identification with Israel as a partner in the so-called War 
on Terror. Abu-Laban and Bakan explained that, in the post 9/11 context, 
the US, and by association other liberal democracies in the global North, have 
come to identify the need for uniquely repressive measures in the face of a 
perceived 'terrorist' threat similar to that faced by Israel since its inception as a 
state. (2011, p. 277) 
In other words, cementing the idea that there is a single war on terror that Israel is 
crucially a part of, because it historically understands and has dealt with "terrorist 
threats," allows for a justification of Israeli policies towards Palestinians. More 
importantly, this justification allows other states to enforce measures similar to those 
practiced by Israel's occupation forces against the Palestinian people for decades. The 
Canadian state is no exception in this regard. 
Kilibarda, for example, outlined some of the most significant connections 
between Canada an~ Israel in a study titled "Canadian and Israeli Defense -- Industrial 
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and Homeland Security Ties: An Analysis" (2008). This study traced the increasing trade 
links with the signing of free trade agreements between Canada and Israel, but, most 
importantly, concentrated on the links in the security sector. Kilibarda noted that, in 
March 2005, a delegation comprised of 13 Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and Canadian 
aerospace industry representatives visited Israel. The CSA signed a "Technology and 
Science Cooperative Agreement" with its Israeli counterpa11, the Israel Space Agency 
(ISA), while Canadian aerospace firms met with representatives of important potential 
Israeli partners in this sector, including Rafael, Elta, Israeli Aerospace Industry's Mabat 
division, and Elbit's Aluf (Kilibarda, 2008, p. 9). According to Kilibarda's report, 
The CSA visit also coincided with a separate trip by 32 Canadian police-chiefs to 
Israel that was hosted by the Israeli Police and the Israeli Ministry of Internal 
Security ... followed in the fall by another visit by 39 Ontario police chiefs. 
(2008, p. 9) 
Kilibarda has asserted that the "strongest expression of this relationship to date 
has been the semi-formal institutionalization of direct Canada-Israel security cooperation 
through the 'Declaration of Intent' on 'public safety."' (2008, p. 10). More recently, Peter 
MacKay, Canada's Minister of National Defence, visited Israel in January 2011 to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding defense relations with his Israeli counterpart 
(Government of Canada, 2011 ). This close coordination at the security level between the 
two states illustrates the ways in which the Canadian state continues its tacit support of 
Israeli policies, while disregarding all of its human rights violations against Palestinians. 
The message this sends, especially to Muslim/ Arab and Palestinian communities living in 
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Canada, is that the Canadian state is in support of Israel's policies and will not attempt to 
hold Israel to account. There is also fear that military equipment and surveillance 
technologies used on Palestinians in Israel are being imported to Canada to be used on 
domestic minorities that the War on Terror targets, under the guise of "public safety" 
initiatives. 
Canada and Israel's close relationship in regard to military technologies extends 
to the private sector as well. In light of Israel's assault on Gaza in 2008, the Canadian 
Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT) published a report on the Canadian 
complicity in the production of major U.S. weapons systems used by Israel. The report 
included 10 detailed tables filled with data detailing about 200 Canadian military 
companies that have direct or indirect export links to Israel (Sanders, n.d.). The Canadian 
Association of Defense and Security Industries (CADS!), the arms industry business 
association, works to lobby the government for increased arms industry collaboration 
between Canada and Israel. In 2004, CADS! organized a "Canada I Israel Industry 
Partnering Mission" to "advance industrial partnerships between Canadian and Israeli 
companies." Speakers at the event included Canada's Minister of National Defence, 
Israel's Ambassador to Canada, a representative from Israel's Ministry of Defense, and 
top bureaucrats from Canadian government departments. Canadian military companies 
heard presentations from Israel's top weapons industries, and then held 20-minute, face-
to-face "Company One-on-Ones" with key Israeli military and security companies 
(Sanders, n.d. ). 
This collaboration between Israel and Canada, especially in the homeland security 
74 
sector, was emphasized by Abu-Laban and Bakan, who have asserted that "in the 
heightened climate of anti-terrorism surveillance following 9/11, the Israeli state has 
increased its international profile as an 'expert' in 'resisting' the threat of the constructed 
'Muslim terrorist"' (2011, p. 288). Abu-Laban and Bakan thus make the link between 
foreign policies, the securitization of the state, and the racialization of Arabs and 
Muslims. Author Naomi Klein's explanation that the Israeli expertise in anti-terrorism 
training has been materially beneficial to Israel (2007, p. 528) adds to this argument; in 
fact, the Palestinian territories have been and continue to be transformed into testing labs 
for the War on Terror. Furthermore, as Gordon maintained, "the use of the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Israel itself as laboratories and showcases for the 
produces that are developed is crucial for Israel's marketing efforts" (2011, p. 154). 
On the economic level, the relationship between Canada and Israel "has been 
strengthened in recent years as evidenced by increased cooperation in several areas, 
including public security, defense, trade and investment, and the increased frequency of 
ministerial visits" (Government of Canada, 2011). In 2010, Peter Van Loan, former 
Canadian Minister of International Trade, and his Israeli counterpart Binyamin Ben 
Eliezer, Israel's then Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour, announced that Canada and 
Israel were to undertake steps toward modernizing the existing Canada-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement (CIFTA). Canada-Israel bilateral goods trade has more than doubled since the 
inception of CIFT A, from $507 million in 1996 to $1.4 billion in 2010-a trend directly 
linked to Harper's free trade agenda. Minister Van Loan explained that: 
Expanding the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement is part of the Harper 
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government's broad and ambitious free trade agenda. In just four years, our 
government has negotiated new trade agreements with eight countries, is in 
negotiation with close to 50 others, and is now expanding the three first-
generation agreements signed by the former government. (Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, 2010) 
At the provincial level, the premiers of Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, and 
I 
Alberta, along with cabinet ministers from other provinces, have led commercial 
I 
delegations to Israel. Thus, extending economic relations with Israel happens at all levels 
of the state, as does repression against the Palestine Solidarity Movement, as the 
following chapters will illustrate. 
These deepening diplomatic, military, and economic relations fall within 
Canada's overall goals to advance free trade and neoliberalism and secure the resources 
of the Middle East and North Africa under Western hegemony, with Israel playing a key 
role in an endless War on Terror. In October 2010, when Canada was not elected to a seat 
on the UN Security Council, Harper himself attributed this to Canada's policies on Israel, 
but he insisted this ~rajectory would continue, and explained: 
There are, after all, a lot more votes - a lot more - in being anti-Israeli than in 
taking a stand. But, as long as I am prime minister, whether it is at the UN or the 
Francophonie or anywhere else, Canada will take that stand, whatever the cost. 
(CBC, 2012) 
Canada's relationship with the Palestinian Authority falls in line with its strong 
support for Israel. The relationship is managed through the provision of aid to the Fatah-
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led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and importantly, through the development of 
a security service that they hope can pacify the Palestinian population. The security 
relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Canada has taken shape "particularly 
through Canadian Forces Operation Proteus, which aims to build a Palestinian security 
force, and through our contribution to the mission of the U.S. Security Coordinator, and 
to the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support" 
(Government of Canada, 2013). 
In 2010, Canada's deputy foreign minister explained that Operation PROTEUS 
(the deployment of a Canadian Forces team to Jerusalem to support the work of the 
Office of the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority) 
was Canada's "second largest deployment after Afghanistan" (Evyatar, 2010). Former 
head of the U.S. Security Coordinator mission for building the PA security force, 
Lieutenant-General Keith Dayton, emphasized that "the Canadian contribution is 
invaluable," in a 2009 speech to the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. Dayton 
went on to explain: 
What we have created are new men ... [men who] believe that their mission is to 
build a Palestinian state ... Upon the return of these new men of Palestine, they 
have shown motivation, discipline and professionalism, and they have made such 
a difference - and I am not making this up - that senior IDF commanders ask me 
frequently: 'how many more of these new Palestinians can you generate, and how 
quickly, because they are our way to leave the West Bank.' 
The training of Pal~stinian security forces is coordinated with Israel, Dayton also publicly 
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stated: "We don't provide anything to the Palestinians unless it has been thoroughly 
coordinated with the State of Israel and they agree to it" (2009). This includes the vetting 
of security services personnel. 
Nonetheless, for many Palestinians, a U.S.-trained, Israel-vetted security force is 
not seen in a good light, but rather as a mechanism to keep the West Bank under control 
and aid the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority against its rival Hamas. These security 
services have been involved in quelling a number of nonviolent protests across the West 
Bank. The so-called Palestine Papers, documents leaked to Aljazeera news network, 
included extensive correspondence between General Dayton and Palestinian chief 
negotiator Saeb Erekat detailing collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian security 
services, as well as Dayton's knowledge of torture of Hamas members in the West Bank 
(Perry, 2011). In the London Review of Books, Adam Shatz aptly wrote: "It is an 
extraordinary arrangement: the security forces of a country under occupation are being 
subcontracted by third parties outside the region to prevent resistance to the occupying 
power, even as that power continues to grab more land" (2011 ). 
Financial resources for these security forces come in the form of "aid" packages 
to the Palestinian Authority. The reality is that under the rubric of development aid the 
Canadian state has found a key mechanism for managing its relationship with the 
Palestinian Authority: exerting pressure when necessary by withholding aid and giving 
aid in key areas, such as to the security forces described above. In 2006, Canada was the 
first country, after Israel, to cut aid from the PA when Hamas was elected, only to restore 
it later when the split between Fatah and Hamas occurred. Canadian officials have not 
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hidden the fact that aid to the Palestinian Authority is provided for the benefit of Israel. In 
January 2008, Maxime Bernier, Canada's then foreign minister, declared: "We are doing 
that because we want Israel to be able to live in peace and security with its neighbors" 
(Zohar, 2008). 
The stated reason for the provision of aid to the West Bank PA is that it is 
specifically meant for the development of Palestinian state institutions. The Canadian 
International Development Agency's (CIDA) program is aligned with the requirements 
identified in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). According to the 
Canadian government, 
Canada is a leading contributor to the development of Palestinian institutions, and 
is in the midst of implementing a $300 million commitment over five years in 
support of the peace process and of Palestinian reform and development in the 
priority areas of security, governance and prosperity. (Government of Canada, 
2013) 
The main thrust of the PRDP is to build state institutions in accordance with a crude 
neoliberal plan for the Palestinian economy. Authors Khalidi and Samour have noted that 
the plan "faithfully reflect[s] the economic policy agenda set forth in the so-called 'Post-
Washington Consensus' (PWC) orthodoxy advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions 
(BWI), the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since the late 
1990s" (2011, p. 9). In adherence with basic neoliberal dictates, the Canadian state 
focuses its aid on support for "private sector development as a major driver of sustainable 
economic growth, employment and stability. In doing so, Canada focuses on helping to 
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develop a more investment-favourable business environment in the West Bank" 
(Government of Canada, 2013). 
In line with this trajectory, trade relations between the PA and Canada fall within 
the Joint Canadian-Palestinian Framework on Economic Cooperation and Trade, signed 
with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on behalf of the Palestinian 
Authority. This framework confirms PA "approval of the application of preferential 
tariffs and any future concessions under CIFT A to goods produced in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip" (Government of Canada, 2013). In this manner, Canadian relations with the 
PA are mediated through its wider relationship with the Israeli economy-this not only 
ties the Palestinian Authority into neoliberal trade agreements, but further consolidates 
Israeli control over future Palestinian economic development. 
As part of this shift in funding priorities to the PA, the Canadian government 
announced in January 2010 that it would transfer its financial support for the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA, the UN agency responsible for Palestinian 
refugees) to the Palestinian Authority. This decision showed weakening Canadian 
government concern for the plight of Palestinian refugees, and a commitment to 
strengthening the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority against Hamas. While officially, the 
Canadian state claims to support a two-state solution, the reality is that on the diplomatic, 
military, and economic levels, it supports Israel's actions uncritically and further 
manages its relationship with the Palestinians in accordance with Israel's interests. The 
aid given for the development of security services, and the support for neoliberal 
development within: the Palestinian Occupied Territories, only function to cement Israel's 
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illegal military occupation. 
Empire, Racism, and the War on Terror 
The foregoing discussion has focused on Canada's position as a second-level 
power within the top tier of the world market, and the implications of this for Canada's 
role in the Middle East and its relationship to Israel. It is necessary to tum now to the 
ways in which this position is articulated within Canada's domestic policies towards 
racialized groups such as Palestinians. One of the key features of neoliberalism is-as 
David McNally has noted-its dual feature of both advancing an ideological and 
programmatic defence of the free market, whilst simultaneously ensuring that 
oppositional voices are silenced or marginalized. Extra economic coercion is a necessary 
corollary of neoliberalism, designed to discipline behaviours that contradict market-
oriented reform (McNally, 2010, p. 113-120). This argument can be extended to include 
the ways in which a neoliberal state such as Canada systematically employs discursive, 
ideological, and other forms of silencing against elements of its population who appear to 
challenge the wider imperialist orientation traced in the discussion above. The Palestinian 
case provides a particularly salient example of this "discipline through silencing," which 
has consistently worked to sustain the project of Canadian imperialism in the Middle 
East. 
On the discursive level, the Canadian state's support for Israel has echoed notions 
advanced by authors such as Samuel Huntington-who posited an eternal Clash of 
Civilizations ( 1996), and a view of Arabs and Muslims as static, irrational beings who are 
culturally inferior-, as well as Francis Fukuyama's End of History (1992) thesis, which 
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argued that capitalist liberal democracy is the way forward for the rest of the world. 
These two themes combine to mark Arabs and Muslims as civilizationally inferior, while 
at the same time as being unable to enter the new democratic world order based on 
capitalist social relations (Ali, 2003; Mahajan, 2002). Drawing upon these discursive 
tropes, the Canadian government has promoted Israel as a democracy with shared 
Wes tern values and a common civilizational agenda, struggling to survive against 
overwhelming odds. In this manner, racialized discourses of Arab/Muslim backwardness, 
which underpin the War on Terror, were utilized to promote Israel as a key ally in that 
war. This process took place in the context of post 9/11 restructuring of racial relations, 
which sets the world in terms of opposing binaries of civilized vs. uncivilized, and good 
vs. evil. 
This view is consistent with the way empire building has historically relied on 
racist constructions to advance and justify its expansion. As Razack explained: "empire is 
a structure of feeling, a deeply held belief in the need to and the right to dominate others 
for their own good, others who are expected to be grateful" (2004, p. 10). McNally also 
rightly emphasized that, "to invoke the defense of civilization is simultaneously to paint 
the enemy as uncivilized, savage, barbaric - all the standard motifs of racism" (2002, 
148). These racial binaries of civilized vs. uncivilized, however, do not only affect the 
world outside the borders of a given state, they reflect on domestic 'Others' in a variety 
of ways-from overt state-sanctioned racial profiling to more subtle forms of common 
sense racism. 
One of the most important features of this new form of racism is a particular 
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projection of "Muslim." Sherene Razack noted that: 
three allegorical figures have come to dominate the social landscape of the "war 
on terror" and its ideological underpinnings of a clash of civilizations: the 
dangerous Muslim man, the imperiled Muslim woman, and the civilized 
European, the latter a figure who is seldom explicitly named but who nevertheless 
anchors the first two figures. (2008, 5) 
Not only is there a projection of specific "allegorical figures," there is an insistence 
regarding how these figures should behave to redeem themselves in order to re-enter the 
mainstream. As Mahmoud Mamdani also explained, within mainstream discourse after 
September 11, 2001, "'Bad Muslims' were clearly responsible for terrorism ... 'good 
Muslims' were anxious to clear their names of consciences of these horrible crimes ... 
and unless proven to be 'good', every Muslim was presumed to be 'bad'" (2004, p. 15). 
Importantly, the racialization of Arabs and Muslims has occured both inside and 
outside the borders of the nation state. The so-called War on Terror, as a "global war" on 
an "existential threat," according to its advocates, is a war that transcends borders and 
definitions of combatants; it also turns on domestic minorities with increased surveillance 
and policing. As Thobani noted, "the racialization of the category 'Muslim' made it 
inevitable that racialized Others inside the country would come to be linked directly with 
the enemy outside the borders of the nation-state" (2007, p. 238). Even strong advocates 
of official multiculturalism, like Kymlicka, noted the changes in relations after the fall of 
the twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001. According to Kymlicka, "The 9111 
attacks, and the subsequent Madrid and London bombings, have led to the 
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'resecuritization' of state-Muslim relations, as fears have arisen that locally settled 
Muslims might collaborate with external enemies of the West, serving as a fifth column" 
(2007, p. 125). Kymlicka also made the connection between multiculturalism in the West 
and geo-political security: 
given that the public acceptance of multiculturalism in the West has depended on 
the perception that it is consistent with both the geopolitical security of the state 
and the personal security of individual citizens, support for a liberal 
multiculturalist approach to the integration of Muslim migrants faces an uphill 
battle in Western Europe. (2007, p. 125) 
Therefore, official multiculturalism, which helps to foster domestic social stability 
because it is designed to create optics of "inclusion" for historically racialized groups, is 
tested to its limits when internal "inclusion" interferes with foreign policies. This has 
meant, in the case of Canada, a "re-whitening of Canadian identity" and a redefinition of 
it along "civilizational lines" (Arat-Koc, 2005, p. 32). 
Too often, however, racism against Arabs and Muslims is not analyzed as a 
structural feature of Western societies; rather, it is only referred to and studied during 
overt moments of discrimination such as deportation to torture prisons (as was the case 
with Canadian citizen Maher Arrar who was deported to a prison in Syria) or security 
certificates (which have affected Arabs disproportionally). These instances are often seen 
as aberrations that might be corrected, or explained as the work of "a few bad apples" (as 
was the case with the Abu Ghraib torture scandal), or even viewed as temporary 
"necessary evils" to help the West in a battle for survival. In contrast to this 
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"exceptionalist" approach, an understanding of the systemic, common sense racialization 
of Arabs and Muslims-beyond simply its most overt moments-allows us to situate the 
racialization process within the actual lived histories of migrant communities. Naming 
and analyzing this racism through moments of erasure, silencing, and censorship allows 
us to study how it is constructed and perpetuated in a multicultural context that claims 
tolerance and diversity. 
Palestinian Racialization: Erasure and Silencing 
Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim racism is most acute in form when it comes to 
Palestinians and the Palestinian narrative. Goldberg described racial Palestinianization as 
"among the most repressive, the most subjugating and degrading, the most deadly forms 
of racial targeting, branding and rationalization not least in the name of racelessness" 
(2009, p. 130). The racialization of Palestinians and the silencing campaign against 
solidarity with them, however, does not begin with the War on Teffor; it is rooted in the 
erasure of the Palestinian narrative of dispossession. The following section begins by 
rooting this racialization historically in the first act of erasure and silencing, the 1948 
ethnic cleansing of Palestine, or the Nakba (the Arabic word for catastrophe). Next, the 
specific racialized discourses utilized in the Canadian context to silence the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement are discussed, including the utilization of multicultural language 
itself, accusations of anti-Semitism, legislative measures, and harsh disciplinary actions. 
It is important to note, first and foremost, that this racialization is solidified on the 
longstanding settler-colonial solidarity between Israel and Canada-one that, 
importantly, denies the experience of indigenous communities in both countries. Harper 
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himself has noted publicly that Canada has "no history of colonialism" (Ljunggren, 
2009). This depoliticization of Canadian history is the starting point of obscuring the 
colonial past, along with the persistence of racial, class, and gender inequalities in 
modem Canada. In speaking of this, Thobani rightly argued that Canadian identity "has 
been deeply racialized since its inception in colonial violence, and that it remains 
inextricably infused with the colonial tropes of white racial supremacy and western 
civilizational superiority" (2007, p. 249). It is no coincidence that a state based in this 
type of erasure would tolerate the erasure, silencing, and censorship of the Palestinian 
narrative of dispossession. 
This type of settler solidarity begins with an erasure of indigenous history and 
colonial conquest. As Nadeau and Sears have argued, 
the silencing of Palestine solidarity has a very long history, and is ultimately 
grounded in the particular character of Palestinian unfreedom. One of the 
fundamental characteristics of Palestinian unfreedom has been the attempted 
erasure of the Palestinian people, their history and their presence. (20 I 0, 7) 
These authors have traced Palestinian unfreedom to the 1947 /48 Nakba (catastrophe), the 
initial ethnic cleansing that saw the expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian 
population and the destruction of more than 500 villages (20 I 0, 7). 15 Importantly, 
Palestinian history following the 194 7 /48 Nakba has been marked with consistent 
resistance to the erasure and silencing of Palestinian history and culture. The history of 
15. For more information and scholarship on the Nakba, see Abu-Lughood & Sa' di, 2007; 
Khalidi, 1992; Masalha, 1997; Pappe, 2007. 
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"Palestinian oppression is defined here as resulting in not only the collective mass 
displacement and transfer of the population in 1948 and 1967 but also the incessant and 
invisible effort of muting (silencing) the Palestinian narrative" (Habashi, 2005, p. 711). 
As with all colonial projects, this "muting of Palestinian narrative" is anchored on 
racializing Palestinians as inferior. As a people facing, surviving, and challenging a 
colonial project embodied in the Zionist movement, the Palestinians are accorded the 
status of being non-existent in the Zionist narrative-or at best, are perceived to be 
"backward natives," violent and uncivilized. Since Israel was portrayed by the Zionist 
movement as the 'bulwark of civilization against Asiatic barbarism" (Herzl, 1896, 18), 
then the people it was displacing, the indigenous population, were to be constructed as 
the "bulwark" of backwardness and barbarism. These are the ideological underpinnings 
used to justify the colonization of Palestine and the silencing of anyone who challenges 
this colonization. Israel was conceived by the Zionist movement and understood in the 
West as a hub of civilization that shares similar values with Western democracies. This 
conception has only been fortified further with every Israeli military victory; Israel is 
referred to as the only democracy in the Middle East, despite ample and well documented 
evidence to the contrary (Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 
2011 ). Israel, in mainstream discourse and politics, becomes the signifier of Western 
values and Palestinians the signifier of the anti-Western. 
A key feature of Palestine solidarity, and more specifically the BDS movement, is 
to challenge this racialization, while at the same time problematizing the "normal" view 
of Israel in the West. A principal aim of the BDS movement is to place the Palestinian 
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narrative and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine as a starting point for discussions of any 
solution to the conflict, as, rather· than analyzing the situation as one between two equal 
conflicting sides, the Palestine movement understands it as an anti-colonial struggle. This 
perspective challenges the core principles of Western hegemony in the Middle East, and 
strategically implicates Western governments and corporations in Israel's ongoing 
violations of Palestinian human rights. For this reason, the Palestine Solidarity Movement 
has faced systematic silencing, curtailment of freedom of expression, and an attempt to 
restrict its access to public space. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has situated the Canadian state's relationship to the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement in the broader context of Canada's position in the world market, its 
role in upholding the imperial order, and the racial hierarchies that stem from it. There is 
a powerful case to be made, based in the literature of critical political economy, for 
seeing the Canadian state not as a neutral, rights-abiding force within global politics, but 
as an imperialist state that has long played an aggressive role within the world market. 
Within the Middle East region, Canada operates within the framework of a U.S.-
led imperialism aimed at securing the resources of the region and bringing it under 
Wes tern control, guaranteeing the flow of petro-dollars and opening the markets of the 
region to foreign investment. Within this framework, a close relationship with and 
support for Israel has become a key pillar. The Canadian state, although it has historically 
supported Israel since the debate on its creation, has increasingly and very openly allied 
itself diplomaticallx, militarily, and economically, with Israeli state policies. Silencing of 
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the Palestinian narrative constitutes an essential part of structuring and perpetuating a 
racial project in Canada that deems Palestinians uncivilized, while positing all traits of 
liberal democracy on the Israeli state. 
As various examples of the silencing campaign throughout this work will 
illustrate, the racialized discourses and mechanisms for silencing Palestine activism do 
vary between softer discursive approaches and harder disciplinary ones (such as cuts to 
funding). All of these discourses and mechanisms of coercion stem from the specific 
nature of the neoliberal Canadian state, despite the liberal multicultural rhetoric on 
diversity and tolerance. Indeed, one of the key mechanisms of silencing is the use of 
official multicultural language itself, especially concepts of "civility" and "dialogue." 
Tolerance and civility are used to claim that views critical of Israel cause discomfort and 
harm diversity and thus should not be tolerated. This language of civility fits neatly with 
the wider discourses of a clash of civilizations. Notions of diversity and civility act to 
mark Palestine solidarity activism as outside of tolerated, acceptable speech in 
multicultural Canada. These constitute the softer side of the silencing campaign, in which 
freedom of speech is limited in the name of protecting diversity and civility. These 
discursive silencing tools go hand in hand with more disruptive disciplining mechanisms 
like defunding organizations, outlawing specific speech through legislative measures, 
introducing bureaucratic and security hurdles in booking spaces for activities, and so 
forth. The defunding of ethno cultural organizations (such as the Canadian Arab 
Federation and Palestine House) is designed to have a serious chilling effect on 
communities that goes beyond the immediate programs that are defunded. The remainder 
89 
1' 
of this dissertation will examine case studies of silencing, including the silencing of 
Israeli Apartheid Week on campuses, the defunding campaign against groups perceived 
to be pro-Palestinian, and finally, the attempts to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid 
from marching in Pride Toronto. In all of the cases studied, the focus will be on the role 
of the state in the silencing campaign, with an understanding that other institutions also 
play key roles in racializing and silencing Palestine advocacy. 
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Chapter 3. Silencing Dissent on Campus: the Case of Israeli Apartheid Week 
"One has to keep telling the [Palestinian} story in as many ways as possible, as 
insistently as possible, and in as compelling a way as possible, to keep attention to it, 
because there is always the fear that it might just disappear" (Said, 2003, p. 187). 
"The organizers of Israeli Apartheid Week use the cover of academic freedom to 
demonize and delegitimize the State of Israel. Jn reality, this week is nothing more than 
an unbalanced attempt to paint Israel and her supporters as racist. This week runs 
contrary to Canadian values of tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding" (Kenney, 
2012). 
University campuses have long been regarded as a space for critical debate and 
the building of solidarity with international struggles, although certainly a space 
embedded within a broader set of ruling relations (Smith, 1999). Despite the fact that the 
production of knowledge in North American universities is increasingly linked to the 
interests of the corporate sector, campuses provide an important space to organize in 
support of marginalized and oppressed groups (Sears, 2003). The gains made by social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s around academic freedom and access to campus 
space, although increasingly under attack at the dawn of the twenty-first century, allow 
for a degree of freedom for political activism. That the university continues to be a 
contested political space is perhaps nowhere more evident than with respect to the 
Palestine Solidarity Movement. This is most sharply felt in the attacks on campus-based 
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Palestine solidarity organizations, such as Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), 
Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA), and Students for Palestinian Human Rights 
(SPHR). 
This chapter focuses on the silencing campaign mounted during Israeli Apartheid 
Week against the flagship organizations of the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada: 
Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA) and Students for Palestinian Human Rights 
(SPHR). Israeli Apartheid Week runs for seven days in late February or early March 
depending on the a~ademic schedule and comprises educational lectures, film screenings, 
and social events organized on university campuses across Canada. It started at the 
University of Toronto in 2005, under the banner of the Arab Students' Collective, and 
broadened to include a cross-Canada coalition of student activists known as Students 
Against Israeli Apartheid before spreading internationally. In the year 2012, 216 IA W 
events were held around the world. The stated aim of IA Wis "to educate people about 
the nature of Israel as an apartheid system and to build Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions (BDS) campaigns as part of a growing global BDS movement" (Israeli 
Apartheid Week, 2012). IA W seeks to insert a Palestinian-centred narrative and acts as a 
"counter history" against what authors Abu Loughod and Sa' di have described as "the 
thundering story of Zionism" (2007, p. 6). 
The silencing campaign against IA W, a permanent fixture of the academic 
calendar in Canada, can be understood as a prototype of the silencing campaign against 
Palestine solidarity activism more generally. Efforts to de-legitimize Israeli Apartheid 
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Week come predominantly from the organized Israel lobby, 16 but the emphasis of this 
chapter is on how the Canadian state aligns with this lobby group through use of 
techniques of ostracism and marginalization of IA W. A central premise underpinning 
these processes is the unsubstantiated claim that IA W, and the use of the term "apartheid" 
in particular, is a form of anti-Semitism against Jewish people. 
Canadian officials have argued that IA W shuts the door on civil debate and goes 
against mutual respect-ostensible pillars of Canadian diversity. As Eva Mackey, author 
of The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identify in Canada, noted, 
"pluralism and tolerance have a key place, and an institutionalized place, in the cultural 
politics of national identity in Canada." She further added that "the story of Canada's 
tolerant nationhood has often been framed in terms of its policy and mythology or 
'multiculturalism"' (2002, p. 2-3). As this suggests, the definitions of tolerance and 
diversity are regarded as the legitimate purview of elected officials, rather than as a site 
of free debate and political contestation. What we see, then, is how attempts to 
de legitimize IA Ware part of wider efforts to harness "multiculturalism" as "a key 
process by which the state manages difference by maintaining control over the power to 
name and annex 'the other"' (Walton-Roberts, 2011, p. 106). By categorizing IA Was 
racist and outside the bounds of civility, the state automatically engages in both naming 
and silencing. 
16. It is important to note that the Israel/Zionist lobby is itself a diverse grouping with the main 
aim of garnering support for Israeli state policies in Canada. It includes individuals and non-
governmental organizations, some of whom claim to speak on behalf of the Jewish community, 
but also others who .are ideological Zionists and Christian Zionists. See for example, Freeman-
Maloy's analysis of some transitions within sections of this lobby (Freeman-Maloy, 2006). 
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In developing these arguments, this chapter begins by situating official campaigns 
against IA W within a broader context of silencing on North American campuses. It then 
moves on to a brief historical overview of student organizing in the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement (focusing on Toronto) and the history of Israeli Apartheid Week in Canada. 
After briefly discussing the responses of the Israel lobby and university administrations to 
IA W, the chapter deals in detail with authoritative declarations against IA Win 
parliament and among elected officials. 
Silencing Palestine on Campus 
In the broader North American context, enormous resources have been marshalled 
in an attempt to silence criticism of Israel in the academy, usually taking the form of 
harassing professors seen to be pro-Palestinian (Benin, 2004). Although such harassment 
campaigns have always existed, they vastly intensified in the rubric of the War on Terror 
as pundits played on the new nationalist fervor inflected with anti-Arab and anti-Muslim 
racism. As Pappano noted, in an article titled "Academic Freedom Threatened in Ontario 
Universities," "in North America, students and faculty raising critical viewpoints about, 
Israel find themselves muffled, accused of anti-Semitism, threatened with disciplinary 
action, or, in the case of former Depaul University professor, Norman Finkelstein, out of 
a job entirely" (2009). 
With the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada, campus activism began to 
challenge the founding myths of Zionism and their hegemonic narrative of Israel as a 
perpetual victim state. In response, supporters of Israel quickly coined the term "the new-
anti-Semitism"-defined effectively as any criticism of Israeli policies (Chesler, 2003; 
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Dershowitz, 2003; Iganski & Kosmin, 2003). Through employing new accusations of 
anti-Semitism, it was hoped that those critical of Israeli policies would either be silenced 
or too caught up with defending themselves against allegations to organize. Importantly, 
this was a strategy aimed at stigmatizing Palestine solidarity as racist. Officials in Canada 
that target pro-Palestinian advocacy usually employ the terminology of the "new anti-
Semitism" as a silencing tool. For example, in his 2009 speech to the Inter-parliamentary 
London Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA), Jason Kenny, Minister of 
Citizenship and Multiculturalism, stated "we do see the growth of a new anti-Semitism, 
the anti-Semitism predicated on the notion that the Jews alone have no right to a 
homeland, the anti-Zionist version of anti-Semitism" (CBC News, 2009). 17 The irony 
here is that it is Palestinians who are denied a homeland and left stateless. This conflation 
of anti-Zionism, referring to a state ideology, with anti-Semitism (racism against Jews) 
works to conflate all Jews with the actions of the Israeli state, while simultaneously 
attempting to cast all Palestine advocacy as racist. 
In the U.S., organizations like the David Project and Campus Watch were 
established in an attempt to silence university professors who were challenging the 
Zionist narrative. Scholars working on the Middle East were pronounced "un-American" 
for producing work that did not support U.S. interests in the Middle East. As the Campus-
17. ICCA is a grouping of parliamentarians, established in 2000, that initially came out of the 
Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism, organized by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The 1999 London Declaration called on parliamentarians "to expose, challenge and isolate 
political actors who engage in hate against Jews and target the State oflsrael as a Jewish 
collectivity" (ICCA, 2009). The Canadian Coalition Against Anti-Semitism, initiated by 
Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenny along with Erwin Cotler, came 
out of the ICCA process. 
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Watch website put it, "U.S. scholars of the Middle East lack any appreciation of their 
country's national interests and often use their positions of authority to disparage these 
interests" (2005). As Makdisi and Goldberg noted: 
It is an extraordinary fact that no fewer than thirty-three distinct organizations-
including AIPAC, the Zionist Organization of America, the American Jewish 
Congress, and the Jewish National Fund-are gathered together today as members 
or affiliates of the Israel on Campus Coalition ... to generate [in their 
organizations' words] a pro-active, pro-Israel agenda on campus." (2009) 
In Canada, the attack was more pronounced when it came to student organizing. 
For example, even before the issue of the academic boycott of Israel had been discussed 
on any university campus in Canada, in the summer of 2007, 19 university presidents 
signed a statement that opposed academic boycotts. This step was executed without any 
consultation with university bodies or students and was seen as a direct measure taken to 
foreclose any discussion on academic boycotts. 18 
As with most social movements, students provide a core of organizers within the 
Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada. This explains the centrality of the debate over 
use of campus space, the use of specific terminology (such as Israeli apartheid), and the 
notion of academic freedom to the movement. In Canada, a very organized 
silencing/censorship campaign has been going on, not only against students active within 
the Palestine Solidarity Movement, but also the faculty who support them (Nadeau & 
18. All statements are collated under a document titled "Statements by Canadian University 
Presidents on the Is~ue of Academic Boycotts" (Canadian Academics for Peace in the Middle 
East, 2010). 
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Sears, 20 I 0). Student activists have noted discrimination in terms of access to space and 
increased bureaucratic hurdles to Palestine-related events, as well as direct administrative 
coordination with Zionist organizations to cancel events related to the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions campaign. In one instance, Freedom of Information Requests 
demonstrate that the cancellation of a student conference titled "Standing Against 
Apartheid" in October of 2008 was discussed prior to the room booking request even 
being handed in (Schofield, 2009). 
The use of space management policies and student codes of conduct to restrict 
PSM activities has been increasingly pursued. For example, the Temporary Use of 
University Space Policy and Procedures (TUUSP), revised in 2004 by the York 
University administration, requires assessments of "High Profile, Controversial or High 
Risk External Speakers." It also includes restrictions on use of campus space by declaring 
the University's lands and properties as private (Canadian Association of University 
Teachers (CAUT), 2008). In 2008, the University of Toronto introduced a similar "Space 
Booking Policy." Student Codes of Conduct were revamped or introduced on a number 
of campuses as a way to manage non-classroom student behaviour. The Canadian 
Association of University Teachers (CAUT) noted, in speaking of York's Student Code 
of Conduct and Temporary Use of Space policy, that: 
The dispassionate language of policy and procedures is utilized to camouflage 
mechanisms that have the potential to infringe in a significant manner on 
academic freedom and freedom of speech .... in the hands of administrators, 
policies and procedures may be called into use as forceful disciplinary tools to 
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suppress legitimate debate and dissent. (2008) 
A 2006 report by CAUT, set up to investigate cases of infringement on freedom 
of expression at York University, concluded: "For many faculty members and students 
the explanation for the contentious events that [have] unfolded on the York campus is 
found in what they see as decisions by the university's senior administration to support 
pro-Israel initiatives and marginalize pro-Palestinian efforts." 19 The introduction of 
student codes of conduct and stricter procedures regarding use of campus space were the 
main mechanisms pursued by university administrations to curb political activism under 
the guise of neutral procedures. 
For example, although charging security fees may seem like a standard procedure 
that applies equally to all groups, it clearly disadvantages groups without access to 
resources and outside financing. Beyond security fees, criteria and procedures for "risk 
assessments" are not public, leaving it up to administrators to decide who poses a risk. 
These decisions on who poses a risk are not neutral procedural matters. In one example, 
York University Security Services charged Students for Palestinian Human Rights 
(SPRH) the costs needed to pay for ten external police officers for a talk given by 
Norman Finkelstein on York's campus. Students at the University of Toronto refused to 
pay such a security fee when they invited acclaimed author Tariq Ali to speak on their 
19. One such case at York was the suspension of student Daniel Freeman-Maloy for the use of a 
megaphone on campus at a rally for Palestine. A court eventually decided that the university 
president at the time, Loma Marsden, had "maliciously misused her statutory power to harm York 
honours student Daniel Freeman-Maloy by summarily suspending him for three years for his 
participation in two campus demonstrations." A CAUT bulletin titled "Supreme Court Refuses to 
Hear York Appeal" reported on this specific case (2006). 
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campus. Such silencing campaigns also involve increased scrutiny of critical academic 
events/papers that relate to Palestine/Israel. 20 
Restricting campus space and imposing codes of conduct resonates with a view of 
students as customers paying for a service in the context of a neoliberal university, rather 
than as active participants in the politics that shape the world around them. As Nadeau 
and Sears have argued, 
the goal of neoliberalism in post-secondary education is to make the universities 
serve exclusively economic goals, preparing students for the corporate workplace 
and creating know-how that can be commercialized. This requires a serious 
culture shift on campuses. One of the core political projects of neoliberalism on 
campus has been to roll back the spaces for campus activism and freedom of 
expression originally won by student militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. (2010) 
Although the intended effect of the v·arious access to space policies and student codes of 
student conduct is to depoliticize campus space and monitor student activism under the 
veneer of neural procedures, they have not passed without contestation from the student 
body. While students continue to face restrictions, room cancellations, and requests for 
detailed information on invited speakers, IA W has nonetheless continued and the student 
sector of the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada continues to anchor its activities 
internationally to a large extent. The following section traces the origins of Israeli 
20. The "Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace" conference at York 
University was one such case where the university administration, as well as government 
officials, intervened in the event requesting changes and extra scrutiny due to the topic at hand. 
See "No Debate: The Israel Lobby and Free Speech at Canadian Universities" by Jon Thompson 
(2011) for a full account of the campaign against the "Mapping Models" conference. 
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Apartheid Week in Toronto placing it in the broader historical context in which it 
emerged during the second Palestinian uprising. 
Origins and History of Israeli Apartheid Week 
At the onset of the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 2000, international 
solidarity efforts with the Palestinian people were in disarray after years of the so-called 
Oslo peace process. The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the umbrella body of the Palestinian liberation movement, and the 
Israeli government, transferred limited powers to the newly established Palestinian 
Authority. They were heralded as a new period of peace negotiations between the Israeli 
state and the PLO, meant to result in two states living side by side. In reality, the Accords 
build on a long standing Israeli policy drive to establish limited Palestinian "self-rule," 
while allowing the Israeli military to maintain remote control over the occupied territories 
of the West Bank and Gaza and their respective populations without deploying its 
soldiers in Palestinian urban centres (Hanieh 2003 ). 
Under the auspices of the Oslo's Accords, discussions on borders, illegal Israeli 
settlements in Palestinian Occupied Territories, further annexation of Jerusalem, and the 
right of return for Palestinian refugees were postponed to "final status" negotiations 
allowing Israel ample time to create "facts on the ground" that prejudiced any final 
outcome. For example, while illegal settlements were designated a "final status" issue, 
under a labour government Israel launched massive settlement expansion. The number of 
Israeli settlers living in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip doubled from 1994 
to the beginning of the year 2000 (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2002). The Oslo 
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Accords divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. The Palestinian Authority was 
given authority over Area A and shared authority with Israel over Area B, while Israel 
retained control of Area C, which constituted more than 70% of the territory (Usher, 
1995). Travel in and out of Areas A and B was under strict Israeli control. Israel retained 
control over major water aquifers as well (Gvirtzman, 1997, 7). In Israel, a network of so-
called bypass roads, or restricted access highways, was established to connect the illegal 
settlements to each other and to cities inside Israel. These bypass roads also acted to 
segment Palestinian cities from each other and restrict Palestinian movement (Shah, 
1997, 221; B'Tselem, 2004). 
In short, the Oslo Accords allowed the Israeli state to give Palestinians limited 
autonomy, yet retain final control over the land and economy. This period also saw the 
move of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) institutions from exile in Tunis and 
surrounding states like Lebanon and Syria to the West Bank and Gaza. 
In July 2000, under the sponsorship of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israel's then 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the late Palestinian Authority President Y asser Arafat 
were meant to sign off on final status issues for the Oslo Accords. The negotiations 
collapsed as the Israeli side insisted there would be no return to 1967 borders, but that 
East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control and large settlement blocks in the 
West Bank would be annexed to Israel; most importantly, there would be no right of 
return for Palestinian refugees, only a limited number of reunification of families (Said, 
2000, 9-14). The second Intifada effectively erupted after these negotiations failed, 
following a visit b~ Israeli military commander Ariel Sharon on September 28, 2000 to 
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Haram Al Sharif in Jerusalem. The Palestinian population, seeing further land 
confiscation for Israel's network of bypass roads and increasing settlement construction 
in recent years, took to the streets in protest, understanding that the Oslo Accords were 
more about institutionalizing Israel's control rather than granting sovereignty. The Israeli 
military responded to protests with militant collective punishment, including enforcing 
curfews and restrictions on movement, and making mass arrests and military incursions. 
In November 2000, under the pretext that it wanted to protect its citizens from Palestinian 
violence, Israel announced plans to build a large Wall that would cut across the West 
Bank, sealing what some have called Israel's Bantustan solution (Bishara, 2002; Hilal, 
2007).21 
With the collapse of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian population-from inside 
the Occupied Territories, those in exile, and those inside Israel-were forced to respond 
to ongoing Israeli military campaigns. Unfortunately, the shift in Palestinian politics 
during this period-between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the eruption of 
the second Palestinian uprising in 2000-meant that structures of the Palestinian 
21. Beginning in 1913, the white South African government started promoting a scheme of 
concentrating blacks inside a dozen allegedly self-governing geographical areas. These areas 
were initially called "native reserves," then referred to as "homelands," and finally named 
"Bantustans." The areas, which reserved 13% of the land for only 75% of the population, which 
was black, were mostly non-contiguous. Blacks living outside Bantustans were often forcefully 
and violently relocated to the Bantustans. In 1970, blacks living in the Bantustans were stripped 
of their South African citizenship and declared citizens of their Bantustans. Thus, the use of the 
term "Bantustan" to designate self-governing Palestinian territories within an intended "two state 
solution" relies on a series of structural and functional similarities with the Bantustan system 
during apartheid in South Africa: 1. The vast inequality in the distribution of land. 2. The lack of 
contiguity, which makes territorial independence impossible. 3. The economic and military 
dependence on Israel., 4. The facade of independence, statehood, and international recognition of 
a structure that is fully under the control of another state. 
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liberation movement, as well as structures of international solidarity established through 
the 1970s and 1980s, had become dormant, often as a result of disillusionment brought on 
by the results of the Oslo process (Hanieh & Ziadah, 2010, 87). The Palestinian anti-
colonial liberation project, which had relied upon international solidarity in earlier 
decades, had morphed into a state-building project limited to the West Bank and Gaza. 
Although Arafat had not signed off on the final status negotiations that would foreclose 
Palestinian right ofreturn, Palestinians in exile had been largely cut off from the 
decision-making process. Younger generations of Palestinians living in the West a decade 
earlier had belonged to the General Union of Palestinian Students, a historically active 
union within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). At the beginning of the 
second Intifada, however, there was no comparable organizational formation to 
participate in. As institutions of the PLO shifted into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
emphasis on organizational structures in the Palestinian diaspora had diminished. New 
ways and organizational forms of engaging with the situation on the ground in Palestine 
had to be created. 
Palestinian youth in the diaspora had been absorbed into the rhetoric of the Oslo 
peace process, and thus, to a large extent, joined organizations that promoted "dialogue" 
between Palestinian and Israeli youth. Such "dialogue" was embedded in a discourse of 
post-conflict resolution that equated the Israeli State and the newly formed Palestinian 
Authority, positing them as equal partners in peace negotiations. The second Intifada, 
however, came as a major challenge to such concepts of the Oslo period and forced 
Palestinian youth in exile to question their relationship to Palestine and their right to 
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return-put on the back burner during the long years of negotiations and considered a 
"final status" issue. As such, Palestinian youth in the diaspora were now challenged to re-
insert themselves into Palestinian politics. 
At the same time, an increasing number of Jewish students did not relate to Israeli 
policies, especially in the context of the continuation of the Intifada, and began 
identifying with anti-Zionism. They insisted that Israel did not speak in their name. 
Larger groups within the anti-globalization and anti-war movements also had to grapple 
with integrating Palestine as a central pillar of their campaigns against militarism and the 
corporatization of war in the Middle East region more broadly. Among these various 
networks, new organizational forms were beginning to emerge, along with stronger 
communication channels between Palestine and outside organizers. 
The analysis of Israel as a settler colony practicing colonialism, occupation, and 
apartheid brought cohesion to what had previously been disparate political groups. The 
continuation of the Intifada forced activists to tackle fundamental questions about the root 
causes of the conflict and go beyond the framework set out by the Oslo Accords. This 
shifted attention to broader political processes beyond the day-to-day human rights 
violations that had long been a concern since the beginning of the second Intifada. The 
launch of IA W was part of this process of rediscovering the anti-colonial history of the 
Palestinian struggle for self-determination beyond narrow state building imperatives. As 
IA W expanded, more scholars and public figures were analyzing the similarities between 
Israel's apartheid policies and those of apartheid-era South Africa (for examples, see 
Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2008; Bishara, 2001; former-US. President Jimmy Carter, 2006; 
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Davis, 2003; Tilley, 2012). 
Broadly speaking, as IA W was launched, student activism in the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement coalesced around two main objectives: 1. to advance the analysis of 
Israel as an apartheid state, and 2. to advance the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
campaign by building toward an academic boycott of Israeli institutions and calling for 
divestment from Israeli companies. The two objectives are of course interrelated, with the 
first being the educational component towards achieving a critical mass of students 
campaigning on their campuses for divestment from companies complicit in Israel's 
military occupation and apartheid policies. 
Israeli Apartheid Week emerged in this context with a focus on both promoting an 
analytical framework and an activist orientation. The week would tackle various aspects 
of Israel's apartheid policies towards the entirety of the Palestinian people and act as an 
intensive educational course (Israeli Apartheid Week, 2005). The first IA W was held in 
2005 at the University of Toronto campus and was organized by the Arab Students 
Collective. In following years, IA W took for its guiding principles the United Palestinian 
Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, issued in 2005 by over 170 Palestinian civil 
society and political organizations (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). 
A byproduct of IA W, beyond the educational aspect, was the immense training 
and skillset gained by student activists working to put on an intensive week of events. 
Organizers developed internal training courses in relating to the media, fundraising, 
choosing topics and speakers, coalition building, and establishing a promotional plan. 
Such skills are crucial to sustaining campus-based movements with a high turnover rate 
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of students. 
The first IA W was very much a reflection of the state of the student Palestine 
Solidarity Movement in Toronto at the time. It brought together speakers from the 
various existing Palestine solidarity organizations, as well as from allied movements. In 
its first year, IA W consisted of five days of lectures from January 31 to February 4, 2005. 
The first lecture was about Al-Nabka (catastrophe in Arabic), referring to the ethnic 
cleansing of Palestinians that took place in 1948. The following lectures focused on 
Palestinian political prisoners, the Wall, labour rights in Palestine, along with poverty in 
Toronto, in an effort to make connections with local struggles. The final Friday lectures 
were titled "Resisting Apartheid" and presented Ilan Pappe as the keynote speaker (at the 
time a professor at Haifa University), elaborating on Israel as an apartheid state and the 
necessity of a global BDS campaign. 
In the following year, IA W began to grow internationally. One of the main 
advances in 2006 was the first IA W taking place at the University of Oxford in the 
United Kingdom, organized by the Oxford Arab Society. Discussions then focused on 
ways IA W could adapt to local contexts and continue to expand. This laid the framework 
that IA W continues to organize by to this day: local groups decide how best to organize 
in their context, while keeping with the general principles of IA W. In various locations, 
IA W weeks took different forms, with some emphasizing academic lectures, and others 
film screenings and cultural events. 
It also happened that 2006 was the thirtieth anniversary of the Convention for the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This gave IA W its theme for that 
106 
year and highlighted the more analytical and legal definition of the term apartheid. 
Importantly, in Toronto at this point, the various Palestine solidarity organizations started 
working together under the auspices of the Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, and IA W 
was organized under the banner of Students Against Israeli Apartheid. 
In 2007, IA W was becoming a more dominant feature of the Palestine solidarity 
calendar internationally. The Universities of London (SOAS) and Cambridge joined 
Oxford in the United Kingdom; Ottawa and Hamilton joined Toronto and Montreal in 
Canada; and New York joined all the others as the site of the first IAW in the United 
States. 
As the year 2008 was the 60th anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba, IA W was 
held under the banner "60 Years of Ethnic Cleansing and Dispossession, Palestinian 
Refugees Will Return." In 2008, IA W took place in 25 cities across the world, and in 
South Africa for the first time, with the important symbolism of Dr. Azmi Bishara (then 
member of Israel's parliament) giving the key address in Soweto. His talk was taped and 
transmitted on Al-Jazeera's channel and broadcast at IA W events in different cities. This 
was a watershed moment for the global coordination of IA W. It had moved from being a 
single event on one university campus, to one taking place in cities around the world. To 
call Israel an apartheid state and organize a full week of events around that analysis was 
no longer seen as an insignificant act by a few local students. 
The threat of the spread of this analysis was not lost on pro-Israel organizations 
and their supporters. At this point, the McMaster University administration in Canada 
attempted to ban the use of the term "Israeli apartheid." This decision was rescinded after . 
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major mobilizations and a rally at McMaster by student organizations from across 
Ontario, including official student union locals who did not necessarily agree with the use 
of the term apartheid or know much about the situation in Palestine, but who wanted to 
assure that freedom of expression was upheld for their own future campaigning on 
campuses (Rebick & Sears, 2009). 
In 2009, IA W happened in the wake of Israel's war on Gaza. Once again, there 
was an exponential· growth in the number of locations that participated, with over 55 
IA W s taking place. Part of the strength of IA W and the reason for its rapid growth is the 
decentralized way in which it is organized. Events are listed on a simple website and no 
large bureaucratic structures are needed for the week to run. 
Pro-Israel Lobby Approaches to IA W 
As IA W spread internationally, the Israeli state felt the imperative to respond. In 
2012, for example, the Public Diplomacy Ministry of Israel created the "Faces of Israel" 
program, training 100 Israelis to travel on a mission to "represent and defend the state 
during Israel Apartheid Week" (Harkov, 2012). IAW has been scrutinized right from its 
inception. At the level of the Zionist lobby in Canada, there is a constant effort to have 
the week banned and equate it with hate speech. University administrations have also 
played an underhanded role in attempting to stall IA W activities. Before moving to the 
specific discourses and mechanisms used by the state, the following section will explain 
the general atmosphere and arguments against IA W. 
Predictably, the organized Zionist groups were in an uproar over Israeli Apartheid 
Week from its inception. In the first few years, attacks were confined to Zionist 
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organizations lobbying campus administrations to ban the week and/or organizing 
counter events. Yet as IA W spread to other campuses over the years, its condemnation 
became more widespread. The approaches to dealing with IA W varied from one Zionist 
organization to the other. This discussion offers a brief summary of some highlights 
within the Zionist response to IA W. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list of every single 
Zionist effort against the week, but a general summary of the main approaches used. 
One can divide the strategies deployed by varying Zionist organizations into soft 
and hard strategies. It is important to note, however, that those two approaches are not in 
opposition to each other, but act to reinforce one another very organically; their end goal 
is the same. The soft approach involves claims that IA W does not support debate that 
fosters peace in the region, but rather demonizes one side. This approach advocates 
dialogue groups and joint events. The hard approach works more directly to ban the week 
and organize counter events. 
The soft approach camp argues that ignoring IA W is the best method for 
depriving its organizers of any legitimacy. Instead they opt for organizing counter events 
that highlight the positive aspects of Israel. This softer approach also emphasizes 
targeting any support IA W might gamer from other organizations in the form of 
endorsements or sponsorship. While mobilizing energies to detract from the week, the 
soft approach employs the constant refrain of how marginal it is. Tilly Shames, Hillel of 
Greater Toronto's associate director in 2008, argued in an article in The Canadian Jewish 
News: 
What we found is that the organizers of this event are very marginalized on 
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campus ... and we feel that it is more effective to focus on the 90 per cent of 
students who are not interested in politicized events and want to come together to 
find a common ground for dialogue. (Shefa, 2008) 
Under the logic of this softer approach, a computer game was created called 
"Peacemaker" and was displayed throughout campuses in Toronto. The "game" 
encouraged students to decide what each side, Palestinian and Israeli, would have to give 
up for peace to be achieved (Shefa, 2008). The concept of dialogue features heavily in 
this approach with an emphasis on "positive Israel programming" that includes 
promoting Israel Appreciation Days to "take back the space on our campus" (Hillel of 
Greater Toronto - Anti-Hate Video, 2007). 
The soft approach also works to deemphasize Israel's militarism and human rights 
violations. In 2008, Hillel ran a series of ads titled "This is Israel" to promote Israel in 
Excalibur, The Ryersonian, and The Varsity, three campus newspapers at York, Ryerson 
University, and the University of Toronto, respectively. In 2010, the soft approach 
created its highest budget campaign yet, titled "Size doesn't matter," in an attempt to put 
emphasis on Israel as a thriving tourist destination despite its small size. A centerpiece of 
the campaign was a video that showed a Canadian woman telling her Israeli boyfriend, 
who appears to be naked, that "it's small" confusing the audience in terms of what she is 
referring to, until the camera pans to a map of Israel (Size Doesn't matter, 2010). 
Presumably, the title of this video was meant to impart to audiences that, just as the 
boyfriend's penis size "doesn't matter" in terms of performance, Israel's size also doesn't 
affect its ability to please as a tourist destination. This campaign was in line with the soft-
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approach method being used to distract from politics and Israel's record in the Palestinian 
occupied territories. 
On the other hand, the hard approach is much more direct, with advocates making 
calls to ban Israeli Apartheid Week and organizing confrontational counter events. For 
example, in 2008, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, in partnership with Betar Tagar, 
organized a series oflectures called Know Radical-Islam Week (Shefa, 2008). In 2008, 
pro-Israel activists countered IA W with "Islamic State Apartheid Week." According to an 
article in the Jewish Tribune: 
The three-day event - sponsored by Betar Tagar, Hasbarah Fellowships, B 'nai 
Brith Canada and standwithus.com - was held during the fourth annual Israeli 
Apartheid Week (IA W) specifically to counter the extensive negative propaganda 
and misinformation concerning the Jewish state. The literature on Islamic 
apartheid was divided into four categories: Gender, sexual, political and religious. 
(Beck, 2008) 
Clarifying the purpose of this counter week in an article, Ben Feferman, Hasbara 
Fellowships campus coordinator for that year, said: 
As much as it is important to talk about the fact that Israel is a democracy, we 
really believe that we need to talk about the ... atrocities that go on [in Islamic 
states]. People don't talk about them because they are afraid to upset Muslims ... 
and it is because of our obsessiveness with being politically correct that these 
countries are suffering because of it. (quoted in Shefa, 2008) 
Unfortunately for the organizers of such counter weeks, their events did very little 
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to harm Israeli Apartheid Week-IA W continued to take place with packed le~tures. If 
anything, the overt anti-Muslim racism of those events managed to upset many students 
on campuses and tum them into supporters of IA W. Such counter weeks did not happen 
again after 2008, but condemnations of the week intensified at the official Canadian state 
level. 
Israeli Apartheid Week and University Administrations 
University administrations have also played their own role in silencing Israeli 
Apartheid Week; while allowing the event to happen, they have put up immense 
bureaucratic obstacles. Delaying room bookings, charging security fees, and scrutinizing 
speakers' bios have become standard practices. Most university presidents had, as noted 
earlier, already declared their rejection of the academic boycott in 2007, and many have 
travelled to Israel to deepen academic linkages. Perhaps the feelings of university 
presidents about IAW were best summarized by David Naylor, the president of the 
University of Toronto, in an article titled "Free Speech has to be for Everyone" written 
by Margaret Wente in February 2008, in which he was quoted as stating, "it is the 
consistently worst week of a president's life." Naylor's comment powerfully confirms the 
significance of IA W to university administrations. It is remarkable to consider that he 
believes that a week of student activity poses more difficulties than any other time in the 
academic year. Such a recognition is indicative of the scale of the resources and energy 
invested by university administrations in obstructing IA W's activities. 
During this period, a long played out war of advertising in mainstream papers also 
occurred, with Zioriist organizations placing ads urging university presidents to ban the 
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week. In the February 5, 2008 issue of the National Post, in an open letter to David 
Naylor, the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies wrote: "Denying 
the Jewish people their right to self-determination by claiming that the existence of Israel 
is a racist endeavor is anti-Semitic. Applying a double standard by requiring of Israel 
behavior not demanded of any of its neighbors is anti-Semitic." Two days later, the 
University of Toronto responded in the National Post with a counter-advertisement 
explaining that: 
Cancelling events because of anticipated controversy rapidly changes the nature 
of the debate. Instead of public attention focusing on the actual positions of the 
speaker or sponsoring group (sometimes extreme and therefore lacking broad 
appeal), the focus shifts to the abrogated free speech rights of the affected groups 
and can create publicity and even sympathy for an extreme view. 
Here, the university is not necessarily promoting free speech-rather the administration is 
explaining that to ignore the week would deprive it of extra publicity. Constantly using 
the word "extreme" in a loose reference to IA W twice in this short paragraph also implies 
negative judgment on the week and its content. It is important also to consider that 
President Naylor has not once attended an IA W event at the University of Toronto 
campus. 
The general treatment of IA W by university administrations has involved a 
balancing act between espousing commitment to freedom of expression, while constantly 
maintaining that they are watching these spaces very carefully for hate speech. David 
Farrar, Deputy Provost and Vice Provost, Students, issued a statement on January 19, 
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2005 on behalf of the University of Toronto explaining that the university would not 
cancel Israeli Apartheid Week because to do so would "violate the university's 
fundamental commitment to freedom of speech." In that same statement he added, 
however, that any "behavior or speech that constitutes hatred or incitement to hatred 
against any group will be dealt with quickly and appropriately" (Scott, 2005). The 
statement continued on to say that the University of Toronto administration had "assured 
Hillel that any hateful or anti-Semitic statements expressed by the organizers of 'Israeli 
Apartheid Week' or their guests [would] be dealt with according to the university code of 
conduct." 
Along the same lines, John Danakas, the director of public affairs at the 
University of Manitoba, told the Winnipeg Jewish Review, in an email referring to the 
first IA W at the University of Manitoba to be held in March 2010, that the university 
would "respond promptly to behaviours that constitute discrimination, harassment or 
represent a violation to Canada's laws." He added: "We will continue to monitor [IA W] 
closely, and please be assured that maintaining a safe and respectful environment for our 
students, faculty and staff remains a priority for the University of Manitoba" (Spivak, 
2010). 
The implication that hate speech might occur because there is a Palestine 
solidarity event is illustrative of the common sense racism pervasive in the university 
setting. There are numerous pro-Israeli events that take place every year on many 
campuses; at times, Israeli soldiers involved in recent military attacks are invited to give 
their positions. Statements that any hate speech will be monitored are not given when 
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Israeli state representatives or soldiers come to speak-indeed, the idea that Israeli 
incitement against Palestinians would be considered hate speech is not uttered in the 
public realm. However, negative stereotyping of Palestinians and pro-Palestine events is 
so common that public statements that Palestine advocacy events are being monitored are 
uttered freely. 
The most overt direct attack against IA W came from Carleton University and the 
University of Ottawa when they banned one particular Israeli Apartheid Week poster 
from their campuses. Carlton University's Equity Services staff are reported to have 
judged that the poster included an image that may "incite others to infringe rights 
protected in the Ontario Human Rights Code" adding that the poster was "insensitive to 
the norms of civil discourse in a free and democratic society" (Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, 2009). The University of Ottawa added that the poster "was inflammatory 
and capable of inciting confrontation" (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2009). In 
the days following the announcement of the ban, Carleton's Provost and Vice-President 
Academic Feridun Hamdullahpur sent a letter to the entire university community calling 
the posters "hurtful and discriminatory" and threatening students, stating that they could 
"be withdrawn from their studies indefinitely" (Students Against Israeli Apatheid at 
Carlton University, 2009). 
The poster in question was for the IA W that came directly after the 2008/9 Israeli 
military assault on Gaza. It depicted a young child holding a teddy bear standing in 
between concrete walls with an apache helicopter launching a missile at him with the 
word "Israel" on the helicopter. The image was meant to invoke the destruction caused 
115 
by the Israeli assault and to point to the number of Palestinian children that were killed in 
the bombing. Thus, in the name of "civil discourse and democracy" this poster, a cartoon 
that is much less harsh than the reality for children in Gaza, was banned. No explanation 
as to how the decision was reached was given and there was no provision of any recourse 
to appeal. Here, the language of civil discourse and democracy was used to shroud 
censorship in a veneer of progressiveness, using the rhetoric of equity to silence by 
marking a specific perspective as being outside the bounds of normalized discourse. 
Students at the University of Carleton subsequently filed a complaint with the Ontario 
Human Rights commission against the banning of the poster. The case is ongoing with 
the university adjudicator, and has been stalled over the question of whether Students 
Against Israeli Apartheid can be described as a group or not. 
Many of the silencing campaign's tactics on campuses have relied heavily on 
claims of equity and adherence to human rights codes while suppressing freedom of 
expression. One of the oft-repeated attacks on IA W has been the "discomfort" it causes 
on campuses. Interestingly, however, in 2009, when the time came to report to the 
Canadian Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism (an extra-parliamentary 
group, that itself is part of the silencing campaign strategy to equate Palestine activism 
with anti-Semitism), no university administrators reported a rise in anti-Semitism on their 
campuses. On November 24, 2009, Ryerson University President Sheldon Levy, York 
University's Vice-President Academic and Provost Patrick Monahan, Concordia 
University's President Emeritus Fred Lowy, the University of Ottawa's Centre for Equity 
and Human Rights Director Francine Page, and the University of Toronto's Assistant 
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Vice-President Robert Steiner all testified at a hearing organized by the CPCCA. 
Mamdouh Shoukri, President and Vice-Chancellor of York University, explained in a 
statement read on his behalf that "for the most part, and for most of the time, the students, 
faculty members and staff go about their business with great respect for differing 
backgrounds and positions and without disruption or incident" (CPCCA - Hearing 3, 
November 23, 2009a, p. 3). Jack Lightstone, President and Vice-Chancellor of Brock 
University, importantly noted "criticism of any government's policy by anyone must be 
acceptable, and in universities it is to be encouraged" (CPCCA - Evidence Hearing 9, 
January 25, 2010, p. 4). 
The address given by Fred Lowy, Concordia University's President Emeritus, is 
very telling of the way university administrators characterize activism relating to 
Palestine on campuses. First, he stated that Canadian campuses "are not hotbeds of anti-
Semitism or racism of any kind, although, of course, these conditions do occur, as they 
do in society generally" (CPCCA - Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b, p. 3). However, he 
went on to offer two reasons why anti-Semitism might be more prominent on campuses 
than in general society, stating: 
students generally tend to be drawn to anti-establishment policies, anti-
establishment events ... Israel now and possibly Jews generally are seen as 
establishment rather than anything else. Israel is seen as powerful and relatively 
affluent in the Middle East. Palestinians are seen as victims and the oppressed. 
(CPCCA - Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b, p. 4) 
The conflation here between anti-Semitism and criticism of the Israeli state is clear. 
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Importantly though, Lowy's second reason to explain tensions on campuses is, as he 
stated, that there exists "organized Islamic anti-Israeli propaganda and activism. I said 
Islamic because I'm not talking about Muslims generally or Arabs generally." He 
explained that criticism of Israel is "entirely appropriate," but that criticism of Israel 
tends to cross the line into anti-Zionism, and Israel is thus singled out for criticism and 
boycotts, which is "out of proportion to its contributions to unrest in the world" (CPCCA 
- Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b ). The term "Islamic propaganda" expresses the framing 
of this issue in racialized terms. The conflation of pro-Palestinian activism with what 
Lowy terms "Islamic" is very telling, particularly with the added note that he doesn't 
mean all Muslims, which has become a common caveat. 
All in all, the racialization of pro-Palestinian activism and its silencing on 
Canadian campuses is evident. Significant, however, is the use of multicultural language 
of diversity, equity, and tolerance to brand such activism as being outside the bounds of 
"multicultural" respectability. 
State Officials and Discourses of Silencing 
It was in 2009 that political figures and parties stepped into the repression 
campaign against IA W, echoing the arguments of Zionist organizations to a large extent. 
Public statements from politicians started to appear regularly in newspapers, and there 
were even debates on resolutions to condemn the week discussed in federal parliament, 
and in the Ontario and Manitoba legislatures. Condemning IA W became part of the 2010 
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mayoral debate in Toronto as well.22 
Some would argue that these attacks on IA W have stemmed solely from the 
Conservative Party, and that surely the Liberal Party would not attempt to condemn a 
week of activities on a campus-after all, freedom of expression is meant to be a liberal 
value. However, as the following section illustrates, support for Israel and condemnation 
of the Palestine Solidarity Movement cuts across the not so wide political divide in 
Canadian politics. Officials from both the Conservative and Liberal parties, and at times 
I 
the New Democratic Party, took great pains to issue statements distancing themselves 
from and condemning Israeli Apartheid Week, some even putting forward motions to 
specifically condemn the use of the term apartheid in relation to Israel. The following 
section discusses the specific discursive strategies used by state officials to marginalize 
IA W, as well as the cross-party consensus on such silencing. 
Accusations of anti-Semitism. 
The most vocal Conservative opponent of IA W is Jason Kenney, federal Minister 
of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism. Speaking in the 40th House of 
Commons session on March 3, 2009, he gave lip service to the principle that "Canadians 
are free to express different views about the policies of foreign government." But, he 
continued on to say that "Israel Apartheid Week is not about that. ... We condemn these 
22. Denunciations ofIAW became common political practice during Toronto's 2010 mayoral 
debate, when candidates were asked their views on the week. In its coverage of the prospective 
candidates' positions on Israeli Apartheid Week, the Canadian Jewish News reported that Ford, 
the candidate that eventually won, explained his attitude towards IA W thusly: "When I'm mayor, 
I assure you there won't be any of this nonsense." Two other candidates felt the future mayor 
would have to be involved, with Rossi explaining: "The mayor should champion this issue and 
create discussions with universities and with police to ensure [Jewish] students feel safe on 
campus" (Levy-Ajzenkopf & Poliakov, 2010). 
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efforts to single out and attack the Jewish people and their homeland" (Kenney, 2009b ). 
In this short sentence, the Minister of Multiculturalism did two things simultaneously: on 
one hand, he was conflating the actions and policies of the Israeli state with Jews around 
the world, and on the other, he marked IA W as being outside the realm of free speech. In 
doing so, he clearly demarcated the space of acceptable speech and cast out voices he 
disagrees with. 
This conflation between the apartheid analysis and anti-Semitism is often repeated 
as a measure to condemn IA W. However, as noted by Rebick and Sears in response to 
accusations of anti-Semitism: 
The deployment of anti-Semitism as an accusation to silence criticism of Israel is 
also a serious setback in genuine struggles against anti-Semitism and other forms 
of discrimination. It is based on a claim that the State of Israel is the single 
outcome of the history of the Jewish people, the final end of generations of 
diasporic existence. It attempts to make the Zionist project of a Jewish nation the 
only legitimate project for all Jews. (2009) 
It is important to note that, in Canadian politics, Zionism and thus Israel has asserted 
itself as a progressive reaction to anti-Semitism because the state was conceived as a 
homeland for the Jews, in their attempt at self-determination. What follows from this 
assertion is that Palestinian narratives are then deemed anti-Semitic for their mere 
existence in the path of this Zionist project. As Bakan and Abu Laban have explained: 
The unique role of Zionism as an ideology that lays claim to anti-racist 
ideological .space as a response to anti-Semitism in the history of Europe, the US 
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and Canada, while at the same time advancing racialised interests of colonial 
expansion in the Middle East, renders the ideological terrain of the BDS 
movement in the Wes_t complex. (2009, p. 33) 
In line with this two-fold character of Zionism, the silencing campaign against the 
BDS movement has focused on broadening the term "anti-Semitism" to encompass the 
activities of Palestine Solidarity activists, while simultaneously applauding the foreign 
policy goals of the Canadian government in the Middle East. 
"Singling out" Israel. 
A common theme across the silencing campaign is "singling out"-the 
implication being that critics of Israeli state policy attack Israel because of its claim to 
being a Jewish state, while ignoring gross human rights violations by other states. 
Wherever Israel's record towards the Palestinian people is scrutinized, the list of 
questions about other states quickly follows: "What about Syria? Iran? North Korea?" 
This notion brings about two results: first, that no criticism of Israel is possible 
because the state is conflated with the entirety of Jews around the world, and second, that 
any criticism of Israel must be coupled with criticism of all other human rights violations 
around the world. Proponents of this argument, sadly, misunderstand that advocates of 
Palestinian human rights do consistently condemn human rights violations 
internationally-they simply want Israel to be held accountable as well. Indeed, it is 
actually the Canadian state that is singling out Israel for preferential treatment and 
uncritical support. As Goldberg and Makdisi noted, those who wish to silence criticism of 
Israel "seek to de-exceptionalize Israel by insisting that critics do not equally condemn 
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Sudan or China or North Korea for violations of human rights. And yet they 
exceptionalize the Israeli state by seeking to shield it from any criticism whatsoever" 
(2009). 
In 2009, the National Post printed a statement by Liberal Party leader Michael 
Ignatieff denouncing the week, and specifically, the use of the term apartheid. 
Embarrassingly, when a similar statement by Ignatieff was issued again in 2010, it was 
pointed out by independent journalist Jon Elmer in this talk during Israeli Apartheid 
Week that, in 2002, in reference to Israel, Ignatieff himself used the term apartheid in the 
following passage in The Guardian: 
When I looked down at the West Bank, at the settlements like Crusader forts 
occupying the high ground, at the Israeli security cordon along the Jordan river 
closing off the Palestinian lands from Jordan, I knew I was not looking down at a 
state or the beginnings of one, but at a Bantus tan, one of those pseudo-states 
created in the dying years of apartheid to keep the African population under 
control. (Ignatieff, 2002) 
Clearly, Ignatieff had had a change of heart, now being leader of the federal opposition 
party. In his short statement to the National Post on March 5, 2009, not only did he 
decide to come out against the use of the term apartheid, he also explained that Apartheid 
Week "goes beyond reasonable criticism" because it "singles out one state, its citizens 
and its supporters for condemnation and exclusion." By this logic, any campaign against 
specific state policies or human rights violations must equally condemn and engage with 
all human rights violations around the world. More importantly, the insinuation that Israel 
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is being "singled out" is used to deflect focus from serious and well-argued criticisms of 
Israeli state policies to the intentions of those posing the criticism. In short, the "singling 
out" argument is used to stifle criticism, without ever engaging with it. 
Diversity, civility, and respectful dialogue. 
In his statement condemning IA W, Michael Ignatieff emphasized that, 
"throughout our history, Canadians have strived to understand each other across the 
solitudes that have broken other countries to pieces. _Our common national purpose has 
been built on our diversity" (2009). It is very interesting that this is Ignattief s point of 
departure for his condemnation of IA W: diversity. Taken to imply a simplistic 
celebration of cultural customs, "diversity" is abstracted from concrete social relations of 
power and divorced from issues of anti-racism. As Bannerji explained, multiculturalism 
as a state apparatus 
rearranged questions of social justice, of unemployment and racism, into issues of 
cultural diversity and focused on symbols of religion, and so-called tradition. 
Thus immigrants were ethicized, culturalized and mapped into traditional/ethnic 
communities. Gradually, a political and administrative framework came into 
being where structural inequalities could be less and less seen or spoken about. 
(2000, p. 44--45) 
Along the lines of respect for diversity, another thrust of the silencing campaign 
argues that IA W runs against known norms of "civil and respectful" debate. This is 
intended to isolate the week as an aberration to the "respectful dialogue" of multicultural 
Canadian politics. The discourse of "civility" mirrors the racialization of Palestinians 
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embedded in the Zionist narrative of civilizing mission, with its "picture of a handful of 
European Jews hewing a civilization of sweetness and light out of the Black Islamic sea" 
(Said, 1992, 25). Narratives that situate Palestinian dispossession at their core, as does 
Israeli Apartheid Week, do not conform to the myth of Zionism as a progressive force in 
the Middle East region-and thus are deemed as lacking in civility. It is therefore through 
the language of "civility" that racist claims that Palestinians and Palestine solidarity 
activists are an uncivil aberration on Canadian campuses are validated. 
Ignattief, for example, stated: "Israel Apartheid Week and CUPE Ontario's anti-
Israel posturing exploit academic freedom, and they should be condemned by all who 
value civil and respectful debate about the tragic conflict in the Middle East" (2009). 
Anita Neville, Co-Chair of Liberal Parliamentarians for Israel, has stated the same ideas 
in different words. In a March 9, 2009 press release by Liberal Parliamentarians for 
Israel, in calling on "Canadians to help prevent the politicization of Canadian campuses," 
she stated: 
the atmosphere of fear and intimidation fostered by IA W is sure proof that our 
campuses are becoming less tolerant and respectful of free speech ... It is a day 
when our values as Canadians are being threatened in institutions that are built on 
the tenets of free speech, multiculturalism, diversity, respect and openness. 
(Liberal Parliamentarians for Israel, 2009) 
There are serious assertions in the statement about "our values as Canadians being 
threatened" that cast those who organize IA W outside of such values. This discourse of 
common values and civility is intended to create a clear binary between those who are 
124 
accepted within Canadian multiculturalism and those whose freedom of expression may 
be curtailed. 
Setting the limits on criticism of Israel. 
In his public statements, Ignattief also takes it upon himself to define the 
boundaries of what is and is not acceptable criticism oflsrael. For example, in 2010, he 
claimed: 
International law defines "apartheid" as a crime against humanity. Labeling Israel 
as an "apartheid" state is a deliberate attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the 
Jewish state itself. Criticism of Israel is legitimate. Attempting to describe its very 
existence as a crime against humanity is not. 
However, there has been extensive scholarly and legal research on the similarities and 
differences between policies in apartheid-era South Africa and in Israel. As a matter of 
fact, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (General Assembly resolution 3068, entered into force on 18 July 1976) sets 
forth that the definition of the crime of apartheid is not limited to the borders of South 
Africa. Thus, if Israel is not an apartheid state, then it should be easy to factually prove 
that it does not practice apartheid. It does not follow that the allegation itself is not 
legitimate. Opponents of Israeli Apartheid Week, instead of engaging with the analysis, 
find it easier to claim that the analysis itself is not legitimate. As the Palestinian Boycott 
National Committee put it, in a statement on repression of the BDS movement in Canada: 
It is not surprising that government officials and some university administrations 
in Canada have chosen to hone in on the use of the term "Israeli apartheid". They 
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would prefer to outlaw the term rather than engaging the facts, perhaps because 
doing so would lead them to the same conclusions of international law experts, 
scores of civil society organizations and Archbishop Desmond Tutu who argue 
that the label is an accurate one, in accordance with the UN Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. The apartheid framing of 
the Israeli regime is long standing; in 2009, a 302-page legal study overseen by 
Prof. John Dugard, a former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, concluded that 'the State of Israel exercises control 
over the Occupied Palestinian Territories with the purpose of maintaining a 
system of domination by Jews over Palestinians and that this system constitutes a 
breach of the [UN] prohibition of apartheid.' (The Palestinian Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC), 2010) 
Although assurances that some criticism of Israel is acceptable are repeated, limits are set 
on criticism that pertains to changing the status quo by recognizing the power differential 
between Palestinians and the Israeli state-or between Palestine solidarity organizers and 
the Canadian state for that matter. 
Finding the balance between occupier and occupied. 
Another track used by state officials to demonize IA W has been to label it 
"unbalanced." Along these lines, Jason Kenney recently stated: "In reality, this week is 
nothing more than an unbalanced attempt to paint Israel and her supporters as racist" 
(2012). The notion of balance is a very interesting silencing tool because it is essentially 
an attempt to cast doubt on the Palestinian narrative wherever it appears. While pro-Israel 
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advocacy is normalized-the yearly Walk for Israel, for example, is attended by various 
state officials-Palestine advocacy is deemed unbalanced. Notions like balance, when 
abstracted from power relations, serve to maintain the status quo because they 
marginalize counter-hegemonic perspectives. The idea that any time a Palestinian 
perspective is put forward it must be countered by a Zionist one, while the reverse is 
certainly not asserted, illustrates the pervasiveness of invizibilizing Palestinians through 
the use of benign terms such as balance. 
Safety, inclusivity, and comfort. 
Both Kenney and Ignatieff claim that IA W victimizes Jewish students, who are 
therefore "feeling increasingly vulnerable" (Kenney), and "wary of expressing their 
opinions, for fear of intimidation" (Ignatieff). Freedom is thus being invoked to silence 
IA W organizers while claims are made presenting an ultimate victimhood for the Zionist 
narrative, which in reality has no trouble being expressed openly on university campuses 
and supported by administrations and the state. Government officials, as a matter of fact, 
profess uncritical support for Israel regularly. The idea that Jewish students are 
intimidated-besides racializing all Jewish students as supporters of Israel-plays on the 
racialization of Arabs/Muslims as security threats out to intimidate the proper working 
order of universities. 
Motions and Statements Condemning IA W 
The discursive silencing strategies listed above were coupled with attempts at 
disciplinary action at the state level in the forms of motions to condemn IA W. A motion 
put before the federal parliament clarifies the role the state plays in condemning IA W. 
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The 2010 motion, put forth by Conservative Tim Uppal, MP for Edmonton Strathcona 
Park, stated: 
this House condemns Israeli Apartheid Week for seeking to delegitimize the State 
of Israel by equating it with the racist South African apartheid regime, and his 
House continues to support a peaceful resolution through a negotiated two-state 
solution that respects Israel's right to exist. 
This motion needed full consent to pass; there was only one voice in all of parliament that 
opposed it, that of Libby Davies (New Democratic Party Member of Parliament), and 
thus it failed. In a 2010 letter thanking those who supported her decision, Davies wrote: 
whatever one thinks about the term "apartheid" in reference to Israel, I don't 
believe that Members of Parliament should have any role or influence in stifling 
open discussion and education on this issue. As someone who has visited the 
West Bank and Gaza twice (most recently in August of 2009), I know first-hand 
the impact and destruction caused by Israeli policies towards Palestinians. 
A week after the motion was defeated, MP' s were literally reading, in parliament, from 
the paper that the Canada Israel Committee issued condemning Libby Davies. MP Sweet, 
for example, said: 
Last week the New Democratic Party blocked a Conservative motion condemning 
Israel Apartheid Week. I fully agree with the Canada-Israel Committee, which 
said that the NDP's position demonstrates, "An utter disregard for the plight of 
students who are bullied and intimidated on campuses in Canada is staggering and 
unacceptable." Why will the New Democratic Party not condemn the so-called 
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"activists" on university campuses who use Israel Apartheid Week as a pretext to 
harass, intimidate and bully Jewish students? (2010) 
There, again, is the oft-repeated claim that IA W intimidates Jewish students-a view that 
assumes that every Jewish student is supportive of the actions of the Israeli state (and 
thereby homogenizes all Jewish students, ignoring those who help organize IA W). In 
reality, the weaker side in the equation is that of the student activists, who have nothing 
more than the strength of their argument to put forward. 
Provincial motions to condemn IA W: Mixed results. 
The first successful attempt to bring a parliamentary resolution condemning IA W 
took place in the Ontario Legislature on February 25, 2010. The resolution, though 
symbolic, is important because it was later used by the Toronto District School Board 
(TDSB) to disallow IAW from happening in Ontario high schools (although there were 
no IA W events planned for high schools). Though the motion was not binding or action 
oriented, it continues to be referenced for condemnation of the week. 23 
The private member's bill, put forth by MPP Peter Shurman, stated: 
the term 'Israeli Apartheid Week' is condemned as it serves to incite hatred 
23. In March 2010, the Director of Education, Chris Spence, released a statement in response to 
Israeli Apartheid Week after the Ontario legislature vote. The statement was circulated to all 
schools and posted on the TDSB website, and read: "The event called 'Israeli Apartheid Week' 
has the effect of fostering ill-will and disharmony among groups and individuals. The 
Government of Ontario and the opposition parties have unanimously adopted a resolution 
condemning 'Israeli Apartheid Week'. The Toronto District School Board therefore affirms that 
'Israeli Apartheid Week' and its activities are not permitted to take place on school or Board 
property, or as part of any activity under the jurisdiction of the TDSB. All TDSB staff in schools 
and workplaces are reminded of the attached Guidelines on Controversial Issues, issued in May 
2009." In June 2010, the motion was used as reference in attempts to ban the Queers Against 
Israeli Apartheid group from marching in Pride (discussed in detail in Chapter 5). 
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against Israel, a democratic state that respects the rule of law and human rights, 
and the use of the word 'apartheid' in this context diminishes the suffering of 
those who were victims of a true apartheid regime in South Africa. (Shurman, 
Resolution 93 condemning Israeli Apartheid Week, 2010) 
It is very instructive to analyze the speeches made in the legislature in support of this 
motion as they are telling of the racialized discourses that permeate the silencing 
campaign. 
Canada and Israel's "common values" paradigm: "democracy and women's 
rights." 
One of the main tools of the silencing campaign is to focus on the "common 
values" between Israel and Canada, presenting both as democracies imbued with a set of 
uniquely Western values that include women's rights. The reliance on the racialized 
rhetoric of "common values" between Canada and Israel fosters an atmosphere where 
silencing dissent is acceptable. Peter Shurman, in his speech supporting his motion 
against IA W, explained: 
It's about an annual event in our province on our campuses, and most 
significantly it's about our values, because our values are the same as the values 
of the state of Israel: democracy, education, individual freedom, human rights and 
the right to defend oneself from aggressors. In fact, the values of Judaism and of 
Israel were bedrock values for the foundation of Canada, and those values from 
Judaism and from Israel date back over 3,000 years, all to say that if you 're going 
to label Israel as apartheid, then you are also calling Canada apartheid and you are 
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attacking Canadian values. The use of the phrase 'Israeli Apartheid Week' is 
about as close to hate speech as one can get without being aITested, and I'm not 
certain it doesn't actually cross over that line. (2010) 
Setting aside what core values Canada and Israel do have in common for the moment (as 
do most settler colonies), the idea of common values being a marker of civilization and 
modernity that connects Canada and Israel is very telling of the racialized demarcation of 
belonging to either, state. Abu-Laban and Bakan have noted the use of the language of 
values in the post 9/11 climate as a "moment of redefining hegemony in the international 
racial contract" whereby a common values discourse marks a unity between the West and 
Israel while casting out an "enemy" as belonging to the racialized categories of "Arab 
and Muslim 'and identified with teITorism"' (2011, p. 286). 
Further, presenting the entire struggle for Palestinian rights as a religious issue 
helps to cement this "common values" paradigm. For example, Shurman's motion was 
supported by the New Democratic Party member of the Ontario Legislature, Cheri 
DiNovo who did not mention the word Palestinian once in her speech, while she refeITed 
mainly to Muslims, Jews, and Christians. This simple fact illustrates that the perception 
of the issue is rooted in a religious standpoint, rather than the struggle being understood 
as a modem conflict over land and basic questions of human rights within the territories 
that Israel controls. Speaking only in religious terms, as if this is an intractable conflict 
based on ancient religious hatred, helps Canadian politicians to distance themselves from 
answering any specific questions on the Canadian government's strong support oflsrael. 
Thus, Canada is created as a spectator in a complex age-old struggle, rather than an active 
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participant in supporting one side over the other. 
In the same speech, DiNovo argued: "We want peace. We don't need 
inflammatory language on either side of this issue. We don't want it. We don't need it. 
We reject it. And is 'apartheid' an inflammatory term? Absolutely" (2010). In this 
manner, she takes on the role of defining what is inflammatory and condemning it, 
without any appropriate process or regard for the specific arguments about Israeli 
policies. 
Interestingly, DiNovo then turned to recounting a conversation she had with a 
"well-respected Muslim" stating: 
It was interesting that one of the Muslims, a well-respected one, and I won't drag 
his name out, said that, really, just like you heard from the member from 
Thornhill, Israel is one of the few if not the only real democracy in the Middle 
East. He said, having been a struggler for rights in Iran, "Certainly I'd rather live 
as a Muslim in Israel than in Iran at the moment." And I think he speaks for many 
Muslims and certainly many of us-certainly as a woman. (2010) 
This rendition of a conversation, seemingly irrelevant to the topic at hand regarding 
condemning a single week of activities on university campuses in Canada, presents 
Israel's supposed democratic virtues while ignoring any facts about the state's treatment 
of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories or even Palestinians who hold Israeli 
citizenship. This is an example of the use of a particular and constant thread in the 
silencing campaign: to refer to Israel as a democracy that may not be termed an apartheid 
state, simply by repeating the mantra that it's a democracy. This view also ignores that 
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even apartheid South Africa was considered a democracy for some of its citizens. 
Importantly, DiNovo adds the reference to herself as a woman who would prefer 
to live in Israel, rather than in any other part of the region. Palestinian women are erased 
in this discourse oflsrael's record in terms of women's rights. It is in this way that the 
alleged superiority of Israel in terms of women's rights preempts any need for 
engagement and effectively silences all grievances against Israel. 
Razack summarized this use of women's rights succinctly, explaining that 
the smallest reference to cultural differences between the European majority and 
Third World peoples (Muslims in particular) triggers an instant chain of 
associations (the veil, female genital mutilation, arranged marriages) that ends 
with the declared superiority of European culture, imagined as a homogeneous 
composite of values including a unique commitment to democracy and human 
rights, and to the human rights of women in particular. (2008, p. 88) 
By utilizing the idea that Israel is a democracy and referencing women's rights, DiNovo 
is invoking the "instant chain of associations" that remain unsaid, but act to trigger a 
cultural allegiance to Israel under the rubric of "common values," while at the same time 
casting Palestinians/ Arabs and those who support them outside those same common 
values. Thus, according to DiNovo's argument, in the name oflsrael's democracy and 
record on women's rights, specific rights to freedom of expression may be curtailed and 
specific forms of organizing deemed too "inflammatory." 
The A-word and hate speech. 
In his speech presenting the motion, Shunnan also argued that the phrase IA Wis 
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"as close to hate speech as you can get without getting arrested." To label an event "close 
to hate speech" without due process, without an attempt at giving a hearing to those who 
study, analyze, and understand Israel as an apartheid state, is an attempt to silence the use 
of the term completely. However, all policies and ideologies underpinning any regime, 
whether Canadian or Israeli, may be challenged and some may indeed call them 
apartheid. 
To claim that an analysis of Israeli state policies is a form of hate speech is to set 
Israel apart from all other states and illustrates how limited the parameters of debate 
around Palestinian human rights may be. Shurman went on to quote from a website he 
found called ziofascism.net. He did not quote from the IA W website, for example, which 
has a long section on the history and goals of the week. Rather, he chose some obscure 
website with no relation to IA W whatsoever. In fact, none of the arguments used by those 
who supported the motion to condemn IA W were based on serious argumentation or even 
references to "what is actually being said" by any IA W speaker. As Goldberg and 
Makdisi argued: 
the rhetoric of response is predictable, and it takes the shape of the familiar litany 
of exhausted assertions that are inevitably recited en bloc, without any reference 
to what is actually being said; what evidence is being offered; what reasons, 
arguments, facts, figures, and citations are being assembled. (2009) 
In the face of a growing effective Palestine Solidarity Movement on Canadian 
campuses, centred around an analysis of Israel as a state practicing apartheid policies 
against the Palestinian people, officials of the Ontario legislature sought to shut down the 
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discussion altogether. In doing so, they were both silencing the Palestinian narrative as 
well as attacking freedom of expression more broadly. 
Other Provincial Legislatures Try to Follow Suit 
Following the Ontario legislature resolution, a private member's resolution 
denouncing Israeli Apartheid Week was tabled on April 15, 2010 in the Legislative 
Assembly of Manitoba. The resolution, introduced by Heather Stefanson, the 
Conservative member for the Winnipeg riding of Tuxedo, called for the denunciation of 
IA W as "divisive, promoting intolerance and undermining a balanced debate of the 
Israeli-Palestinian question." It added that IA W "may promote anti-Semitic opinions 
leading to the harassment and intimidation of Jewish students and staff' and that "the use 
of the word 'apartheid' is offensive to victims of apartheid in South Africa and ignores 
that Israel is a strong democracy ... "(2010, p. 809-810). This resolution, unlike the 
Ontario Legislature resolution, did not pass. 
One member, Dave Chomiak, Minister of Innovation, Energy and Mines, simply 
rejected the resolution, noting that it would give the week more publicity. Gord 
Mackintosh, Minister of Family Services and Consumer Affairs, on the other hand, while 
agreeing with the thrust of the motion, that the term apartheid is "profoundly unhelpful" 
and "unwelcome speech," noted that it was speech "likely protected" by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He added: "The resolution is speaking outside, then, of 
the existing civil and criminal laws and the Human Rights Code of Manitoba." 
MacKintosh rejected the notion, stating that it is the "new function for provincial 
governments of the day in Canada to formally denounce and chill unwelcome speech" 
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(2010, p. 814). This view was noticeably absent at the Ontario legislature. 
Conclusion 
Israeli Apartheid Week has grown from a single campus in Toronto to reach more 
than 216 campuses worldwide by 2013. It continues to be an important vehicle through 
which students learn about and join the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. It 
is also a key space for spreading the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state. 
The week's student organizers have been persistent on two accounts: first, at 
assuring that Apartheid Week events provide a sophisticated analysis of Israel as a 
settler-colonial state, and second, by insisting on building alliances and coalitions aimed 
at protecting students' rights to organize on campuses and debate issues that university 
administrations and the Canadian government deem controversial. Thus, the Palestinian 
anti-apartheid movement on campuses in Canada has become intertwined with questions 
of academic freedom, access to campus space, and ability to debate and question 
mainstream assumptions about the Israeli state. 
This chapter has sketched the various silencing discourses employed against this 
week of activities, including accusations of anti-Semitism, of a lack of balance regarding 
the conflict, and of a singling out of Israel. Importantly, the chapter has traced the ways 
in which the silencing attempts are couched in anti-racist language and shrouded with the 
multicultural terminology of diversity and civility. Legislative attempts to silence IA W 
analyzed in this chapter illustrate the use of multicultural language to cast IA W outside 
Canadian norms of "balanced dialogue" for example. 
It is importar;it to note, however, that the silencing of this particular week of 
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events is rooted in the silencing of the Palestinian narrative more generally. As Said 
noted, "so much of our [Palestinian] history has been occluded. We are invisible people" 
(2003, p. 20). Israeli Apartheid Week is thus an attempt to narrate Palestine in a context 
where, "Power is not only exercised over the land and its people, it also controls the 
story, its point of view, and the meta-narrative of truth and memory (Bresheeth, 2007, p. 
165). The silencing and erasure of the Palestinian narrative does not remain confined to 
the territories controlled by Israel; it is generalized, as Western states, including Canada, 
have a vested material interest in Israel, in addition to an ideological connection based on 
settler-colonial logic that manifests itself in the assertion of "common values." 
The constant attempts to discipline and demonize Palestine advocacy on 
campuses have put a spotlight on the student movement's struggle for freedom of 
expression and access to space. This, in tum, has ushered a broader debate that involves 
faculty and unions on campuses. By 2011, Faculty for Palestine, a grouping of university 
professors which formed in 2008, had issued an open letter signed by 400 academics, 
related specifically to "increasing efforts to limit advocacy of Palestinian rights on 
Canadian universities, amounting to a pattern of the suppression of freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly" (Pappano, 2009). This alliance between students and faculty 
has been key in slowing down the drive to ban Israeli Apartheid Week on Canadian 
campuses. 
In writing about the various disciplinary measures undertaken against Palestine 
advocacy groups in Canada, the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National 
Committee (BNC) has explained clearly how such measures are "not only repulsive per 
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se; they are forms of complicity with Israeli violations of international law and 
Palestinian rights and have far reaching adverse consequences for civil liberties" (BNC 
Secretariat, 2010). The silencing campaign against Israeli Apartheid Week is thus not 
only an issue of concern for the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada, it is crucially 
an issue of civil liberties and anti-racism that cuts across many social movements. 
The following chapters illustrate how discourses utilized against Israeli Apartheid 
Week are common across the silencing campaign, and simply differ in emphasis from 
one case of silencing to the next. 
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Chapter 4. Mechanisms of Disciplining Dissent: Funding Cuts and the Silencing 
Campaign 
"We know, of course, there is really no such thing as the 'voiceless.' There are only the 
deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard" (Roy, 2004, p. 1). 
"The Palestinian Boycott National Committee (ENC) is deeply troubled by the politically 
suspect and professionally unjustifiable defunding of organisations that advocate 
Palestinian rights and organise humanitarian efforts on behalf of Palestinians" (BNC, 
2010). 
As a "new approach to nation-building" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 105), 
multiculturalism has been conducive to the construction of the Canadian state as 
ostensibly tolerant and accepting of cultural difference, allowing it to both manage and 
limit what has come to be known as Canadian diversity. This chapter shows how 
development aid and multicultural policies are linked together in the Canadian 
government's effort to present itself as a benign and neutral actor in relation to global 
hierarchies of race and imperial domination. The production of this image is facilitated, 
in part, through the suppression of internal dissent concerning the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement in Canada. The chapter examines how this suppression is affected through 
two key mechanisms: funding priorities and appointments to federal governance bodies. 
In the period under consideration, a key context that emerges for these processes is the 
so-called War on Terror, and in particular the federal government's unprecedented 
diplomatic support for Israel. This unwavering backing of the Israeli government reflects 
139 
back domestically on "internal Others," and specifically on those supportive of the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign. Supporters of BDS not only directly 
challenge the Canadian government's official ·support of Israel, but also unsettle the 
premises of this support by calling attention to Israel's authoritarian character, thus 
undermining its constructed image as a liberal state respectful of democratic liberties. 
This chapter describes in detail several cases of funding cuts to or efforts to 
undermine the financial stability of organizations supportive of the BDS campaign or 
those loosely associated with a pro-Palestinian stance-namely, the Canadian Arab 
Federation and Pal~stine House, each of which saw their funds rolled back by Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (CIC), as well as KAIROS and Alternatives, each of which had 
their funds cut by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 
Additionally, the chapter looks at cases of interference with grant decisions at Rights and 
Democracy and the International Development Research Centre, both federally funded 
non-governmental organizations ostensibly operating at arms-length from the state. 
This chapter begins the examination of these funding interventions by identifying 
the official rationales invoked by those who enacted them. It shows that invocations of 
"anti-Semitism" were key claims made by federal bodies in their funding decisions. 
These claims of anti-Semitism were often twinned with accusations of "links to or 
support for terrorism." Together, these rationales relied on racialized discourses and a 
generalized atmosphere of common sense racism against Arabs and Muslims. Arabs and 
Muslims were depicted as presumed anti-Semites and as the figure of the enemy in the 
War on Terror. At the same time, the violence against the Palestinian people and latter's 
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resistance to this violence was rendered invisible and unimportant. State funding cuts 
represent one form of pressure that enabled this erasure. The BDS campaign was thus 
implicitly treated as an internal threat to the Canadian state. This was because it 
undermined the dominant narrative of Canada as a "tolerant, peacekeeping nation" by 
foregrounding Canada's complicity in state violence against the Palestinian people and 
human rights violations more generally. 
Questioning the State Funding Paradigm 
Before discussing the specifics of the case studies below, it is important to 
contextualize the types of funding addressed in this chapter and place them within the 
broader evolution of multicultural policy funding. This context begins to explain the 
ways in which ongoing changes to state funding for ethnocultural organizations have 
evolved to increase the reliance of ethnocultural groups on state funds in an economic 
context increasingly marked by neoliberalism, turning them into "service provision" 
organizations rather than advocacy groups. Importantly, it also reveals that the state's 
official rhetoric of commitment to multiculturalism and diversity has not been backed 
with equivalent funding prioritization. As noted by Abu-Laban and Gabriel, by the new 
millennium, multiculturalism was an area of "relatively little state spending" (2002, p. 
110). Canadian development funding, on the other hand, as appears from the case studies 
below, was increasingly tied ever more closely to neoliberal methods and foreign policy 
objectives; although, as noted by some, this aid, even when channeled through 
independent NGOs, has never been completely neutral or benign in its aims (Barry-Shaw 
& Oja Jay, 2012). 
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Multiculturalism as state policy began in 1971, and was further codified with the 
1988 passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (CMA). With the adoption of this 
act, Canada became the first country in the world to legally define multiculturalism. 
Canada's multicultural policy has been marked by a high degree of fluidity. In the 
1970s, it was framed as "ethnic multiculturalism," and focused on the maintenance of 
identities, folklore, and language training. In the 1980s, after coming under criticism for 
the failure to deal with issues of institutional racism, multicultural policy objectives 
shifted to integrate issues of equity in Canadian society. In the 1990s, multicultural 
programs were once again reframed, and an emphasis on integration and civic 
participation was introduced. By 2009, three new objectives for the Multiculturalism 
Program were approved and came into effect on April 1, 2010: to build an integrated, 
socially cohesive society; to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs 
of a diverse population; and to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and 
diversity at an international level. Fl eras and Kunz (2001) describe this evolution as a 
transition from Ethnic Multiculturalism in the 1970s, Equity Multiculturalism in the 
1980s, Civil Multiculturalism in the 1990s, to Integrative Multiculturalism in the 2000s 
(Fleras & Kunz, 2001; Kunz & Sykes, 2007). 
The primary governmental unit for dealing with multicultural policy also changed 
over the years. Originally entrusted to the Multicultural Directorate created for this 
purpose within the Department of the Secretary of State, the implementation of the policy 
was moved to the new Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1991. The new 
Department was in tum dismantled in 1993 and the multiculturalism programs were 
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transferred to a new Canadian Heritage Department. Finally, in 2008, responsibility for 
administering the Canadian Multiculturalism Act moved from the Department of 
Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. For easy orientation, Table 1 
provides a chronology of the main events in the history of Canada's multicultural policy. 





1963 Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Band B Commission). 
1969 The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism released Book Four, 
on the contribution of other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada. 
1971 Multiculturalism Policy established multiculturalism within a bilingual 
framework. 
1973 Multiculturalism Directorate was created within the department of the Secretary 
of State. The new department supported folklore activities and language 
education (in languages other than English/French). 
1981 The Multiculturalism Directorate created a race relations unit. 
1982 Multiculturalism was referred to in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Section 27 of the Charter states: "this Charter shall be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians." 
1986 Progressive Conservatives organized "Multiculturalism means business" 
conference in Toronto. 
1988 Multiculturalism Act was passed. 
1991 New Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was officially established. 
1993 Progressive Conservatives Pre-election Cabinet disbanded Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship as a separate department. 
1993 Incoming Liberal government created the Department of Canadian Heritage, 
which included the Department of Multiculturalism, the Secretary of State, the 
Department of Fitness and Amateur Sport, the parks component of Environment 
Canada, and the cultural broadcasting component of the Department of 
Communications. Multiculturalism was overseen by the Secretary of State, who 
was responsible for Multiculturalism and Status of Women. Citizenship 
programs would be amalgamated into the newly established Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration. 
1995 The government commissioned Brighton Research to perform an evaluation and 
review the multiculturalism program. 
1996 The Brighton Report was released, with key recommendations that 
multiculturalism should be about "identity, participations and justice." The 




Table 1 (continued) 
Multiculturalism Timeline 
Year Milestone 
1997-98 The multiculturalism program was redesigned. The program focused on three 
goals: identity, civic participation, and social justice. Funding to ethno cultural 
organizations would only be given to "projects which address the priorities of 
the Multiculturalism program." 
2007 The government conducted a policy review of the program. The review 
concluded that there was a need to adjust multiculturalism programming to 
focus more on integration and link the program to broader notions of citizenship 
and Canadian identity. 
2008 Responsibility for administering the Canadian Multiculturalism Act moved from 
the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 
2009 The three new objectives for the Multiculturalism Program were approved 
145 
Table 2 
Shifts in the Stated Objectives of Multicultural Policy 
Period Policy Objective 
1971-1981 Multicultural policy was established: 
• To assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity; 
• To assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full participation 
in Canadian society (Thus, the multiculturalism policy advocated the full 
involvement and equal participation of ethnic minorities in mainstream 
institutions, without denying them the right to identify with select 
elements of their cultural past if they so chose.); 
• To promote creative exchanges among all Canadian cultural groups; 
• To assist immigrants in acquiring at least one of the official languages. 
1981-1991 Multiculuralism was given a legal basis through the passing of two pieces of 
legislation in this period: 
• 1982: the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 27 of the 
Charter states "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians." 
• 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act which ensures "that all individuals 
receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while 
respecting and valuing their diversity." 
1991 Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship established to promote 
• Race Relations and Cross-Cultural Understanding "to promote among 
Canadian and in Canadian institutions appreciation, acceptance and 
implementation of the principles of racial equality and multiculturalism"; 
• Heritage Cultures and Languages "to assist Canadians to preserve, 
enhance and share their cultures, languages and ethnocultural group 
identities"; 
• Community Support and Participation "to support the full and equitable 
participation in Canadian life of individuals and communities from 
Canada's racial and ethnocultural minorities." 
(continued) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Shifts in the Stated Objectives of Multicultural Policy 
Period Policy Objective 
1997 /1998 Federal Liberals announced new priorities for Multicultural Program (now 
transferred to new amalgamated Department of Canadian Heritage). The new 
goals were: 
• Fostering a society that recognizes, respects, and reflects a diversity of 
cultures such that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and 
attachment to Canada. 
• Developing, among Canada's diverse people, active citizens with both the 
opportunity and capacity to participate in shaping the future of their 
communities and their country. 
• Building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that 
respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins. (Canada, 
1998) 
2008 The aims of the Multiculturalism Program were summarized as 
• ethnocultural/racial minorities to participate in public decision-making 
(civic participation); 
• communities and the broad public engage informed dialogue and 
sustained action to combat racism (anti-racism/anti-hate/cross-cultural 
understanding); 
• public institutions eliminate systemic barriers (institutional change); and 
• federal polices, programs and services respond to diversity (federal 
institutional change). (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012) 
2009 Responsibility for administering the Canadian Multiculturalism Act moved from 
the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 
Three new objectives for the Multiculturalism Program were approved and came 
into effect on April 1, 2010: 
• to build an integrated, socially cohesive society; 
• to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a 
diverse population; and 
• to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and diversity at an 
international level. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012) 
Source: Canada (1998). 9th Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism 
Act, 1996-1997. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada; 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012c ). Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program. 
Retrieved from http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/multi/sectionl .asp 
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Multicultural Policy and State Funding 
Before proceeding to examine the development of the linkage of funding with 
recipient organizations' stance on the Palestinian cause, it is necessary to review the 
historical context of the change in funding practices, marked by both a decrease in the 
general level of funding and an increase in the various strings that came to be attached to 
it. 
Representing a culmination of over a decade of growing dominance of neoliberal 
ideas of governance, a key moment of transition in the practices of funding 
multiculturalism took place in 1995, when the federal Liberals commissioned Brighton 
Research, a private company, to evaluate the multiculturalism program. One of the 
pivotal recommendations of the report was on the issue of funding, noting that "past 
funding practices have reinforced the impression that multiculturalism is a program of 
special interests" (Department of Canadian Heritage, 1996, p. 76). In the subsequent three 
years, the program was redesigned in line with the report's recommendations, so that 
funding would be provided on a project by project basis. Less money was therefore 
available to fund the general and autonomous operations of ethnocultural organizations. 
Ethnocultural communities were still eligible for funding, but they had to address the new 
program objectives and compete with private entities in applying for funding. 
Organizations applying for funds had to craft each project to meet funding criteria, thus 
losing a measure of autonomy and forced to focus on "servicing clients." 
By 1998, the program's objectives focused less on preserving cultural identity and 
working with ethnocultural groups dedicated to single communities; instead, the goal was 
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to "inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) and to create 
active citizens" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 114). Ethnocultural organizations did 
not support this shift at the time. In fact, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council criticized 
the shift, arguing that community groups were not consulted, and that the Brighton 
Report failed to address the issue of ongoing funding cuts to multicultural programming 
to begin with (Kordan, 1997). 
Two shifts occurred simultaneously to the multiculturalism program. First, the 
program suffered decreased funding and was opened up to the market to create 
competition over grants, and was thus made both more vulnerable to and more dependent 
on governmental arbitrariness. Second, the purpose of the program itself was 
"increasingly emphasized as a way to deal with global markets and global 
competitiveness" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 116). Thus, the objectives of the 
multiculturalism program, as well as its funding, were transformed in line with neoliberal 
percepts of restructuring state/community relations, emphasizing efficiency in "service 
delivery." At the same time, the purpose of the entire multiculturalism program was 
subordinated to the discourses of neoliberal globalization. The reforms following the 
Brighton Research report followed over a decade of neoliberal transformation of the role 
and functioning of the state. In the area under consideration, this process of 
transformation and the increased ideological centrality of the market had been epitomized 
a year earlier by the "Multiculturalism Means Business" slogan, the title of the 
conference that Progressive Conservatives organized in Toronto in 1986, which sought to 
recast multiculturalism by engaging the business elites of ethnocultural communities, and 
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by harvesting connections with countries of origin for trade benefits (Abu-Laban & 
Gabriel, 2002). 
Following the electoral victory of the Conservative Party, a new policy review of 
the program was conducted in 2007. The review recommended adjusting 
multiculturalism programming to focus more on integration and linking the program to 
broader notions of citizenship and Canadian identity. In 2008, the responsibility for 
implementing the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was transferred to the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). The minister responsible for the portfolio, 
Jason Kenney, explained that this "allow[ ed] for greater coordination between the 
government's settlement programs for newcomers and its programs to promote further 
inclusion, participation and shared citizenship for all Canadians" (2009a). The objectives 
of the program were updated in 2009 even further, with a focus in the direction of 
inculcating a Canadian identity based on, among other things "promoting intercultural 
understanding, fostering citizenship, civic memory and pride, and respect for core 
democratic values, and promoting equal opportunity for individuals of all origins" 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012d). 
Under CIC auspices, three major funding programs involving newcomers and 
multiculturalism were funded: Settlement, Resettlement, and Inter-Act. Outcomes for the 
Settlement program are Orientation to Newcomers, Language/Skills, Labour Market 
Access, welcoming communities, and finally, Policy and Program Development 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012d). Both the Canadian Arab Federation and 
Palestine House were funded through this stream to deliver services to newcomers of all 
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origins (not only Arabs). The Inter-Action stream was conceived as "Canada's 
Multiculturalism Grants and Contribution Program" with the objectives of 
intercultural/interfaith understanding, civic memory and pride, and respect for core 
democratic values (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012c). This constituted an ever 
clearer connection between fostering a unified Canadian identity based on the idea of 
"core values" that belonging to the nation necessitated. 
This process thus subordinated the funding of multiculturalism to a construction 
of the Canadian nation built around increasingly more exclusionary notions such as civic 
memory, pride, and core values. These core values were in actuality those attributed to a 
specifically Western tradition. The shifts in multiculturalism coincided with other 
reorientations of Canadian policy, including a shift of foreign policy towards greater 
alignment with the U.S. The idea of "common values" between Canada and Israel, which 
increased in popularity among Canadian politicians, was fundamental to the new 
ideological reconstruction of the nature of the relation between the the two ·states. Thus, 
the reorientation of citizenship and belonging around "values" had significance in 
transforming international alliances and the repositioning of Canada within the 
"civilizational" camps within a new articulation of global divisions. 
Beyond the changes in the program's official objectives, it is instructive to 
compare concretely the actual level of funding of multicultural programming to the 
prevalence of multiculturalism in mainstream discourse. Funding for the Inter-Action 
program in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 was $13 .2 million and $15 .3 million, for a total of 
$28.5 million in two years (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012c). As for 
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Settlement programing, Minister Jason Kenney announced that "Integration Services Are 
About Nation Building" (Citizenship and Immigration Canadab, 2012b ), tripling 
allocations from $200 million for 2005-2006 to almost $600 million for 2012-2013 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011 ). While this increase in settlement services 
may seem significant, it must be understood in the context of the Conservative push for 
"nation building," rather than as a commitment to multiculturalism. Indeed, it can be 
contrasted to the $20 billion in funding provided for the military budget in 2011. 24 This 
gives a very different picture about the priorities and positioning of the Canadian state in 
relation to both its domestic and international affairs. While much time is spent in 
mainstream discourse on the success of Canada as a multicultural state and the 
importance of diversity, the shifts in the priorities of the multiculturalism program and its 
small budget, especially when contrasted to other budget items such as the military, 
highlights a change to an exclusionary-not only white, but also neoliberal-
multiculturalism. This reorientation allows the state to manage and discipline 
ethnocultural groups through tight budgets that run on a project-by-project basis, while 
shifting their role to providing services that introduce a set of "core values." 
Funding cuts from the Canadian International Development Agency, the second 
category discussed in this chapter, must be situated in the broader terms of funding aid 
within a neoliberal framework as well. While CIDA support for specific projects does 
certainly have an impact on people's lives in the global south, such aid has also been 
24. CBS commentator Brian Stewart noted: "Between Afghanistan and military modernization, 
Canada has spent perhaps $30 billion more on defense than the norm in the past decade" (2011). 
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crucial to advancing and securing spaces of accumulation for Canadian capital. As 
Gordon notes, 
by the late 80s structural adjustment was strongly endorsed and advocated by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the departments of 
finance and external (now foreign) affairs as part of an effort to facilitate the 
expansion of Canadian economic interests in the wake of the profitability squeeze 
of the 1970s and 80s. (2010, p. 142) 
Critical literature about the connection between official state funding and NGOs 
stresses the role of such funding in promoting "a new type of cultural and economic 
colonialism" (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, p. 132). Others note that, "as northern NGOs 
increasingly rely on official donor funding and goodwill, and as the conditionalities 
attached to that aid increase, they are inevitably drawn into supporting and even 
spreading many aspects of the dominant global agenda" (Wallace, 2003, 203). As a 
specific example of the connection between Canadian state funding prioritization and 
foreign policy objectives, writing in 2010 for The Globe and Mail on the shifts to CIDA 
priorities under new Minister Beverley Oda, Smilie explained: 
the minister spoke about how CIDA was deprioritizing Canadian aid to several of 
the poorest African countries, along with Cambodia and Sri Lanka. This was 
supposedly all about geographic "focus," but it conveniently loosened up money 
for new programs in two upper-middle-income countries, Peru and Colombia, 
where, coincidentally, the government wants to improve trade. 
The switching of funding priorities has created a form of self-censorship for many 
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NGOs wishing to maintain funding. As noted in an article in The Globe and Mail: "Some 
[NGOs] have had veiled warnings about positions that clash with Ottawa's on issues such 
as climate change, free trade with Colombia, or the Middle East, said Gerry Barr, 
president of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, an umbrella group" 
(Clark, 2010). 
Here too, it is necessary to look concretely at how much funding actually goes to 
development aid. After a spending freeze at $5.16 billion since 2010, the 2012 federal 
budget decreased Overseas Development Aid (ODA) by "more than 7 per cent by 2014-
15 - a $377 million slice from Canada's current $5.16 billion aid budget ... CIDA's 
budget will be cut by $319.2 million by 2014-15" (Scallan, 2012). To put this in 
perspective, the development aid budget for 2010 (even before the cuts to the 2012 
budget) stood at only 0.34% of the Gross National Income (GNI) (OECD, 2012). Of the 
many countries affected by these cuts, "eight are in Africa and rank at the bottom of the 
UN's 2011 Human Development Program," while countries with which Canada has 
"either ongoing trade agreements or is carrying out significant business activity, will see 
no change in their relationships with Ottawa" explained Chantal Havard, the government 
relations and communications officer at the Canadian Council for International Co-
operation (CCIC) (Sheikh, 2012). 
Again, the ideological use of development aid in establishing an image of the 
Canadian state as a source of support for developing countries is not matched in reality in 
funding prioritization. Thus, in the following discussion on funding cuts, it is 
fundamental to look critically at the general notion of "independent" NGOs, given that so 
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many of the protagonists rely so heavily on state money to continue to operate. 
Importantly, CIDA priorities themselves must be understood in the context of Canada's 
place and relationship to neoliberal globalization and its foreign policy objectives. 
Funding Cuts to Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House 
Funding shifts and cuts have been a central feature of the way the Canadian state 
has managed its relationship with and exercised discipline over the Palestinian Authority, 
and the same tools were used in the case of Canada-based Arab/Palestinian community 
organizations and international aid NGOs involved in Palestine. For example, in 2006, 
the Canadian state was the first to follow Israel in cutting funding to the Palestinian 
Authority after the Hamas government was democratically elected, only restoring aid 
after a division between Hamas and Fatah put Fatah at the head of the Palestinian 
Authority again (CBC News, 2007). According to the Canadian International 
Development Agency, 
in 2009, as part of Canada's new aid effectiveness agenda, the West Bank and 
Gaza was selected by CIDA as a country of focus ... CIDA's program in the 
West Bank and Gaza is aligned with the requirements identified in the Palestinian 
Reform and Development (PRDP) for 2008-2011. (Canadian International 
Development Agency, 2013) 
Hanieh described this PRDP program: 
Developed in close collaboration with institutions such as the World Bank and the 
British Department for International Development (DFID), the PRDP is currently 
being implemented in the West Bank where the Abu Mazen-led PA has effective 
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control. It embraces the fundamental precepts of neoliberalism: a private sector-
driven economic strategy in which the aim is to attract foreign investment and 
reduce public spending to a minimum. (2008) 
A significant portion of the Canadian aid to the Palestinian Authority is diverted 
towards enhancing the policing, judicial, and security apparatus of the PA. Through such 
aid, through an operation named PROTEUS, Canadian officials support the U.S. Security 
Coordinator office in Jerusalem. The Canadian state also "redirected" its funding for 
international organizations that support Palestinians, such as the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (Zerbisias, 2010), to the PA. Furthermore, UNESCO funding was 
threatened as punishment for the vote in favour of the Palestinian statehood bid. It is clear 
that Canadian aid to the Palestinian Authority goes well beyond humanitarian assistance, 
instead promoting a neoliberal security paradigm. 25 
Between 2008 and 2012, there was a wave of funding cuts to Canadian-based 
NGOs and community organizations that spoke out for Palestinian human rights by both 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC) (see Table 4.3). KAIROS Canada, a church-based 
development NGO, for example, lost CDN$7 .1 million in funding from the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). The official stated reason was that KAIROS 
did not fit CIDA development priorities. However, it soon emerged that the real reason 
was its perceived support for the BDS campaign (this case will be detailed below). In 
25. For a critical view of the Western aid to the Palestinian Authority, see Taghdisi-Rad (2010) 
and Tartir (2011). 
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December 2009, Alternatives, another NGO critical of Israel's occupation of Palestine, 
lost CDN$2.1 million in CIDA funding. The Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine 
House, both community organizations, lost their funding from the Canadian Immigration 
and Citizenship (CIC) for their English language and newcomer settlement programs. 
Table 3 gives a breakdown of six organizations' mandates and loss of funding. 
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"Alternatives' mission is to create a world where 
international solidarity, environmental rights, 
democratic rights and human dignity are 
universally respected .... We will thus continue 
to work for a world in which: 
• Women, men and children live in dignity 
and respect, and equitably share the 
power and resources they need to live and 
thrive. 
• The diversity of peoples and individuals 
is respected, as well as their human, civil, 
economic, social, and cultural rights. 
• Solidarity, cooperation, respect for the 
environment, participatory democracy 
and peace are truly valued. 
• Sustainable, just and democratic social 
and economic development takes place at 
local, national and global levels." 
"CAF is made up of over 40 member 
organizations. Through an elected Executive 
Committee, CAF's team implements the 
organization's vision. 
CAF's Values 
CAF is committed to: 
1. The protection of civil liberties and the 
equality of human rights; 
2. Combating racism and hate in all of its forms; 
3. Working with all politicians and all levels of 
government on issues of importance to Canadian 
Arabs to promote community empowerment 
through civic participation; 
4. Assuring the accurate representation of Arabs 
in the media, and in all areas of civil society; 
5. A strong, vibrant multicultural Canada." 
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Cuts/Impact 
Lost $2.1 million 
in CIDA program 
funding in December 
2009. 




renewed in March 
2009 and a $473,873 
contract for 
immigrant job search 
assistance threatened. 
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"Who: We are a Canadian Crown corporation 
established in 1970. 
What: We help developing countries use 
science and technology to find solutions to 
local problems. 
Why: Our efforts lead to healthier people, 
higher incomes, cleaner environments, and 
responsible governments." 
"The current agenda and mandate of KAIROS 
reflect dedication to action in the following 
priority areas: 
• International human rights 
• Global economic justice (including corporate 
social responsibility and global trade and debt 
issues) 
• Ecological justice 
•Canadian social development (including anti-
poverty advocacy and funding and refugees 
and migrants) 
• Aboriginal and indigenous rights 
•Global partnerships 
• Education and animation 
The Board, program committees, and staff of 
KAIROS carry forward these priorities, 
working with key partners and a network of 
people from across the country." 
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Cuts/Impact 
In March 2010, two 
grants worth almost 
$800,000 from IDRC 
to Mada al-Carmel, 
were terminated. 
Mada al-Carmel is a 
Haifa based research 
institute focused on 
studies on Palestinian 
citizens inside Israel. 
KAIROS program 
proposal for 2009-13, 
involving $?million 
in CIDA funding, 
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"The Palestine House Educational and Cultural Contract worth nearly 
Centre is a not-for-profit organization that was $1 million annually to 
established in June 1992 by the joint efforts of provide language and 
various Palestinian Associations in Canada. It settlement services 
serves as the educational, cultural, and social for new immigrants 
centre for the Palestinian community in the not renewed in 
Greater Toronto Area (in particular) and in January 2012. 
Canada (in general). 
Our Membership is open to all Palestinians 
and Arabs in Canada, and our services are 
available to the Canadian community at large." 
"Rights & Democracy (International Centre for Effective March 
Human Rights and Democratic Development), 2009, no further 
is a non-partisan organization with an funding given to three 
international mandate. It was created by human rights 
Canada's Parliament in 1988 to encourage and organizations 
support the universal values of human rights operating in Israel (Al 
and the promotion of democratic institutions Haq, Al Mezan, and 
and practices around the world." B'Tselem). R&D shut 
down by the Harper 
Government in April 
2012. 
Note. Organizational mandates drawn from official agency websites. 
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Arab community organizations were historically organized through the Canadian 
Arab Federation (CAF), and the Palestinian community was specifically involved with 
the Palestine House Educational and Cultural Center (which is a member group of CAF). 
Both organizations lost their funding for Settlement and English training programs from 
the Canadian Immigration and Citizenship (CIC) ministry. The stated reason for the 
funding cuts to CAF was the perception that the organization's leadership was anti-
Semitic and supported "extremism." As for Palestine House, the organization received a 
letter explaining that they were losing funding because of actions "that could arguably be 
seen as extreme" (Kenney 2011 ). The following section traces the history and reasoning 
for those funding cuts, addressing the way both were stigmatized and disciplined by the 
state for their opposition to its uncritical support for Israel, and for addressing the 
increased racial profiling and targeting of Arab-Canadians. 
The Canadian Arab Federation was formed in 1967 as a direct response to the 
1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was decided by members of 
the Arab community that there was an urgent need to mobilize, no matter where their 
place of residence, and present a united voice to advocate for Arab~Canadians. Thus, 
from its inception, CAF was not divorced from the political realities in the Middle East 
and was established to play a leading role in representing the interests of the Arab 
community to the Canadian government. CAF was envisaged as a vehicle for Arab-
Canadians to voice their opinions on the politics of the region they came from and to 
influence policies in the new state they lived in, challenging the negative stereotypes of 
Arabs in Canada. At the time, Arab nationalism was strong among the newcomer 
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community and the number of Arab-Canadians was small, so it made sense politically 
and logistically to unite under the banner of one organization. 
As early as 1982, CAF commissioned a study about racial stereotypes of Arabs in 
political cartoons published in Canadian newspapers. The study determined that Arabs 
were repeatedly portrayed as terrorists. The researcher pointed to the danger of such 
pervasive negative imagery, recalling the role played by German caricaturists in their 
similar depictions of Jews as laying the groundwork for the Holocaust (Henry & Tator, 
2002, p. 42). During the first war against Iraq, after the invasion of Kuwait, CAF 
documented over 100 violent anti-Arab incidents across Canada (Antliff, 2004, p. 132). 
With the continuing migration of Arabs to Canada, with many fleeing wars or 
repressive regimes, and with the weakening of Arab nationalist sentiment in the Middle 
East, Arab newcomers began to retreat into national or sectarian-based organizations, and 
CAF became an umbrella for those smaller groups. By 2010, CAF stated that its 
membership consisted of 40 Arab-Canadian community groups. CAF's aims include 
influencing Canadian public policy in matters related to the Middle East, and raising 
issues of civil liberties, racial profiling, and racism affecting Arab-Canadians (Canadian 
Arab Federation website, Position Papers section, n.d.). 
With the restriction of multicultural funding, CAF began to also run govemment-
funded programs, such as Job Search Workshops aimed at assisting new immigrants in 
learning skills like resume and cover letter writing. CAF also ran a LINC Program 
(Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada) for eleven years with funding provided 
by Citizenship & Immigration Canada (CIC); in 2008, CIC approved the continuation of 
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the program's contract for 2009-2010. 
After the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, when 
racial profiling of Arab-Canadians and Muslims increased, CAF was heavily involved in 
organizing a response to new legislation that enhanced the targeting of Canadians of Arab 
origin, such as the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of June 2002, and the Anti-
Terrorism Act, introduced in October 2001. In a position paper to Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, published in April 2003, CAF warned of the sweeping new anti-
terror regulations, explaining that such measures after "September the 11th and its 
aftermath have left Arab and Muslim Canadians reeling with sentiments of anxiety, fear, 
alienation, marginalization, betrayal, and disillusionment" (Canadian Arab Federation, 
2003). However, the language used by CAF sought to strike a balance between civil 
liberties and the "legitimate" security concerns of the state. For example, in 2005, CAF 
president Omar Alghabra (later to become a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party 
of Canada) stated in the CAF Annual Report that CAF was "working hard to advance a 
Canada that is inclusive of diversity and respectful of the balance required to protect both 
security and civil liberties" (2005, 1). Earlier in April 2003, CAF's position statement on 
multiculturalism and civil rights argued that: 
given that multiculturalism is premised on the equal treatment and respect of all 
citizens, Canada needs to consider how the security agenda and multiculturalism 
can co-exist. To date, the former has come at the expense of the latter ... we need 
to determine, as a society, how to combine our desire to respect human rights and 
multiculturalism with our need to protect our security and trade interests. 
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(Canadian Arab Federation, 2003) 
With security becoming the dominant theme of Canadian politics, and with the 
rightward shift in Canadian foreign policy towards overt support for U.S. policy 
objectives in the Middle East, CAF's straddling strategy became increasingly untenable. 
Under the new presidency ofKhaled Mouammar, CAF's discourse shifted to a more 
active condemnation of Canadian foreign policy and toward explicit support for 
Palestinian and anti-war solidarity actions and groups, such as the Coalition against 
Israeli Apartheid and the Toronto Coalition to Stop the War. On the one hand, the newly 
elected Conservative government leadership was not meeting with CAF and was aligning 
its policies closely with Israel; on the other hand, CAF itself, largely in response to events 
in the Middle East, was becoming increasingly alienated from the government and taking 
public positions condemning the shift in both foreign and domestic policies related to 
Arabs and Palestinians. This coincided with the emergence of a stronger grassroots 
movement in support of Palestinian human rights across campuses in Canada, a 
development that emboldened CAF and led it to take a more active role at the grassroots 
level-versus the lobbying model which no longer seemed to yield results on the political 
front. This shift alienated some of CAF's traditional base organizations invested in 
keeping open lines of communication with the political parties, and in securing funding 
for their member organizations from multicultural granting institutions. 
The disjuncture between the Canadian government and the Canadian Arab 
Federation became particularly sharp in the summer of 2006, when Israel attacked 
Lebanon. While CAF helped to organize demonstrations against the war and mobilized 
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the Arab-Canadian community, the Harper government's response was one of overt 
support for Israel. In an action alert CAF issued in July of 2006, in response to the Israeli 
bombing raids, CAF President Khaled Mouammar wrote: 
The Canadian government has been a major supporter of the Israeli Apartheid 
Regime, both economically (Canada has a Free Trade Agreement with Israel that 
grosses over 1 billion dollars) and diplomatically (Canada voted against the 
Palestinian Refugees Right of Return at the UN in March of this year, Canada was 
also the first country to declare sanctions against the Democratically elected 
Hamas government). 
Then, in a press release from August 10, 2006, Mouammar was quoted as saying: "we are 
marching together, beyond Palestine and Lebanon - against war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
against poverty and police brutality, and against the erosion of social services and civil 
rights" (Canadian Arab Federation, 2006). By 2006, then, the leadership of CAF was 
explicitly making the connections between ongoing wars in the Middle East and domestic 
policies affecting Arab Canadians under the rubric of the War on Terror. 
As the war in Lebanon revolved around Hezbollah (an organization officially 
listed as a terrorist group in Canada), it was inevitable that CAF would address the issue 
of Hezbollah and its perception in Canada as well. After three MPs visiting Lebanon on a 
mission organized by the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations suggested that the 
Canadian government should communicate with Hezbollah, they were attacked by 
Minister Jason Kenney and Minister Peter MacKay, with Kenney comparing Hezbollah 
to the Nazis. In response, the president of CAF, in an article in The Star, stated: 
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By refusing to deal with Hezbollah, a political party represented in the Lebanese 
government whose resistance to Israel's aggression is supported by 87 per cent of 
Lebanese citizens, Peter MacKay is parroting the Bush administration's stand and 
is emboldening Israel to launch further wars against its neighbours. (Fraser, 2006) 
Later on, in a policy paper released in November 2006, CAF put forth its position 
on both Hezbollah and Hamas: 
Both of these groups are legitimate political parties, with grassroots support, and 
are represented in the legislature and the cabinets of Lebanon and the Palestinian 
Authority respectively. Both groups are resisting the illegal Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon and Palestine respectively which right is guaranteed under international 
law. 
The paper went on to call on the Canadian Government to "remove Hezbollah and Hamas 
from the list of banned organizations" (Canadian Arab Federation, 2006). This policy 
paper and CAF's remarks about the two groups were then used as a justification for 
portraying CAF as a supporter of terrorism, rather than simply as an advocate of a 
perspective different than that of the party in government. These policy suggestions, 
despite having the support of thousands of Arab-Canadians, were thus construed as 
outside the realm of legitimate debate in a Canadian context dominated by the anti-
terrorism discourse, coupled with the perception of the Arab community as the "fifth 
column within," trying to undermine the Canadian state and the safety of its citizens from 
within. These policy positions therefore alienated CAF from the political establishment 
even further. Significantly, CAF's behaviour has never been termed illegal. In fact, 
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Minister Kenny, in speaking of CAF's positions, stated: "When I say beyond the pale, I 
don't mean illegal. But these are the kinds of organizations that should receive no formal 
support from the organs of the Canadian state" (Talaga, 2009). However, if CAF' s 
actions are not illegal, this calls into question the rules that apply to Arab Canadians' 
organizations. As argued by Razack in a different context, "Muslims have been evicted 
from law and politics" where, in a state of exception, "paradoxically, the law has 
determined that the rule of law does not apply" (2008, p. 6). 26 
It was in February 2009 that Minister Jason Kenney announced that he would 
review the federal funding to the Canadian Arab Federation for its settlement services. 
While present at a conference against the "new anti-Semitism" in London, England on 
February 18, 2009, Minister Kenney said: 
These [Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and CAF] and other organizations are 
free within the confines of our law and consistent with our traditions of freedom 
of expression, to speak their mind, but they should not expect to receive resources 
from the state, support from taxpayers or any other form of official respect from 
the government or the organs of our State [emphasis added]. And I would 
encourage all other governments to take a similar approach to organizations that 
either excuse violence against Jews or express essentially anti-Semitic sentiments. 
26. In the case of the banning of George Galloway, prominent anti-war activist and Respect Party 
MP to the British Parliament, from entering Canada based on accusations of "support for terrorist 
groups" issued from the Citizenship and Immigration Ministry office, in September 27, 2010, 
Federal Court judge Richard Mosley found that Minister Kenney's office had acted 
inappropriately, using "a flawed and overreaching interpretation of the standards under Canadian 
law for labeling someone as engaging in terrorism or being a member of a terrorist organizations" 
(CBC News, 201 Ob). The ban was revoked, but the incident is a clear indication of the 
"overarching" ways in which legislation is interpreted to suit ideological goals. 
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(CBC News, 2009) 
This happened soon after Khaled Mouammar, during a rally against the bombing of 
Gaza, had called Kenney (and other Canadian politicians) "professional whores" for their 
support of Israel. Here, Kenney was articulating the view that governmental funding 
could be made contingent on recipients' political views and the political implications of 
their legal activities, and used to punish or promote various groups holding different 
political views. Crucially, he also identifies anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, altering the 
definition of anti-Semitism itself, stating: "The argument is with those whose premise is 
that Israel itself is an abomination, and that the Jews alone have no right to a homeland. 
And in that sense, anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism (CBC News, 2009). 
The back and forth between CAF and the Minister continued. On March 13, 2009, 
Kenney gave an interview with the Canwest News Service and Global National, saying: 
I can tell you, at my ministry, I have no intention of funding that organization 
[CAF] as long as it has the current leadership that apologizes for groups like 
Hezbollah and Hamas, [that] says they [Hezbollah and Hamas] should be able to 
operate legally, [and] that promotes hateful and extreme views, particularly the 
most pernicious and durable form of hatred, which is anti-Semitism. (O'Neill, 
2009a) 
At the time, CAF's member organizations issued a statement supporting CAF President 
Khaled Mouammar, but did add that Mouammar's use of the term "professional whore" 
was "unfortunate." The groups were attempting damage control at this point, but that did 
not help. 
168 
On March 18, 2009, Rick Stewart, then Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, 
Operations, wrote to CAF that the government would not renew a two-year, $2.1 million 
contract, which expired that month, for immigrant language instruction that CAF 
provided. A second $473,873 contract for immigrant job search assistance was also 
threatened. Stewart's letter included a statement from Minister Kenney justifying the 
decision to halt funding: 
Serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have 
been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have 
included the promotion of hatred, anti-Semitism and support for the banned 
terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these 
public statements in that they appear to reflect the CAF's evident support for 
terrorist organizations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic 
raises serious questions about the integrity of your organization and has 
undermined the government's confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner for 
the delivery of settlement services to newcomers. (National Post, 2009) 
Interestingly, the letter uses terms such as "they appear to reflect" and "arguably anti-
Semitic"-vague terms that avoid any legal terminology, reference to hate-crimes, or 
reference to anti-terror legislation. In other words, the statement is based on the 
perceptions and biases of the minister in charge, not on an investigation. While hate-
crime legislation and anti-terror legislation might be biased as well, the important point is 
that the use of terms such a~ terrorism and anti-Semitism provided a context in which 
notions of due proc~ss and impartiality could simply be ignored. 
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Although in mainstream media the suspension of funding was quickly explained 
as a result of "name-calling," Minister Kenney explained subsequently several times that 
cutting CAF 's funding had been on his agenda since he entered office, stating: 
When I first became Minister over 2 years ago, one of the very first things I said 
to my bureaucrats on the very first day in my Department of Multiculturalism was 
that we would not be funding groups that promote extremism, defend or apologize 
for terrorism or terrorist organizations and promote hatred, and as I mentioned 
specifically two groups: the Canadian Arab Federation and the Canadian Islamic 
Congress. (Canadian Arab Federation, 2009) 
In the legal proceedings that followed CAF's application for an interim injunction 
to the Federal Court, which sought to stop the funding cuts until a full judicial review of 
that decision could be undertaken, the Minister's side argued that it was "not the insult to 
the Minister per se but rather the 'anti-Semitism' and 'sympathy with terrorists' that 
caused Mr. Kenney to cancel the funding" (Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) v. The 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2009, para. 8). The court did not grant an 
interim injunction, on the grounds that the cuts did not constitute irreparable harm to the 
organization. The court did find, however, that Minister Kenney may have breached his 
legal duty to act fairly towards CAF. Justice Kelen, who presided over the case, made it 
clear that it would be inappropriate for the Minister to cut CAF's funding because its 
President had called the Minister a name, stating: 
Being a target of public criticism is part of holding public office. If the Minister 
decided to cancel the English as a Second Language funding contract for the 
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Canadian Arab community simply because he was called a name ... his decision 
should not stand. It was not unexpected that the Arab community would be 
repulsed by Israel's invasion of Gaza ... the Arab community was upset that the 
Canadian government did not strongly protest this attack. Many reputable 
Canadian Jews were similarly opposed to [the] attack. (Canadian Arab 
Federation (CAF) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2009, para. 31) 
In its decision, the court stated that the Minister was legally obligated to advise 
CAF of his reasons for intending to cancel the contract, to provide CAF with a full 
opportunity to respond, and to fairly take into account this response before making his 
final decision (Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) v. The Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, 2009). Minister Kenney took only the procedural lesson to heart; as will be 
explained below, for later funding cuts to Palestine House, he sent a letter warning that he 
was investigating the organization, requested a response, and later proceeded to cut the 
funding. 
In response to the cuts to CAF's funding, Jim Karygiannis, a Liberal Party 
Toronto Member of Parliament in whose riding the CAF program operated, requested 
parliamentary ethics commissioner Mary Dawson investigate the issue. Karygiannis' 
complaint explained: 
I believe for the Minister to use his position and exert undue influence and or in 
this case instruct his officials to hold funding from such an NGO; this sets a bad 
precedent which clearly should not be allowed to stand. With this move the 
Minister sends out a signal to community-based NGOs to toe the line or risk 
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losing their funding. (Thompson, 2009a) 
However, news reports quoted Alykhan Velshi, spokesman for Kenney, who 
called the complaint "ridiculous" and "said it was 'disturbing' to see a Liberal MP 
standing up for a group that has made anti-Semitic comments" (Thompson, 2009a). As 
noted earlier, discourses of silencing include casting positions in support of Palestinians 
as being anti-Semitic, as well as the use of anti-terror discourses to racialize and 
stigmatize Arabs. In the case of the funding cuts to CAF, both discourses were utilized by 
the state. Using ideological biases rather than due process, the Minister was able to cast 
CAF as extremist for its political opposition to both Canada's support for Israel and its 
internal policies of racial profiling. Moreover, the attempt of the state to replace the 
leadership of CAF altogether was very telling of the shift in the management of the 
relationship between the state and ethnocultural organizations. As 0 'Neill reported, 
Kenney explained that a change in leadership would restore the funding: 
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney says the Canadian Arab Federation will have 
to change its leadership and adopt a more moderate stance or risk losing federal 
funding ... Mr. Kenney said taxpayers should not be footing the bill for an 
organization whose leader "promotes hateful and extremist views." Mr. Kenney 
said there are many moderate organizations that could do the job ... He suggested 
the decision could be reversed if more moderate leaders were in place. (2009b) 
In an interview with The Canadian Jewish News, Kenney again criticized CAF 
President Mouammar, stating: 
The more Mr. Mouammar ... speaks, the more clear it is that he doesn't speak for 
172 
the vast majority of Canadians of Arab origin, who are honest, decent, thoughtful, 
democratic, moderate people; most of whom came to this country seeking life in a 
stable, liberal democracy, not this kind of shrill, cartoonish voice of extremism 
that he too often represents. (Levy-Ajzenkopf, 2009) 
In this case, the Minister was clearly using funding as a political tool to change 
community leadership to one of his liking. The Canadian political establishment is 
devoutly pro-Israel (and makes no effort to hide this), and the Arab-Canadian community 
happens to bear the brunt of Israel's military aggressions when they occur in their region 
of origin. So this community is specifically told to be quiet and to elect a "moderate" 
leadership. The acquiescence of the Arab-Canadian community leadership is necessary 
for Canadian foreign policy imperatives. The main contradiction, however, lies between, 
on the one hand, the strong support for Israel and the internal security agenda, and on the 
other hand, the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity. The bounds of multicultural 
diversity are clearly demarcated within a specific politics; when actual disagreement with 
the state on policy occurs, then the community in question needs to put their "diverse" 
view aside or suffer the consequences of losing funding. Funding is used here as a tool 
for control and discipline. 
The Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre suffered a similar fate to the 
Canadian Arab Federation in 2012. Palestine House is a not-for-profit organization that 
was established in June 1992 through the joint efforts of various Palestinian Associations 
in Canada. It serves as the educational, cultural, and social centre for the Palestinian 
community in the Greater Toronto Area (in particular), and in Canada (in general) 
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(Palestine House, n.d.). On December 16, 2011, in response to an application to renew 
their CIC funding, the organization received a letter signed by Minister Jason Kenney, 
notifying them of a review. The letter noted that the settlement program is not only for 
language training, "it also facilitates the settlement and social, cultural, economic and 
civic integration of sometimes vulnerable and impressionable immigrants and refugees 
into Canadian Society." The letter also stated, "we expect that a service provider will 
conduct itself in a manner that could not be perceived as extreme or endorsing violence 
against any person or group," adding that the review will take into account actions, 
statements, and positions that "may be incompatible with CIC's interest in providing 
services to new Canadians, free of any association with extreme political activity or 
views" (Palestine House letter, viewed by author, March 15, 2012). The letter did not 
specify how the review would be conducted, or importantly, what constitutes"extreme" 
activity and political views. 
The letter went on to stress three actions that the Ministry found objectionable, 
explaining that "Palestine House has a history of taking positions that could be 
interpreted as extreme or supportive of terrorists and terrorism and viewed as offensive to 
newcomers and to many Canadians." The incidents cited in the letter as objectionable 
included: "the presence on your [Palestine House] website of a map showing a 
Palestinian state encompassing all of Israel." A Palestine House event held on Oct 8, 
2011, marking the release by Israel of about 1,000 prisoners in an exchange deal with 
Hamas for the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, was also cited, with the letter stating 
that the freed prisoners were "convicted terrorists and at least one individual who 
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murdered two Canadian citizens." Lastly, a March 2010 event was cited, for which the 
Palestine House hosted Abdul Bari Atwan, a journalist based in London, for Palestinian 
Land Day commemorations, which the centre hosts yearly. The letter specifically quoted 
Atwan' s comment from a televised interview on a Lebanese channel, where he said: "If 
the Iranian missiles strike Israel, by Allah, I will go to Trafalgar Square and dance with 
delight." 
Palestine House responded to the letter, explaining that the map on their website 
was merely an outline of historical Palestine, a geography that many Palestinian-
Canadians continue to be connected to, adding that it could be easily removed. On the 
subject of the event to mark the release of Palestinian prisoners, Palestine House 
explained that the event was in ·support of the prisoners and all their families, not one 
particular prisoner, adding that the majority of Palestinians are tried under Israeli military 
courts for political activities of any kind (not necessarily political violence). On the final 
issue of hosting Abdul Bari Atwan, the organization made clear in their response that he 
was hosted as a prominent London-based Palestinian journalist with a long career, and 
that they were not aware of the particular statement quoted and in any case did not agree 
with it (Siddiqui, 2012). 
The explanation did not convince the Ministry, and in January 2012, the Palestine 
House was informed that the CIC would not enter into a new agreement with them. 
Twenty staff members lost their jobs due to these cuts, the majority of them both women 
and non-Palestinian. Most individuals receiving services at the centre were of Chinese 
and South Asian background, and were neither Arab nor Palestinian. 
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In both of the above cases, CAF and Palestine House were not assessed on their 
program delivery-rather, the judgment was on their positions, actions, and events 
regarding Canadian foreign policies in the Middle East, and specifically their criticism of 
Israeli state policies. Those in favour of funding cuts continue to stress that state funding 
should not go towards advocacy. However, it is important to note that funds given by the 
state through CIC for settlement programs are monitored very closely through monthly 
reports that program managers must submit to CIC; these reports are detailed to the point 
of recording exact spending on photocopying, office supplies, and so on. Both CAF and 
Palestine House insisted that none of their activities that were Palestine related were ever 
supported with CIC funds. This indicates that the issue for the government was not the 
manner in which the funding was used, as the monthly reports they received easily 
proved the effective organizational operations in using the resources-rather, this is a 
case of specifically disciplining groups for their activities unrelated to "service delivery." 
It is unclear, however, what positions on Palestine CIC would not deem "extreme" or if 
there is even an acceptable Palestine solidarity position that would satisfy the Ministry. 
Interestingly, the first letter to Palestine House notifying the organization of the 
review, dated Dec. 16, 2011, included a reference to the new Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada citizenship guide issued in March 2011, titled Discover Canada: 
The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship. The letter noted: "as stated in CIC's guide 
to new Canadians 'some Canadians immigrate from places where they have experienced 
warfare or conflict. Such experiences do not justify bringing to Canada violent, extreme 
or hateful prejudice."' The use of the guide is significant: it was utilized for managing 
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what discourses and experiences Canadian immigrants can and cannot "bring" with them. 
According to a CIC report evaluating the multiculturalism program, the updated guide 
"strengthens the content on common Canadian values such as freedom, democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law and the equality of men and women" (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, 2012a). Moreover, right after the guide was reissued, "an 
advertisement campaign on citizenship was launched which emphasized the meaning of 
being Canadian and the importance of Canada's values, symbols, institutions and history" 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a). The use of the guide in the context of a 
letter issued to revi~w an organization highlights its use in the disciplining of 
communities that are determined to, potentially, "bring in prejudice" and "extremism"-
as such terms are defined by the state officials. Citizenship itself is reordered in this way, 
not only into a set of common values that include freedom and democracy as inherently 
Canadian values (and not universal), but the guide itself is also quoted to curtail what 
discourses and experiences are to be admissible into Canada. 
It is critical to assess the described cuts to the funding of two of the most 
important Arab community organizations in Canada in light of Canada's foreign policies, 
as well as the redefinition of Canadian citizenship into a white-neoliberal 
multiculturalism in a context of neoliberal globalization and the War on Terror. As Gary 
Younge noted in relation to Islamophobia in Britain: 
Somewhere out there is the Muslim that the British government seeks. Like all 
religious people he (the government is more likely to talk about Muslim women 
than to them) supports gay rights, racial equality, women's rights, tolerance and 
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parliamentary democracy. He abhors the murder of innocent civilians without 
qualifications - unless they are in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. He wants to be 
treated as a regular British citizen - but not by the police, immigration or airport 
security. 
He raises his daughters to be assertive: they can wear whatever they want 
so long as it's not a headscarf. He believes in free speech and the right to cause 
offence but understands that he has neither the right to be offended nor to speak 
out. Whatever an extremist is, on any given day, he is not it. (2009) 
In the case of Palestinian-Canadians, the Canadian state is looking for something 
similar: a Palestinian-Arab who will not speak about Canadian support for the Israeli 
state, will not engage in conversations about the ethnic cleansing of Palestine or 
remember his/her original villages on a map, and who will not even celebrate the release 
of Palestinian political prisoners. 27 The government explains that if organizations are to 
engage in such acts, they will not receive government funding for newcomer services. 
Multiculturalism for Arab-Canadians, then, is relegated to expressions of dress, food, and 
dance, but does not include expressions of political positions-especially those that do 
not conform to the expressed foreign policies of the state. 
Funding Cuts to Development NGO 
27. It is important to consider that the use of funding to silence and discipline community groups 
happens also in other Western states allied to Israel. For just one example, in Britain, the week 
preceding a government launch of an anti-terror strategy named Contest 2, MP Hazel Blear 
threatened to deny funding to the Muslim Council of Britain "because of comments its deputy 
secretary, Daud Abdu.llah, made about supp01iing Palestinians. It shows how these domestic 
tensions are intertwined with foreign policy" (Younge, 2009). 
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The funding cuts went well beyond Arab community organizations to reach aid 
and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that the state considered to be 
at odds with its foreign policy. The following section will discuss the funding cuts to two 
development aid NGOs: KAIROS and Alternatives. 
KAIROS is an organization composed of eleven churches and religious groups. 28 
Its main work consists of promoting human rights, sustainable development, and 
women's rights with its partners in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle 
East. 
In March 2009, KAIROS submitted a program proposal for 2009-2013 which 
focused on human rights and ecological justice. As is common practice, KAIROS 
submitted the proposal in consultation with CIDA staff and made all adjustments to the 
program requested by the program officer (KAIROS, n.d.). By July 2009, the proposal 
was received by Beverly Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, after approval from 
various levels of CIDA. On November 30, however, KAIROS received a phone call that 
they would not receive their requested funding. After some pressure following media 
reports and questions in the House of Commons, CIDA faxed a letter to KAIROS stating 
that CIDA was focusing its resources on three themes-food security, children and youth, 
and economic growth-and that the KAIROS proposal did not fit these priorities. But, 
28. KAIROS members include the Anglican Church of Canada, Christian Reformed Church in 
North America, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, Mennonite Central Committee, 
Presbyterian Church in Canada, United Church of Canada, Religious Society of Friends 
(Quakers), Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Canadian Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Canadian Religious Conference, and the Primate's World Relief and 
Development Fund. 
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according to KAIROS, the proposal was framed within two CIDA priority areas: 
promoting good governance (human rights), and advancing ecological sustainability 
(reducing the impact of climate change and addressing land degradation) (KAIROS, 
n.d.). The KAIRIOS proposal, the organization argued, "was deemed by CIDA staff to be 
within CIDA criteria and priorities throughout the approval process," a fact that 
completely undermined the official explanation for the cuts. At that stage, however, no 
coherent alternative explanation for the cuts existed besides the official one regarding 
KAIROS falling outside the revised CIDA priorities. 
However, boasting about the decision a few weeks later in a speech to the Global 
Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem, Citizenship and Immigration Minister 
Jason Kenney explained: 
We have articulated and implemented a zero tolerance approach to anti-Semitism. 
What does this mean? It means that we eliminated the government funding 
relationship with organizations like for example, the Canadian Arab Federation, 
whose leadership apologized for terrorism or extremism, or who promote hatred, 
in particular anti-Semitism. We have ended government contact with like-minded 
organizations like the Canadian Islamic Congress, whose President notoriously 
said that all Israelis over the age of 18 are legitimate targets for assassination. We 
have defunded organizations, most recently like KAIROS, who are taking a 
leadership role in the boycott. (2009e) 
The following day, Jason Kenney's office defended the assertion that KAIROS 
was involved in theBDS campaign by referencing NGO Monitor (NGOM), a pro-Israeli 
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source. As reported by Elizabeth Thompson on December 17, 2009 for the Toronto Sun, 
Kenney's office pointed to critical comments made by an Israel-based group. The 
NGO Monitor said KAIROS is a main supporter of the anti-Israel divestment 
movement in Canada and gave a $25,000 grant in 2007 to Sabeel, a Palestinian 
NGO whose leader "employs anti-Semitic themes and imagery." ... Kenney's 
office also pointed to a 2006 press release from B 'nai Brith and Canadian 
Christian College president Charles Mc Vety calling on CIDA to stop funding 
KAIROS. 
The use of NGO Monitor information as a source is itself very revealing. 29 According to 
its own website, "NGO Monitor's objective is to end the practice used by certain self-
declared 'humanitarian NGOs' of exploiting the label 'universal human rights values' to 
promote politically and ideologically motivated agendas" (NGO Monitor, n.d.). As 
Reghai" explained: 
Although using language that would appear neutral, NGOM is a highly partisan 
organization that weakens universal human rights by its fixation on shielding 
Israel from accountability and charging some of the most respected international 
human rights organizations with bias against Israel. According to NGOM, these 
include Christian Aid, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Oxfam, the 
Center for Constitutional Rights and Medecins Sans Frontiers. (2010) 
29. NGO Monitor produced briefings on KAIROS and Alternatives, prior to the funding cuts, that 
can be found on the organization's website, dated 2007 and 2009, respectively. When the funding 
was cut for the two organizations, NGOM updated their website with a section titled "Canadian 
Gov't to Halt Funding for NGOs Promoting Conflict" (2009b). 
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In 2008, NGO Monitor wrote regarding CIDA that, "funding continues for a 
number ofNGOs engaged in anti-Israel campaigning [and] [t]his group includes Al Haq, 
Alternatives, Medecins Du Monde, Oxfam and the Mennonite Central Committee," 
clearly casting a wide net on what they deem anti-Israel campaigning (NGO Monitor, 
2008). 
In a response to Kenney' s allegations, KAIROS explained in a press release: 
Minister Kenney's charge against KAIROS is false. KAIROS did not lead this 
campaign. In 2007, KAIROS took a public position opposing sanctions and a 
boycott of Israel. A recently released document, KAIROS Palestine, 2009: A 
Moment of Truth, is not a document ofKAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice 
Initiatives. (2009) 
It was assumed that Minister Kenney had mistaken the KAIROS Palestine 
document for a KAIROS Canada position. In fact, the KAIROS Palestine document 
supportive of BDS was indeed issued in Bethlehem on December 11, 2009, but had 
nothing to do with KAIROS Canada. KAIROS' response went on to say, 
Minister Kenney's statement, in a highly charged environment, raises very 
disturbing questions about the integrity of Canadian development aid decisions. If 
aid decisions are based on political rumor rather than on due diligence, 
development criteria and CIDA's own evaluation process then this is a matter of 
grave concern for the entire international development sector - and for the 
Canadian people who pay for this aid. (2009) 
It is worth noting that KAIROS' actual position on Palestine-Israel included 
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"three strategies: educate church membership on the conflict in Palestine and Israel; 
promote fair trade olive oil and other products from the Occupied Palestinian Territories; 
and highlight Canadian economic relationships with illegal Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories" (KAIROS, 2008). KAIROS argued that their position 
was consistent with Canada's foreign policy on Israel-Palestine, stating that according to 
the Government's own Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
it was specified under the heading "Occupied Territories," that Canada adheres to "UN 
Security Council Resolution 446 and 465 [both of which] refer to Israeli settlements in 
occupied territories as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The settlements also 
constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace" 
(KAIROS, 2008). 
Minister Kenney was forced to retract his comments, especially as they 
contradicted the public statements by other officials from CIDA regarding the cuts and 
CIDA funding priorities. In a response to an article on the issue in the Toronto Star, 
Kenney explained: 
While I disagree with the nature of KAIROS's militant stance toward the Jewish 
homeland that is not the reason their request for taxpayer funding was denied. 
International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda - not me - is responsible for the 
Canada International Development Agency. And she has been clear that a cost-
sharing program with KAIROS was not approved because it did not meet CIDA's 
current priorities, such as increased food aid. (2009d) 
The government continued to insist that the cuts were merely the result of missed 
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criteria. Jim Abbott, former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International 
Cooperation, told Parliament on March 15, 2010 that CIDA recommended cutting 
funding to KAIROS: "CIDA thoroughly analyzed KAIROS' program proposal and 
determined, with regret, that it did not meet the agency's current priorities" (Abbott, 
2010). In the House of Commons, Minister Oda claimed that KAIROS had lost its 
funding because their work no longer fit CIDA's objectives stating: 
Mr. Speaker, our government has been very clear. We have an international aid 
effectiveness strategy and we are acting on it ... all projects by CIDA are 
assessed against our effectiveness standards. After due diligence, it was 
determined that KAIROS' proposal did not meet government standards. (2010) 
Unfortunately for Beverly Oda, the story of the funding cuts did not end there. 
Documents obtained through an Access to Information request showed that KAIROS' 
2009-2013 funding proposal had been approved at every level of CIDA. Thus, it was not 
a decision made by the staff of CIDA in response to an evaluation of the proposal based 
on stated criteria; rather, it was a political decision. The documents contained the 
signatures of top CIDA officials recommending that funding to KAIROS continue, 
including the signature of CIDA President Margaret Biggs. However, a handwritten "not" 
was added to the final document. 
As a result, both Margaret Biggs and Minister Oda were questioned in the 
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Development in December 
2010. Margaret Biggs testified that the inserted word "not" was not on the final document 
that the Minister received. Minister Oda also testified that she did not know who had 
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doctored the document. 
In February 2011, the Minister finally explained that it was her personal decision 
not to recommend funding, and that it was up to ministers to make such decisions: "Mr. 
Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to set the record straight regarding the 
funding application for KAIROS ... The 'not' was inserted at my direction" (Oda, 2011 ). 
She insisted, however, that she had not misled Parliament about the doctored document. 
After examining the case, then Speaker of the House of Commons, Peter Milliken, ruled 
that "the government withheld information from a parliamentary committee, and that 
International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda may have misled the House" (Ibbitson, 
2011). 
As reported by Clark in The Globe and Mail (2011 ), the Prime Minister 
nonetheless continued to support Minister Bev Oda. The decision to stop funding was not 
rescinded, forcing KAIROS to cut some of their programming. What became evident as 
this case unfolded was th~t the notion of "fitting priorities" was effectively used to deny 
funding to an organization, while government ministers publicly, and on flimsy grounds, 
accused it of anti-Semitism. 
Another NGO that suffered a similar fate to KAIROS and lost its funding from 
CIDA under similar circumstances was Alternatives, a left-leaning, Montreal-based NGO 
established in 1994. Its stated mission is to "create a world where international solidarity, 
environmental rights, democratic rights and human dignity are universally respected 
(Alternatives, n.d.). In December 2009, after 17 years of receiving funding from CIDA 
for projects in over 30 countries, Alternatives learned through an article in a national 
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newspaper that CIDA funding for their programs would be cut (Voices-Voix, n.d.). The 
organization could not get a confirmation from Minister of International Cooperation 
Beverely Oda, or from CIDA President Margaret Briggs. Michel Lambert, Alternatives' 
Executive director said at the time: "From our point of view we have no news, and we 
have asked many times for the [minister's office] and CIDA to clarify that and we don't 
even get an answer, so we don't know." Mr. Lambert said further that: "The people we 
discuss with on a daily basis say it's still in process, but the higher-level people, like the 
president [Margaret Biggs], are not responding" (Payton, 2010a). It was widely reported 
however that "an independent evaluator, working for CIDA, gave Alternatives a positive 
recommendation. The evaluator even suggested a five-year funding renewal. CIDA staff 
suggested Mr. Lambert amend it to a three-year proposal" (Payton, 2010b). 
The government never explained officially what had taken place; it was just 
implied in media reports that Alternatives' position on Palestine was the issue. 
Alternatives' executive director, however, publicly stated: "What we hear from various 
people in Ottawa, including a member of Parliament, is that we are going to be cut (off) 
based on point of view ... mainly on the issue oflsrael-Palestine" (Brennan, 2010). 
Alternatives was forced to dismiss many members of its staff and to cancel various 
projects following the cuts to its funding. 
Federally Funded "Arm's-Length" Institutions? 
The cases of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development (better known as Rights and Democracy) and the International 
Development Research Centre showcase a different aspect of the interference in funding 
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because both organizations were created by the Canadian parliament. However, they 
were meant to be independent and at arm's length from the state. The cases below outline 
funding cuts to grants that were made by both organizations to NGOs critical of Israeli 
policies. Through a series of board appointments from the Conservative government, 
Rights and Democracy was embroiled in a controversy and eventually shut down, with 
the debate largely surrounding three grants approved by the president for three NGO's 
that operate in Palestine: Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, and B'tselem, three human rights 
organizations critical of Israeli policies. The International Development Research Centre 
also revoked a grant to Mada al-Carmel, a research institute active around issues of 
Palestinian minority rights within Israeli society. 
In 2008, the Harper conservative government appointed four new Rights and 
Democracy Board members: Jacques Gauthier, Jean Builbeault, Payam Akhavan, and 
Ellio Tepper. Then, in early 2009, Aurel Braun was appointed as Chair of the Board. 
According to Sima Samar, an international board member who later resigned, some of the 
new appointees had a "narrow political agenda" (Siddiqui, 2010). Warren Allmand, a 
former president of the agency and former Liberal cabinet member, commented on the 
changes and controversy at the organization, noting, "It's pretty clear to me that the 
government recently has been packing the board with people who have the biases of the 
Prime Minister's Office" (CBC, 201 Oa). 
In testimony to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Development on the issue, board member Payam Akhavan insisted that problems 
between board members first began when a minority led by Braun and Gauthier pursued 
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a "hostile takeover" (Akhavan, 2010). In February of 2009, Rights and Democracy 
provided grants of $10,000 each to B 'Tselem, Al Haq, and Al Mezan, three human rights 
organizations critical of Israeli policies. These grants were one of the key points of 
contention between some new board members and the president of the organization, 
Remi Beauregard, who had approved the grants. 
Mr. Braun, the Chair, was quoted in the media stating his objections to the grants: 
"Al Haq and Al Mezan - have links to terrorism. The third group, B 'Tselem, which is 
Israeli, is biased and undeserving of funding" (CBC, 2010). There was no evidence 
provided for the all~gations. 30 Together with his allies on the Board, Braun accused 
President of Rights and Democracy Remi Beauregard of a lack of accountability and 
communication with the Board. A Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and International Development investigating what went on at Rights and Democracy 
stated: 
It is abundantly clear to the Committee that a significant factor underlying the 
dispute between certain members of the Board and Mr. Beauregard and the 
organization were differing views on the current dispute in the Middle East. From 
the perspective of Professor Braun and his supporters, their clear view was that 
support for certain organizations, in the words of Mr. Braun, followed a pattern of 
"delegitimating and dehumanizing a fellow democracy." From the perspective of 
President Beauregard, it is clear that Rights and Democracy felt it important to 
30. It is worth noting that Al-Haq and Al Mezan are funded by many governments and European 
foundations, including Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Christian Aid, Diakonia, the Ford Foundation, 
and the Open Society Institute. 
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support the cause of civil rights in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, even if this 
meant supporting organizations critical of the state of Israel. It is clearly 
impossible to understand the depth of emotion underlying the dispute between 
members of the Board and between the Board and senior officials at Rights and 
Democracy without comprehending the deep differences of opinion on this 
important subject. (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010) 
As early as March 26, 2009, at the Board of Director's first meeting chaired by 
Braun, after strong opposition to the grants was voiced by board members Braun and 
Gautheir, a compromise was struck that no further funding would be given to Al Haq, Al 
Mezan, or B 'Tselem. Prior to these events, Beauregard had received a positive 
performance review, and the 2009 audit of R&D by the Auditor General of Canada was 
also positive. However, three members of the board (Gautheir, Tepper, and Braun) 
initiated an assessment of the president's performance and sent their negative evaluation 
to the office of the Chairman to the Privy Council Office (PCO) without any discussion 
with the Board. Beauregard had not seen the evaluation either, and later only accessed it 
through a Freedom of Information request. According to the testimony of board member 
Akhavan, the evaluation included "baseless accusations, half-truths, and distortions that 
disregarded or minimized his successful leadership" and amounted to "a character 
assassination" (Akhavan, 2010). 
The review included a reference to the three grants as well as to Beauregard's 
participation in a conference in Cairo. According to Akhavan's testimony to the 
parliamentary committee, Beauregard was accused by Gauthier (another of the four 
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Harper appointees on the Board), of having met with representatives of Hamas and 
Hezbollah as part of this conference. Gauthier also implied that Beauregard broke the law 
by attending these meetings, referring to the "section 83 .18 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada [which] provides that contributing directly or indirectly to the activity of a 
terrorist group is punishable by ten years of imprisonment." Akhavan stressed that 
Gauthier's serious accusations were not backed by facts, and bemoaned how "[s]o 
without a shred of evidence-without a shred of evidence-a distinguished bureaucrat 
with a spotless record was accused of being a criminal" (Akhavan, 2010). 
In a June 18, 2009 board meeting, President Beauregard responded to his 
evaluation report and requested that it be rectified; the majority of the Board also 
requested that it be revised, and rejected the evaluation. This never took place, however, 
as the following board meeting was cancelled hastily, and the next one only took place 
after the Braun faction had placed a decisive majority on the Board through new 
appointments. New appointees included Marco Navarro-Genie and Bradley Farquhar 
(appointed November 2009), as well as David Matas and Michael Van Pelt (appointed 
November 2009). Regardless of their political affiliation (Matas, for example, belonged 
to the Liberal party and was senior counsel to B 'nai Brith), they voted to support the 
Braun faction. It was Matas in his first board meeting who brought in the motion to 
repudiate the grants to Al-Mezan, Al-Haq, and B'Tselem. 
After securing a majority on the Board, the conflict between Beauregard and 
certain members of the board erupted at a key meeting on January 7, 2010. The new 
Board had voted to deny a second term of office to Guido Riveros Franck of Bolivia, one 
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of three international Directors. Sima Samar resigned and walked out of the meeting, as 
did international human rights expert Payam Akhavan. The board members voted at this 
meeting to repudiate the three grants, with Beauregard voting in favour of this change. 
The final vote was nine for and one abstention. Beauregard died of a heart attack the 
following day, Jan. 8, 2010. His widow has stated publicly that he experienced 
considerable stress and bullying in the months before his death (CBC Radio, 2011 ). Of 
the 47 staff employed at R&D at the time, 45 members signed a letter demanding that 
Directors Braun, Gauthier, and Tepper be dismissed from the Board, due to behaviour 
that constituted harassment (Cheadle, 2010). 
This only resulted in the Board appointing Jacques Gauthier as interim President 
of Rights and Democracy. He proceeded to suspend three directors, later dismissing them 
(they filed a legal case for wrongful dismissal) (Standing Committee on F AAE, 2010). 
Gauthier also "authorized several contracts to hire external firms during his short tenure, 
which included two law firms, a communications firms, an accounting firm, and a private 
investigation firm" to perform an external audit (Standing Committee on F AAE, 2010). 
The hiring of these private firms was not done through a tender process. Importantly, the 
audit did not reach any damning conclusions regarding the agency's financial 
management. The biggest issues identified by Deloitte & Touche related to matters of 
governance, pointing to "several conflicts between certain members of the Board of 
Directors and certain management personnel." As a result, auditors called on the Board to 
clearly define "restrictions concerning the activities, projects and/or partnerships, or 
geographic areas with which Rights & Democracy should not be associated or to which it 
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should not provide financial assistance" (LeBlanc, 2010). 
In its recommendations, the parliamentary committee investigating the situation at 
Rights and Democracy concluded that "the Privy Council Office remove the Board's 
evaluation (and all documents related to the evaluation) of Remy Beauregard from all 
files" and recommended that "the Government of Canada reconstitute the Board, with a 
new Chair." The Committee also concluded that the new Board "should be appointed in 
consultation with the opposition parties to ensure an arms-length, non-partisan Board." 
However, the Conservative government did not agree to all recommendations and 
remained supportive of the Board (Standing Committee on F AAE, 2010). The 
Conservative Party of Canada produced a "dissenting opinion" to the parliamentary 
report, writing in response: 
We want to express our confidence in the Board of Directors and thank them for 
their perseverance during these difficult incidents. These are essentially volunteer 
positions and their labour is one of service to their country. While we worked 
diligently with opposition members to agree on the body of this report, we cannot 
support ALL the recommendations pushed through by the opposition majority on 
the Committee. (Standing Committee on F AAE, 2010) 
In March 2012, the Canadian government announced that it would close down 
R&D, and transfer the organization's functions to the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (Mills, 2012). Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said: "For some 
time, the many challenges of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, also known as Rights & Democracy, have been well publicized. It is time 
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to put these past challenges behind us and move forward" (2012b). Even though it was 
clear that there was no organizational mismanagement, nor any financial issues, the 
organization was folded and the report evaluating the late president was never changed. 
In the same vein, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), another 
development research institution funded by the federal government and meant to be at 
arm's length from the state, ended its contract for two grants to Mada al-Carmel, a Haifa-
based research institute focused on studies on Pale~tinian citizens inside Israel. The IDRC 
was taken to court by Mada al-Carmel, with allegations that the institute lost its IDRC 
funding without an explanation relating to the institute's conduct. In its application to the 
federal court, Mada noted that they had 
been criticized in written submissions to Canadian Parliamentarians by an 
aggressive Israeli organization, NGO Monitor. The Respondents are aware of 
NGO Monitor's submissions, which are inflammatory and incorrect in accusing 
Mada Al-Carmel of advancing "a one-sided agenda of demonizing and 
delegitimizing Israel." (Federal Court, 2010) 31 
Mada was in the second year of two three-year grants from the IDRC to study the 
marginalization of women in Arab-Israeli society and the low level of political 
participation by Arab Israelis, when the IDRC tenninated the grants, worth almost 
$800,000. This was not related to the performance of the organization. As a matter of 
fact, an IDRC statement said: "We wish to emphasize that this termination is ... by no 
31. This was in refer~nce to NGO Monitor's "Submission to Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to 
Combat Anti-Semitism" dated August 31, 2009. 
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means a reflection on the quality of the work being done by your institution" (Martin, 
2012). 
The official reasoning given for the revocation of the grants by IDRC president 
David Malone was that the IDRC's "mandate is to fund research in developing nations 
and that Israel, as a high-income country, is not considered a developing state" (Martin, 
2010). However, he acknowledged that the Mada grants were "first brought to [his] 
attention as the result of an inquiry by NGO Monitor, an Israeli advocacy group," in late 
January. Shortly afterward, IDRC management received a communication from the office 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, also inquiring about Mada. 
However, Malorie insisted that "[i]t was a management decision ... strictly internal" 
(Martin, 2012). Following an initial IDRC investigation, Malone wrote to Cannon that he 
planned to continue Mada's grants, as noted in a letter by Palestinian NGOs inside Israel 
to the Canadian ambassador to Israel: "From Mr. Malone's cross examination under oath, 
we know that your office did conduct its own inquiry about Mada al-Carmel and that you 
reported back that Mada is a credible research center serving the Palestinian community 
in Israel" (Johal, 2010). But one month later, Malone changed his mind about the IDRC's 
own investigation, and just two weeks before the grants were cut he met with the Israeli 
ambassador at the Israeli embassy in Ottawa. 
When asked by Mada's lawyer if that meeting had anything to do with his 
decision to end the grants to Mada, Mr. Malone was prevented from answering by a 
lawyer for the Attorney General of Canada, who warned he must not reveal the contents 
of any such embassy meeting as they relate to Canada's national security and 
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international relations (Martin, 2012). The idea that such a decision was "strictly internal" 
was highly suspect since, by Malone's own admission, the grants came to the IDRC's 
attention through NGO Monitor. Abruptly, in September of 2010, as the court case was 
ongoing, both organizations announced that they had "reached a mutually agreed 
settlement of all legal disputes" and Mada dropped the legal case (Mada al-Carmel, 
2010). 
As both the cases of Rights and Democracy and the IDRC illustrate, even 
supposed arm's-length non-partisan organizations have to be disciplined and brought in 
line with the Canadian state's support for Israeli policies. Interference through board 
appointments and pressure on staff can lead to defunding and ending relations, not on the 
basis of any relevant criteria, but because of this sort of one-sided inference. Thus, 
disciplining mechanisms cut across the board, from community organizations to 
development NGO's and all the way to federally supported institutions. Discipline is 
exercised though direct funding cuts from CIC or CIDA, or by assuring board 
appointments that will put pressure on funding institutions. In all these cases, 
"imbalance" and criticism of Israel was cited as a reason for cutting funding. Meanwhile, 
it is the Canadian government that is imbalanced in its support and one-sided orientation 
towards Israel. 
Conclusion 
The cases of funding cuts to the Canadian Arab Federation, Palestine House, 
KAIROS, and Alternatives, as well as the interference in the grants given by Rights and 
Democracy and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), reveal a clear 
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pattern of targeting and disciplining organizations that do not agree with the uncritical 
support for Israel adopted by Prime Minister Martin's Liberal government, and advancing 
more vigorously under Harper's Conservative government. This chapter has sought to 
contextualize funding cuts within the broader process of subordination of official 
Canadian multiculturalism to the goal of advancing a more exclusionary Canadian 
identity based on "core values"-values that demarcate a "civilizational" border that 
leaves Arabs, Muslims, and by extension Palestine solidarity, outside. Further, the 
analysis is rooted in an understanding of the changing relationship between state funding 
and ethnocultural organizations in a neoliberal paradigm, whereby ethnocultural 
organizations become more dependent on the state for their survival and transform into 
"service providers," thus becoming more vulnerable and susceptible to the exercise of 
discipline by the state. Importantly, this chapter has highlighted the use of development 
aid as a tool for silencing NGOs, arguing that the state retains the power to silence dissent 
through funding, even as the term "independent" continues to be associated with the 
NGO sector. 
Clearly, the War on Terror "jettisoned those of Arab and Muslim background 
from their place in Western nations and 'Western civilization' and made precarious the 
national belonging and political citizenship of many other Canadians of color" (Arat-Koc, 
2005, p. 36). Arabs and Muslims have come to understand that the state operates by 
dividing their communities into fundamentalists and moderates, and that the main role of 
a citizen in such a circumstance is to prove at all times that s/he belongs to the latter. 
Mahmood Mamdani's (2004) work, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, convincingly explains 
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how, under the guise of the War on Terror, every Muslim is a perceived as a threat and 
must act to clear his/her name to fit the "good Muslim" category. As Thobani notes, 
however, "unfortunately for the good Muslims, no matter how deep their gratitude to the 
nation, no matter how ardent their embrace of western civilizational norms, the new anti-
terrorism measures continue to make them as equally suspect as the bad Muslims" (2007, 
p. 238). Both the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House were doomed to fit the 
category of "bad Muslim" despite all attempts to escape from this label. Unfortunately, 
this category does not apply only to Muslims; it applies to any individual/group that is 
perceived to take up a position critical of the imagined camp belonging to "Western 
civilizational values." 
The securitization of state/community relations increases levels of state 
censorship against groups that oppose unconditional support for Israel. This censorship 
relies, as discussed in Chapter One, on discourses and mechanisms of silencing that 
encompass labeling Palestine solidarity organizing as anti-Semitic (with a broad enough 
definition of anti-Semitism to encompass criticism of Israel), and the racialization of 
Arabs and Muslims as civilizationally inferior and extreme. The neoliberal ploy of 
subjecting the funding of organizations to "market" incentives further increases the 
vulnerability of organizations such as community groups and NGOs and paradoxically 
strengthens the state's power to discipline them. In an atmosphere of decreasing funding, 
with the language of "homegrown terrorism and domestic threats," commonplace, self-
imposed censorship becomes a key method of survival within the multicultural mosaic. 
However, such censorship rarely stops at the boundaries of single communities, but 
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gradually begins to affect any organization that would speak for Palestinian human rights 
or contradict the government on foreign or domestic policies. Eventually, dynamics of 
racialization and inferiorization spill out to encompass all dissent against state policies. 
Both CAF and Palestine House continue to operate without government funding; 
they have had to relearn skills of community fundraising to sustain themselves. If 
anything, they can now be even more outspoken about policies in the Middle East 
because the threat of funding loss has been acted upon. The court case for CAF is still 
pending, with state lawyers delaying proceedings at every opportunity. As for NGOs, 
there has been a serious chill placed over any activities related to Palestine, but this must 
also give them pause-to consider their level of "independence" when there is such 
heavy reliance on state funding. 
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Chapter 5. Queers Against Israeli Apartheid: Organizing Against the Silencing 
Campaign 
"The narrative of Palestine in the cultural arena carved by Zionism is first and foremost 
a story of erasure, denial, and active silencing by historians and intellectuals" 
(Bresheeth, 2007, p. 179). 
"Canada and Israel bolster each other's colonial occupations through political, military 
and economic support. To us, the links are clear. As queers our role in the struggle is 
obvious" (QuAIA, 2009). 
As the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) gained momentum, especially after 
Israel's assault on Gaza in 2008, the silencing campaign against a variety of Palestine 
advocacy organizations intensified. There was a turning point after the war on Gaza, 
when pro-Palestinian advocacy was clearly moving beyond campus activism, reaching 
into the trade union movement, and making connections with other human rights 
organizations. It was in this context that Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) was 
formed and began to face severe attempts at silencing and censorship. 
Discussions about forming Queers Against Israeli Apartheid followed a public 
forum at Toronto's Israeli Apartheid Week in 2008. At that particular IA W event, queer 
human rights activists spoke from the audience about the ways in which Israel uses 
LGBTQ rights to portray itself as a tolerant and multicultural state. This attempt to 
appropriate the language of LGBTQ rights to market Israel in a positive light 
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internationally was dubbed "pinkwashing" by advocates of Palestinian human rights. In a 
November 22, 2011 article in the New York Times titled "Israel and 'Pinkwashing,"' 
Sarah Schulman defined it as a "deliberate strategy to conceal the continuing violations 
of Palestinians' human rights behind an image of modernity signified by Israeli gay life." 
The naming of this strategy as pinkwashing facilitated the coalescence of a new pro-
Palestinian organizing focus in response to Israel's attempt to appropriate LGBTQ 
liberation in defense of its policies versus Palestinians. 
In the "Who We Are" section of their website, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid 
activists explained that: 
Today, in response to increasing criticism of its occupation of Palestine, Israel is 
cultivating an image of itself as an oasis of gay tolerance in the Middle East. As 
queers, we recognize that homophobia exists in Israel, Palestine, and across all 
borders. But queer Palestinians face the additional challenge of living under 
occupation, subject to Israeli state violence and control. Israel's apartheid system 
extends gay rights only to some, based on race. (QuAIA, n.d.) 
Initially, QuAIA's main focus was to open discussions and offer education about 
apartheid in Israel and the role of pinkwashing, as well as to support Palestinian queer 
groups. QuAIA also adopted the Palestinian call for BDS, and thus began to actively 
campaign on the basis of an analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and to advocate BDS 
as a tactic. One method used towards achieving this goal was to march with anti-
apartheid slogans during the annual Pride Week activities in Toronto. According to the 
official website, Pride Week "exists to celebrate the history, courage, diversity, and future 
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of Toronto's LGBTTIQQ2SA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Transgender, 
Intersex, Queer, Questioning, 2-Spirited, and Allies)" (Pride Toronto, 2011).32 The Pride 
festival is run by Pride Toronto (PT) a not-for-profit organization that hosts and organizes 
the week. 
Backlash against these new forms of advocacy emerged swiftly in the form of a 
campaign to silence QuAIA. The silencing campaign mainly focused on censoring 
QuAIA' s messaging and banning the group from marching in the main Pride parade. This 
chapter will take an in-depth look at the attempts to censor the group, by following the 
actions and discourses of pro-Israel lobbyists, the responses of the Pride Toronto 
executive committee, and the involvement of City of Toronto staff and elected officials. 
It begins by contextualizing the attack on QuAIA within the broader politics of the 
tolerant/intolerant binary within official multiculturalism, a binary used to mark "others" 
as inferior. Overall, the chapter frames these moments of silencing and erasure not 
merely as the work of over-zealous lobbyists and city officials who pushed for defunding 
Pride, but rather as the structuring and perpetuating of a racial imperial project aided by 
discourses of official multicultural policies that help to marginalize through the very 
32. Terminologies of sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are contested, and various 
competing and sometimes hotly debated acronyms are in usage, including LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender), and LGBTQ (which adds Queer, or in some versions Questioning). 
Groups arguing for the named inclusion of more specific identities have put forward longer 
acronyms, such as Pride Toronto's LGBTTIQQ2SA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, 
Transgender, Intersex, Queer, Questioning, 2- Spirited, and Allies). In this work, the tenns Queer 
and LGBTQ will be used throughout, except in quotes or references to specific usage. For 
definitions and examples of some of the pitfalls of acronyms, see Morya Lang's article, Library 
Rhetoric: the Canadian Library Association Statement of Diversity and Inclusion and LBGBTQ 
Advocacy, Progressive Librarian: A Journal for Critical Studies & Progressive Politics in 




language of inclusivity. 
The resistance to the silencing campaign is also a central focus of this discussion 
as it is a significant part of QuAIA' s narrative. When state officials and Zionist lobbyists 
tried to ban QuAIA from Pride Toronto (or, as some put it, ban the term Israeli 
apartheid), they faced what proved to be the strongest and most organized opposition yet 
to an attempt at censorship in the context of the Palestine Solidarity Movement. In the 
case of QuAIA, the silencing campaign was not contending with frightened Arab 
community groups dependent on funding or young student activists, it was dealing with 
long-term activists in a movement that had faced its own silencing battles and won them 
in the past. 
While the methods and discourses of silencing discussed so far in this dissertation 
were also employed against QuAIA, there is an important specificity to this case that 
must be examined because it brings questions of the racialization and corporatization of 
queer identity to the forefront. The arguments used to oust QuAIA from Pride Toronto 
are extremely helpful in understanding the various ways racialization and exclusion 
occurs in an official multicultural setting. Increasingly, _LGBTQ identities are being 
integrated into a cultural mainstream based on a white multiculturalism that does not 
challenge the status quo, but looks to manage it within the confines of existing power 
relations. 
As Eva Mackey explained, "the recurring paradox of multiculturalism and core 
culture in Canada is that the proliferation and plurality of other cultures should add up to 
the bounded and indefinable core culture of the nation" (2002, p. 151 ). In tackling the 
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issue of Israeli apartheid and standing against it, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid 
stepped outside the bounds of this core culture, which accepts LGBTQ liberal rights so 
long as they are separated out from a wider oppositional politics that focuses on the role 
of the Canadian state within conflicts and wars internationally. Those trying to silence 
QuAIA relied on using the official multicultural language of "keeping space inclusive 
and safe" in order to mark QuAIA as being outside of that space of inclusivity. Thus, the 
treatment of QuAIA is consistent with Puar's observation that "the terrorist figure is not 
merely racialized and sexualized; the body must appear improperly racialized (outside the 
norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the 
terrorist in the first place" (2007, p. 38). Language that is meant to build towards 
"tolerance" is as easily used to foster intolerance of specific narratives. One cannot 
abstract notions of inclusivity and tolerance from social relationships of power and the 
material conditions which produce them. Official multicultural policies, as the case study 
of QuAIA reveals, may be deployed to set not only the parameters for what is acceptable 
diversity and tolerance, but also our understanding of identity in general, as well as queer 
identity in particular and its relationship to power. 
A Note on Pinkwashing, Silencing, and Erasure 
The state of Israel relies on the silencing and erasure of Palestinian history to 
perpetuate the status quo in its conflict with the Palestinian people. It also relies heavily 
on transmitting an image of itself as a multicultural liberal democracy attuned to and 
working in sync with the "values of Western culture." As a key imperial proxy in the 
Middle East, Israel asserts and is accorded with civilizational superiority-already in the 
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vision of the founder of political Zionism it stood as a "rampart of Europe against Asia, 
an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism" (Herzl, 1896, p. 29). One of the 
strategies the state uses to mark its belonging to "Wes tern civilization" is the marketing 
of the "tolerant" aspects of Israeli society, and specifically for the case being examined 
here, its tolerance of LGBTQ rights. Benjamin Netanyanhu summed up this racialized 
construction of the Middle East succinctly in a speech in May 2011 to U.S. Congress, 
stating that "in a region where women are stoned, gays are hanged, Christians are 
persecuted, Israel stands out. It is different" (N etanyahu, 2011 ). 
However, as Cnaan Liphshiz bluntly explained in a 2009 Haaretz article, "Tel 
Aviv's burgeoning gay scene may be the single most effective Israel-advocacy 
instrument in the Zionist toolbox, according to participants of a new program which uses 
Israel's vibrant gay culture to improve the country's image abroad." It is no coincidence 
that the Israeli state adopted a campaign of branding itself as a gay haven within a region 
of intolerance. Focusing solely on the celebration of LGBTQ identity while all other 
Israeli state actions are ignored, the branding campaign expands significant sums and 
much effort on portraying Israel as a modem, multicultural, and tolerant state that stands 
out in a region plagued by widespread homophobia, thus reinforcing "the 'cultural 
difference' of Palestinian homophobia rather than recogniz[ing] the constraining, 
suffocating spatial and economic effects oflsraeli occupation" (Puar, 2012). 
The silencing of queer voices in support of Palestinian human rights on the streets 
of Toronto is an extension of the racialization of Palestinians as inferior and the 
wholesale erasure of the Palestinian narrative. It requires turning a blind eye to the acts of 
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the Israeli state and setting limits on what queer liberation can mean, specifically 
excluding from it any affinity with broader struggles for social and economic justice. In a 
dual movement, then, this silencing involves the racialization of Palestinians as inferior 
and the demarcation of queer space as a white multicultural space that celebrates one 
identity while ignoring other forms of oppression. Therefore, by their mere presence and 
registration to march in the Pride Parade in Toronto, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid not 
only challenged Israel's pinkwashing agenda, but also reclaimed the Pride Parade as a 
political space from this white multiculturalism and the forces that sought to impose it. 
For pinkwashing to be effective, the Palestinian narrative must be silenced and 
erased wherever it emerges, even if it is on the streets of Toronto. This is because any 
rupture in the pristine image of Israel as a queer-friendly liberal democracy is a rupture in 
the imperial narrative as a whole, a narrative in which the imperial adoption of the 
language of LGBTQ rights is seen as progressive and positive-so long as it comes at no 
expense to its foreign policy interests. 
Therefore, pinkwashing, silencing, and erasure must take place at the scale of the 
whole empire, and not just within Israel. As Puar explained, "pinkwashing only makes 
sense through an erasure of the spatial logics of occupational control as an intricate, even 
intimate system of apartheid emerges" (2012). Therefore, at the heart of the silencing 
campaigns are multiple forms of erasure and racialization that have the effect of silencing 
the Palestinian narrative in general, erasing Palestinian queers from any narrative, and 
importantly also from accounts of homophobia in Israel. To maintain an image of Israel 
as a haven of tolerance in a sea of intolerance, the sanitizing of queer space 
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internationally from any oppositional discourse becomes a necessity. 
Canada's Official Multicultural Policies and Homonationalist Inclusiveness 
As noted by Thobani, official multicultural policy allows the state to "live with 
the difference of others, while claiming this difference to enhance its own cultural 
superiority" (2007, p. 145). This cultural superiority is articulated through a language of 
tolerance and inclusivity that works on two axes: first, by solidifying a specific kind of 
acceptance onto a liberal white multiculturalism that maintains racial, class, and sexual 
hierarchies; and second, by casting out Others, framing them as intolerant and outside the 
bounds of multicultural inclusiveness. In the context of queer politics specifically, the 
state expresses its tolerance of LGBTQ liberal rights to enhance its own image locally 
and globally in opposition to an intolerant "Other." 
At the same time, this tolerance and promotion of queer rights marks the 
acceptance of LGBTQ subjects into a core culture, so long as there is no direct challenge 
to the state's neoliberal project and/or external imperial project. In short, LGBTQ liberal 
civil rights are brought into the space of tolerance in a managed way that supports and 
enhances a core culture. In the same way that, within official multicultural discourses, 
race is "reconfigured as culture and cultural identity became crystallized as political 
identity, with the core of the nation continuing to be defined as bilingual and bicultural 
(that is, white)" (Thobani, 2007, p. 145), sexual politics is reconfigured in communal 
terms and integrated into an acceptable and accepting core culture. 
Within the framework of the War on Terror, a binary between a multicultural, 
superior West and the Rest articulates an imperial politics of core, and periphery, and 
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maps, onto the Middle East region by casting Arabs and Muslims specifically as 
intolerant and barbaric. This can be seen as an additional moment in a continuum of 
imperial racism that deploys human rights language and minority rights to present its 
superiority, erase its own colonial history in relation to other regions, and significantly, 
justify intervening to "save those in need." It is important to note that this racialized 
discourse is expressed in many ways, some of which are embedded in the language of 
civilization, human rights, and tolerance, but all serve to support patterns of domination, 
exclusion, and marginalization (Henry, Totor, Mattis, & Rees, 2000). 
The growing degree of acceptance that is afforded in the West today to sexualities 
traditionally marked as deviant must be understood in the context of this imperial 
mechanism. Puar noted that: "The politics of recognition and incorporation entail that 
certain - but certainly not most - homosexual, gay and queer bodies may be the 
temporary recipients of the 'measures of benevolence' that are afforded by liberal 
discourses of multicultural tolerance and diversity" (2007, p. xii). Therefore, a core 
culture, in this case a Canadian core culture, can be constructed as accepting of LGBTQ 
liberal rights-and be given credit for its tolerance-while this same tolerance is used to 
both manage queer communities within specific state-set hierarchies and mark the 
intolerance of "Others," legitimizing the state's imposition of its domination on them-
including through wars-on the ground of its perceived superiority. Thus, LGBTQ liberal 
rights are themselves reconfigured to support a dominant nationalism. The concept of 
homonationalism explains this contradiction of incorporating queerness into white 
multiculturalism and liberal rights in a way that subordinates and excludes many others. 
207 
r 
Importantly, this binary creation of a tolerant state in opposition to an intolerant 
other is not only organized to inferiorize the Other outside the borders of the state, but 
also to solidify internal identities that can be depoliticized and managed in a context of 
"diversity management." It is not only that Arabs/Muslims must be constructed as 
homophobic and intolerant, queer identity must also be managed to fit inside an 
apolitical, celebratory notion of diversity that looks at queer rights in liberal terms that 
are fragmented from a broader emancipatory politics. In other words, homonormativity 
is, as explained by Duggan: "A politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative 
assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the 
possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture 
anchored in domesticity and consumption" (2003, p. 179). 
Thus, spaces for the celebration of queer identity are supported and encouraged so 
long as those involved remain within a prescribed role that disconnects oppressions and 
fragments social/political fight back. When it came to Queers Against Israeli Apartheid 
marching in Pride Toronto, their presence was acting against various layers of silencing: 
the silencing of the Palestinian narrative, the racialization of Palestinians, and the 
silencing of an oppositional politics within Pride events. 
Commodified Queer Identity 
In addition to the fragmentation of identities, there is also a corporatization or 
commodification of those identities within a neoliberal framework that thrives on 
"selling-diversity" (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). As Duggan noted, "neoliberalism in 
fact has a sexual politics" (2002, p. 177). Scholars of neoliberalism, such as Harvey, have 
208 
explained that neoliberalism "proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Official multicultural policies set within a neoliberal framework "as 
a basis for national identity mobilises the idea that the 'multi-cultures' are made up of 
identifiable and commodifiable fragments of culture, a defined range of traditional 
practices, cultural possessions or lifestyle choices" (Mackey, 2002, p. 151 ). 
A cursory look at the Pride Toronto website is enough to show the extent to which 
neoliberal consumption has become integrated and central to the functioning of this 
festival meant to celebrate "history, courage, and diversity." Pride Toronto boasts of 
having been named "Best Festival in Canada" by the Canadian Special Events Industry in 
2004, 2005, and 2009, and having been recognized as one of only eight Signature Events 
in the City of Toronto (Pride Toronto, 2010). Seen from a different angle, the financial 
annual report for 2010 reveals that sponsorships for the festival amounted to $1,469,027, 
which made up 42% of the total festival revenue for that year (Pride Toronto, 2010, p. 4). 
It is no coincidence that in making her case for the banning of the term Israel 
apartheid, Tracey Sandilands, executive director of Pride Toronto at the time, explained 
in an email reproduced in Xtra I newspaper that "both current and potential sponsors have 
made it clear that their reasons for supporting Pride is to support LGBT issues and the 
queer community, rather than an event that could become an 'omnibus of unrelated 
political issues"' (2010). In responding to this type ofreasoning for censorship, Tim 
McCaskell, speaking for QuAIA, said that "Pride Toronto has become more of a creature 
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belonging to a city that wants to sell tourism and corporations that want to sell to gay 
people. They've lost any connection to the community or diversity" (2010). 
The multicultural discourse divides society into ontologically and politically 
disconnected cultures and communities such that they can be then reconnected through 
the market and the state as a set of segmented bodies/communities that celebrate specific 
aspects of identity (in the most corporatized and commodified fashion possible). In 
protesting the banning of the term Israeli apartheid from Pride Toronto in 2010, the 
founding members of Pride insisted in a statement published on the QuAIA website: 
Solidarity with all struggles against oppression has been a crucial part of the 
history of Pride. To break this solidarity as the Pride Committee has now done not 
only refuses to recognize how queer people always live our lives in relation to 
race, class, gender, ability and other forms of oppression but also breaks our 
connections with the struggles of important allies who have assisted us in making 
the important gains that we have won. (Amup et al., 2010) 
This segmentation and corporatization of identity, along with the celebration of 
some voices and the silencing of others, reveals the failure of official multicultural 
policies to meet oppositional politics and demands of recognition by marginalized groups 
within an integrated discourse of equality and anti-racism. As Bannerji observed, through 
the concept of multiculturalism: 
The concept of race lost its hard edges of criticality, class disappeared entirely, 
and colour gave a feeling of brightness, brilliance or vividness, of a celebration of 
difference which was disconnected from social relations of power, but instead 
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perceived as diversity, as existing socio-cultural ontologies or facts. (2000, p. 32) 
Thus, celebration can occur, as long as it's a celebration in the form of corporate events 
that can be linked to tourism and emptied of a politics that challenges Canada's foreign 
policy. The Palestinian narrative specifically is racialized as being outside of the issues 
acceptable within Pride-it is outside the core culture. This form of diversity 
management relies on a complicit homonationalist construction of diversity that 
prescribes limits to what queer political subjects can care about and say. In official 
multicultural logic, queer subjects are meant to speak only of LGBTQ liberal rights not 
human rights in general, and if they venture into human rights more broadly it has to be 
about those rights that reside within the realm of acceptable imperial politics. Identities 
are re-constructed in isolation and are to a large extent ghettoized, their internal and 
constitutive relations of power and connections denied, and their potential for solidarity 
and joint struggle undermined. 
In August 2009, in a statement titled "Call to queers in Ottawa, Gatineau: March 
to Show there is 'No Pride in Apartheid,"' QuAIA activists rejected such notions of an 
apolitical corporate Pride, explaining that: 
We reject the corporatization and depoliticization of queer identity that is being 
"celebrated" today. Instead, we celebrate the long history of queers being at the 
forefront of social justice movements (from the Civil Rights movement in the 
U.S. to the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa). 
Pride A-Political? 
One aspect of sanitizing queer space involves the acceptance of a commodified 
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queer identity immersed in the language of celebrating diversity. This commodification 
entails a limited politics of liberal civil rights. In this context, it makes sense to claim, as 
some did in their campaign to push QuAIA out of Pride Toronto, that this "celebration" is 
meant to be apolitical. For example, Bernie Farber, CEO of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress, was quoted by Ian Roberston, in a Toronto Sun article dated 12 June 2009, as 
saymg: 
This parade ought not to be politicized ... we're disappointed ... It's a pretty sad 
story that the Pride Parade, a highlight of the summer which invites people to 
come out and show pride in their identity, includes heavy-duty, very intense 
political debate. 
Along the same lines, in a Toronto Star article, Martin Gladstone, a leading character in 
the silencing campaign against QuAIA, argued, after Pride Toronto reversed its ban on 
the term Israeli apartheid: "we don't want Pride to tum into a battleground ofregional 
conflicts all over the world. It's on a slippery slope from being a parade about gay 
celebration to becoming a parade about non-gay issues" (2010). 
A statement was issued by the Pride Toronto executive on May 27, 2009 to make 
their position on Pride and politics clearer. The statement explained: 
Pride Toronto wishes to state publicly that it is a nonpartisan organization created 
to serve the LGBTTIQQ2S* community of Toronto in all its cultural, religious, 
ethnic and sexual diversity. The organization does not have any affiliations 
whatsoever to political entities or causes. It exists for the purpose of delivering the 
annual Pride festival, which is an informational, educational and cultural festival. 
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(Kuhr & Garro, 2009) 
However, at the same time, and contradicting the Pride Toronto statement, Pride Toronto 
executive director Tracey Sandilands explained that: 
No one will be banned because of their messaging unless they contravene the hate 
crimes laws or anti discrimination policies. But if they simply have a political 
position, whether it's prevent global warming, save the whales or down with 
Israeli apartheid, that is not our decision to make [to stop them from participating] 
[sic]. Pride has always been a political platform. (Kuhr & Garro, 2009) 
At this stage, the crisis in the identity of Pride Toronto itself was emerging. On 
one hand, Pride organizers were pressured to declare that the organization exists only for 
the "delivery of the annual festival." But on the other hand, participating groups were 
insisting that the festival ought to remain true to its origins in the LGBTQ struggle and 
remain a political event. 
Although some organizations tried to say that Pride should not be political, it was 
in fact the specific politics of Palestinian human rights that they were concerned with. 
The same was true of the oft-repeated accusation that the presence of QuAIA made some 
feel uncomfortable and did not allow for an inclusive environment. In this way, keeping 
spaces safe, apolitical, and inclusive became code for cleansing those spaces of unwanted 
politics that disrupted the power structure and challenged the funders and pro-Israel 
lobbyists. What was at stake was a question of what politics rather than politics per se-
and significantly, it was a matter of allowing those in positions of power, and in a context 
of common sense racism against Arabs and Muslims, to decide which politics were 
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inappropriate, which were properly "inclusive," and what could be tolerated within 
tolerant multicultural spaces. 
The argument that this was "outside politics" coming in to hijack Pride Toronto 
had no basis, and only antagonized people into defending freedom of expression. It is 
critical to note, because it is easily forgotten, that the history of Pride itself is a very 
political history. Pride evolved out of the mass protests that followed the 1981 Toronto 
bathhouse raids. In February 1981, the Metropolitan Toronto Police launched raids 
against four gay bathhouses in Toronto, and more than three hundred men were arrested. 
In their statement protesting the banning of QuAIA, the founders of Pride made a direct 
reference to this history, noting: 
We remind people of the political roots of Pride in the Stonewall rebellion against 
police repression in 1969 and that the Pride march in 1981 in Toronto grew out of 
our community resistance to the massive bath raids of that year. On the Pride 
march in 1981 about a thousand of us stopped in protest in front of 52 Division 
Police Station (which played a major part in the raids) and our resistance to the 
bath raids was rooted in solidarity with other communities (including the Black 
and South Asian communities) also facing police repression. Two of the initiating 
groups for Pride in 1981 - Gay Liberation Against the Right Everywhere 
(GLARE) and Lesbians Against the Right (LAR) - organized Pride as part of 
more general organizing against the moral conservative right-wing. This included 
not only its anti-queer but also its anti-feminist, racist and anti-working class 
agendas. (Ai:nup et al., 2010) 
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In a context of official multiculturalism, this political history of Pride can easily 
be subsumed in a language that defines diversity and tolerance in terms of celebration, 
not struggles for equality. What is to be celebrated or silenced is carefully prescribed and 
managed. In one instance, Pride is being stripped of its political past and history of 
struggle on many international solidarity questions (such as apartheid South Africa). 
Meanwhile, tolerance in this context excludes political speech around Palestine and also 
excludes queer Palestinians, as well as anyone willing to speak out for Palestinian human 
rights. The next section traces the silencing campaign and its discourses chronologically. 
The Beginnings of a Silencing Campaign 
One of the early public manifestations of a queer movement against Israeli 
apartheid in Toronto occurred in the Dyke March on June 28, 2008, in which there was at 
least one banner protesting Israeli apartheid. A video of the Pride Parade that took place 
on the following day shows a very visible contingent of more than twenty people 
marching with the Canadian Union of Public Employees Ontario float under banners that 
read "Queers Against Apartheid" and "End Israeli Apartheid." The Ontario division of 
the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) had just passed a BDS motion at its 
convention, and, as was its custom, invited allies to march with the CUPE float during 
Pride with banners highlighting the recently developed policy. 
Official Zionist reaction to the first appearance of QuAIA was communicated in 
the Jewish Tribune in an article titled "Remove Hate Messaging from Pride Parade." The 
article quoted Frank Dimant, Executive Vice President of B 'nai Brith Canada, arguing 
that the anti-apartheid "signage" was intended to "de-legitimize the Jewish state" and that 
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it "promotes hatred against its supporters at home and abroad" (2008, p. 1 ). Dimant 
strongly urged Pride organizers to pressure CUPE to take down their website photos that 
allegedly misrepresented the "spirit" of Pride by showing a banner containing "the 
propaganda slogan [sic] of Israel Apartheid." In the same article, Martin Goldstone was 
also quoted to the effect that QuAIA "singles out and marginalizes the Jewish community 
on a political issue, demonizing the Jewish state with taxpayers' money." 
This first Zionist reaction already contained the main arguments that would 
continuously be used against QuAIA in the coming years, by: 1. conflating Israel with the 
Jewish community, so that criticism oflsrael is equated to promoting anti-Semitism; 2. 
claiming that taxpayers' money is being used to fund a forum which is supposed to 
promote diversity, not political messaging; and 3. arguing that the term Israeli apartheid 
delegitimizes Israel. 
The silencing campaign against QuAIA intensified the following year. In 2009, 
QUAIA began to think strategically about reaching out to other LGBTQ organizations, 
beyond those already active in the Palestine Solidarity Movement. It held two forums, 
one at the University of Toronto, the other at Buddies in Bad Times Theatre. The second 
forum was titled "Exploring Queer Resistance to Apartheid from South Africa to 
Palestine." The promotion for the event drew strong parallels between queer involvement 
in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and QuAIA's involvement in the 
movement against Israeli apartheid. The announcement for the event read: 
1986: Queer people in Toronto united in the Simon Nkoli Anti-Apartheid 
Committee (SNAAC) to fight for justice in South Africa. 
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2009: Another struggle against apartheid is building throughout the world. Queer 
people are joining the international call to name Israel's occupation of Palestine 
apartheid. 
Israel has now begun to frame itself as a tolerant, queer-positive democracy. This 
can never be reality under Occupation. Join Queers Against Israeli Apartheid on 
May 23 for an evening to reignite Toronto's queer community in the fight against 
apartheid. 
One of the speakers in this forum was El-Farouk Khaki, well-known lawyer and queer 
activist, and founder of Salaam Canada: Queer Muslim Community. Khaki also happened 
to be the grand marshal for the 2009 Pride Parade (which at the time was an honorary 
nomination made by an open vote). There was a concerted attack against Khaki for 
speaking at this forum even before the event took place. As one example, B 'nai Brith 
issued a press release on May 20, 2009, titled "B'nai Brith Canada urges LGBT 
community not to allow their agenda to be hijacked by anti-Israel agitators." 
Along with the public denunciations of the speakers at the forum, pressure was 
being brought to bear against Pride Toronto, as reported in an article in B'nai Brith's 
Jewish Tribune of May 28, 2009, titled "Pride Parade Microcosm of Anti-Semitism 
Happening Globally" (Beck, 2009) The article focussed on the de-funding of the parade. 
This is a clear illustration of how the silencing campaign relied on using both defamation 
through the accusation of anti-Semitism and threats to funding as key pillars to silence 
and erase oppositional voices. In the same article, Gladstone was quoted as stating that 
"the City of Toronto as well as TD Canada Trust, the main corporate sponsor, contacted 
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the Pride committee, urging them not to tolerate anti-Israel activity during the festivities 
[sic]" (Beck, 2009). 
QuAIA continued to plan for its contingent in Pride Toronto despite the attack on 
its public event. However, on May 28 of 2009, a National Post article incorrectly 
reported that Queers Against Israeli Apartheid had been "banned" from Toronto's annual 
Pride parade. It read: "Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA), an anti-Zionist protest 
group that made corporate sponsors squirm by flying banners at last year's Toronto Pride 
parade, has been banned this year, along with any other group that would advance a 
political agenda" (National Post, 2009). 
In response, Pride Toronto issued a public statement stating that there was no such 
banning; however, at the same time, the PT executive began to implement various 
bureaucratic tactics to manage the week. They argued that the trouble with QuAIA 
marching in 2008 was the lack of registration, and that for the 2009 parade they would 
have to apply and register if they wished to march. Tracey Sandilands, then Pride 
executive director, explained: "This is an issue that we are taking very seriously. We have 
retained legal counsel to investigate and advise us of our rights and responsibilities in the 
matter and a decision will be taken by our board on May 26 in the evening" (Jewish 
Tribune, 2009). Even though there was no direct banning of the group, it was clear the 
pressure against QuAIA was mounting to the point that Pride Toronto had to get legal 
counsel. To this end, the PT executive introduced new registration rules. 
At this time, countering the narrative that some people had just "slipped in" the 
previous year, Stephen Seaborn, vice president of political action for CUPE Toronto 
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District Council, explained that the initial QuAIA contingent in 2008 was invited by 
CUPE Ontario to march with them as it was customary for CUPE to "invite community 
allies and partners to join us on that day" (Kuhr & Garro, 2009). 
Although it was becoming clear that Pride Toronto was being pressured to 
introduce new rules to regulate the physical space of the Pride Parade, QuAIA chose not 
to challenge the new registration process. Spokesperson for QuAIA at the time, Corvin 
Russell, stated: "We decided to register to avoid any ambiguity and get clarity on Pride's 
position, and to avoid putting other groups in an awkward position" (Kuhr & Garro, 
2009). QuAIA went on to assemble a large anti-apartheid contingent in the 2009 Pride 
Week-about 180 women and trans people in the Dyke March, and over 200 people in 
the main Pride Parade on Sunday. 
The attempts to silence QuAIA actually managed to gamer the group more 
support. In the lead-up to Pride, QuAIA produced a video and held a workshop titled 
"Queering Apartheid" intended for people unfamiliar with the politics of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The silencing campaign thus gave QuAIA an opportunity to 
provide further education. QuAIA used the time before Pride very well, continuing to 
hold forums and reaching out to various groups. When it came time for QuAIA to march 
in Pride, the contingent was very strong and vibrant. There were a number of verbal 
attacks on the QuAIA contingent by supporters of Israel in the main Pride Parade, but 
otherwise the participation of QuAIA went without incident (Brett, 2009). 
The pressure in the lead-up to the 2009 Pride Parade saw Pride Toronto 
responding to Zionist and corporate pressure, by making the relatively minor concession 
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of introducing compulsory registration of participants, but not attempting to control the 
messaging of participants. These concessions did not go far enough, however, for the 
opponents of QuAIA' s participation and the silencing campaign only increased in 
intensity in 2010. 
Keeping pride under control. 
It was increasingly obvious that the pressure on Pride Toronto was becoming 
more organized and daring. Changes began to seep into Pride Toronto organizing that 
were intended to control the messaging of all groups, as well as transfer the power away 
from participating groups and move it to the Pride executive. For example, one of the 
early changes introduced in 2010 was a shift in the selection process for grand marshals, 
honoured dykes, and honoured groups. The selection process was changed to include 
votes by "a jury of peers, instead of a public voting process." It was also explained in the 
press release making the announcement that "the nominations will be screened by the 
Pride Toronto Board and a shortlist will then be sent to a jury of former Pride Award 
Winners who will make decisions in each category" (Pride Toronto, 2010). This appeared 
to be a direct response to the selection of Khaki as grand marshal in the previous year. 
Another change was introduced on March 10, 2010, when Pride Toronto unveiled 
revised terms and conditions for groups applying to participate in the 2010 Parade and 
Dyke March in a press release titled "Pride Toronto focuses on celebrating 30 years in 
Parade." The new terms and conditions required that "participating groups must agree to 
avoid any messages that promote violence or hatred and to have their messages and 
signage approved by the Ethics Committee of Pride Toronto in advance of the event" 
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(Pride Toronto, 2010). The press release went on to explain that this vetting/censorship 
policy, in the words of Pride co-chair Jim Cullen, meant that: "We are promoting 
freedom of expression and diversity in a way that is positive and supportive of our 
community. We hope to include everybody who wants to participate." 
These new rules amounted to a vetting of every message by every group 
participating in the Parade. As a response, the "Don't Sanitize Pride: Free Expression 
Must Prevail" Facebook group was launched and more than 1,500 people joined it over 
the next two weeks. After a concerted organizing campaign, Pride Toronto dropped its 
policy on sign vetting in advance of the Parade in an announcement on March 23, stating, 
"The Board of Directors of Pride Toronto has listened to feedback from the community, 
and the proposed plan for an Ethics Committee to review and approve all messaging prior 
to the Parade, Dyke and Trans March has been withdrawn" (Pride Toronto, 2010). 
Significantly, it was revealed in documents obtained through Freedom of 
Information requests made by QuAIA and shared with the Xtra! newspaper that, at the 
time these new regulations were imposed, even though the Pride Toronto executive and 
co-chairs insisted that the motivation for the new policies had been merely the desire to 
improve the event, city staff had been working with the Pride Toronto executive behind 
the scenes and discussing QuAIA's participation in Pride. For example, a letter dated 
April 14, 2010 from the office of Rita Davies, the City's executive director of culture, 
summarized a discussion with PT Executive Director Tracey Sandilands and co-chairs 
Jim Cullen and Genevieve D'Iorio. The letter, addressed to the City Manager and 
Councillor Kyle Rae, among others, read: 
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A review will be made as to whether they can ban a group on the basis of being 
called "Queers Against Israeli Apartheid." If that is the registered name of the 
group this would prove difficult. If not, it is "messaging" and can be covered 
under the need to abide by the City's anti-discrimination policies. (Martin, 2010) 
Another briefing note addressed to councillors, dating back to November 2009, 
from Executive Director of Cultural Services Rita Davies, shows that plans were in the 
works long before the sign vetting policy was announced in March of the following year. 
It noted: "In response to city staffs continuing concerns, Pride Toronto has confirmed 
that it is working with a consultant and has been receiving legal advice on how to curtail 
the anti-Israel marchers in next year's Pride parade." 
The collaboration between the PT executive and city staff to work out rules and 
regulations to ensure that QuAIA did not march is very telling of the pressure funding has 
on organizations such as Pride Toronto, but also of the ease with which silencing and 
censorship function in official circles without any due process. Without discussion with 
QuAIA, the group was judged in advance as inappropriate-and this was not done 
through a human rights tribunal or by adhering to any criminal code. 
The summer events of 2010 amounted to an intense stand-off between activists 
and Pride Toronto, with Pride Toronto attempting to balance between grassroots activists 
and the pressure from its corporate sponsors, Zionist lobbyists, and city officials. 
Excluding you to be inclusive. 
In the midst of the back and forth around new rules and regulations for 
participation in Pride, a homemade film by lawyer Martin Gladstone accusing QuAIA of 
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having "Nazi memorabilia" during Pride 2009 was circulated. This film was sent to 
media outlets and city officials. In fact, the t-shirt Goldstone pointed to in the video had a 
well-known Anti-Racist Action symbol which features a crossed-out swastika. Gladstone, 
who had already been lobbying to oust QuAIA from Pride, began to use the video to 
lobby city councillors and Pride sponsors to ban QuAIA. 
The group Kulanu Toronto (meaning "All of us" in Hebrew), a Jewish LGBTQ 
group, publicly supported Gladstone's video, stating, "We support Martin Gladstone's 
fight to educate the public about QuAIA' s mandate and encourage people to watch his 
poignant 2009 Pride documentary entitled "Reclaiming Our Pride" (Kulanu, n.d.). In a 
press conference after the ban on the term Israeli apartheid had been rescinded, Kulanu' s 
executive director explained: "Kulanu promotes inclusivity, diversity, acceptance, 
tolerance. We feel those values have been removed from the Pride parade and we want to 
bring them back" (Dagostino, 2010). This example illustrates how tolerance and diversity 
became catch phrases used to silence QuAIA. 
As early as November 2009, Martin Gladstone (lawyer) and Avi Benlolo, Chief 
Executive Officer of the Canadian branch of the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for 
Holocaust Studies (FSWC), met with city staffers. A briefing note from that meeting to 
Ward 27 City Councillor Kyle Rae, obtained through Freedom oflnformation requests, 
read: 
Gladstone stated that Pride has no mandate to engage in anti-Israel advocacy and 
that by allowing marchers, some of who wore swastikas and carried signs that 
read "End Israeli Apartheid" and "We Stand with Queers in Palestine," is contrary 
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to the City of Toronto Anti-Racism, Access & Equity Policy. (Davies, 2009) 
The meeting minutes were obtained by QuAIA through Freedom of Information 
requests and posted on their website. The list of arguments put forward against QuAIA 
included the point that grant money is meant to be given for the "celebration of gay 
culture, not anti-Israel messaging" (City of Toronto, 2009). Interestingly, anti-racism 
policy was also invoked, claiming that "just because it [the term Israeli apartheid] does 
not meet the criminal standard of hate law in the Criminal Code of Canada, does not 
mean it is acceptable by City of Toronto Standards." This amounts to a recommendation 
for city officials to ignore laws and due process in deciding on the exclusion of groups 
like QuAIA from civic spaces. 
Calls for censorship were thus framed as neutral claims to protect inclusivity. As 
the meeting minutes indicate, grant money for Pride Toronto was justified through the 
need "to help promote a healthy fabric for a multicultural city"; the implication was that 
QuAIA' s messaging was incompatible with multicultural celebrations. In an Orwellian 
twist, the principles underlying this multicultural fabric were listed in point form as: anti-
discrimination, inclusion, no racism, no divisiveness, everyone should feel welcome. 
Everyone, that is, unless they are Queers Against Israeli Apartheid. In the same 
document, the pro-Israel delegation suggested that defunding the Canadian Arab 
Federation for its "anti-Israel advocacy had set a precedent that should be applied to 
Pride" (City of Toronto, 2009). 
In response to what was clearly becoming an organized campaign to censor 
QuAIA, many groups wrote in to support freedom of expression. For example, 
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the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) wrote a letter to Mayor David Miller 
on April 20, 2010, objecting to the threat to Pride funding: 
in activities such as parades, art exhibitions and theatre performances, points of 
view on controversial subjects may be expressed that may make individuals from 
specific communities uncomfortable. Freedom of expression is central to such 
activities, however, and these considerations alone should not preclude public 
funding. 
Importantly, Queer groups from Palestine also wrote in explaining: 
We believe that as queers, one of the most disadvantaged and oppressed 
minorities in human societies, we should protest against all forms of oppression 
and struggle together. As Palestinian queers, our struggle relates to 
social injustices caused by the discrimination that is deeply rooted in Israel's 
policies and practices against the Palestinian people, straight and gay alike. 
(Aswat & alQaws, n.d.) 
Defunding pride: banning the term Israeli apartheid. 
That Israel lobbyists would try to exclude QuAIA is not surprising, but what is 
instructive is the role city officials took upon themselves in putting pressure on Pride to 
censor QuAIA. Correspondence obtained through Freedom of Information requests 
reveals that Toronto City Councillor Kyle Rae had sent a letter dated February 9, 2010 
requesting that the board of Pride Toronto "review the parade entrance requirements to 
ensure that Pride's mission vision and values are reflected in the (QuAIA) contingent's 
participation" (Xtra Staff, 2010). In his letter to Pride Toronto, Rae explained that he had 
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seen "the film produced by Martin Gladstone, and found the intervention of Queers 
Against Israeli Apartheid in last year's Pride parade completely out of keeping with the 
spirit and values of Pride Toronto." Furthermore, the Toronto Star reported (Dale, 2010) 
that Toronto City's manager of economic development and culture, Mike Williams, 
explained that the City's anti-discrimination policy had likely been violated by QuAIA's 
conduct and very presence at the previous summer's parade. However, he added that the 
City "didn't do a formal review and weigh all the evidence." 
Specifically on the use of the term Israeli apartheid, Williams could not produce a 
legal opinion, but followed Rae's lead in referring to the Ontario Legislature's symbolic 
motion: "We sort of have to take a look at it based on what the province did in their 
motion, where that phrase was pointed out as being an inappropriate phrase" (Dale, 
2010). The resolution on Israeli Apartheid Week was therefore used to designate the 
limits of acceptable speech, even though the passing of that resolution in itself was very 
problematic. This is a clear illustration of the ways in which the silencing campaigns 
have been mutually reinforcing: a condemnation of Israeli Apartheid Week in the Ontario 
legislature was used to silence the use of the term Israeli apartheid in various contexts, 
even though the term did "not meet the criminal standard of hate law" and even though 
there was no due process. The silencing campaign was orchestrated initially by some pro-
Israel lobbyists, but was then carried out and sanctioned by the state. 
Silencing Motions in City Council Begin 
The campaign to silence QuAIA took a more legislative tum before the 2010 
Pride Parade in the form of motions put forward by City of Toronto Councillors to 
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defund the parade. The City Council had consistently given Pride Toronto substantial 
funding and in-kind donations of city services such as clean-up and policing. On April 
28, 2010, Toronto City Councillor and mayoral candidate Giorgio Mammoliti issued the 
following ultimatum to QuAIA and Pride Toronto: 
I'm giving them 24 hours, I'll give 'em till midnight tonight. If they [QuAIA] 
don't withdraw from the parade, I'll be drafting up a motion at the next city 
council meeting asking to get rid of the funding this year completely and any 
resources that are associated with it. If we've already given any money to the 
parade, we'll be asking for it back. (2010a) 
Neither QuAIA nor Pride Toronto responded to Mammolitti and he went on to introduce 
a motion at the May 11, 2010 council meeting, which recommended that: 
1. City Council direct the City Clerk to advise the Pride organizers that the City of 
Toronto's 2010 funding and support will be revoked if Pride Toronto does not 
invoke the City of Toronto's anti-discrimination policies. 
2. City Council direct that if the Pride Committee confirms to the General 
Manager, Economic Development and Culture, that it has received and rejected 
an application to march from QuAIA prior to June 14, 2010, there be no further 
consideration of this matter by the Executive Committee. (Toronto City Council, 
2010) 
Although the motion invoked the city's anti-discrimination policy, there was 
nothing at this stage to back a claim that QuAIA actually contravened any such policies. 
In the background document accompanying this motion, the only evidence put forward to 
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support the claim that QuAIA was in breach of anti-discrimination policies was a 
reference to the Gladstone video. The document stated: 
A video, Reclaiming Our Pride, recently created by Lawyer Martin Gladstone 
shows footage from the 2009 parade where QuAIA marchers carried signs 
condemning Israel with their members chanting the slogan, "Fist by Fist, Blow by 
Blow, Apartheid State, Has Got to Go." 
Neither was any effort made to argue in what way the aforementioned slogan was 
discriminatory, nor was there any opportunity given to QuAIA to defend itself. The anti-
discrimination policies were thus invoked against QuAIA based solely on the biases of 
city councillors and fabricated information from pro-Israel lobbyists. The defunding 
motion also exemplifies how control can be exercised over communities in a 
multicultural setting through funding. The corporatization of Pride Toronto and its 
embeddedness in a neoliberal logic of selling diversity for profit and tourism makes it 
susceptible to the pressure of actual or even merely threatened funding cuts from both the 
state and private corporations. As Schulman argued in reference to QuAIA and Pride 
Toronto: 
The queer community being dependent on government funding is a recent 
phenomenon. If we've come to the point where governments are telling us that we 
have to exclude people to get funding, that means the relationship of dependency 
has become destructive. We have to ask ourselves what is more important, the 
integrity of our community or the approval of the government. (Dupuis, 2011) 
Within discourses of multicultural and neoliberal policies, events like Pride are 
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transformed into mere festivals disconnected from struggles for equality. Funding is used 
as a disciplinary mechanism that enforces the exercise of a very particular form of 
"diversity"-one that supports the status quo of Canadian foreign policy. 
Pressing Ahead with Motions to Defund Pride Toronto 
Mammaloti's first motion was referred to the next executive committee meeting, 
which was to be held on June 14. This was part of a strategy by the council to make it 
appear that Pride Toronto, and not the council, was making the decision to ban QuAIA. 
An Xtra! article reported that City Councillor Rae explained that he "worked with 
Mammoliti to tum his immediate vote into a deferred one. Instead of us going into a 
discussion about what Pride will or will not do or may or may not do." He continued on 
to say: "I was trying to get Giorgio to understand that it's more important, I felt, for Pride 
to have the ability to make a decision themselves" (Dagostino, 2010). 
The response from the board of Pride Toronto was to ban the use of the term 
"Israeli apartheid" from any messaging in the Pride parade that was to take place on July 
4th, effectively banning QuAIA from the parade. In a press release issued on May 25th, 
Pride Toronto stated: "on May 21st 2010 the Board of Directors voted to disallow the use 
of the term 'Israeli Apartheid', or any combination of this notion, in the Pride Festival." 
In the same press release, they explained that, "the City of Toronto has expressed the 
presence of the term 'Israeli Apartheid' in the Parade may contravene its anti-
discrimination policy" (Pride Toronto, 2010). Note that the City did not accuse Pride 
Toronto of contravening guidelines, and only stated that they might have done so. As a 
direct result of Pride Toronto's capitulation to the City's demands, the June 14th meeting 
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of the Executive Committee withdrew the motion threatening to defund Pride Toronto 
from the agenda. 
In this initial press release banning the term "Israeli apartheid," the executive 
director of Pride Toronto stated: "We welcome the space for debates and discussions 
[and] hope that over time, there will be a way for people to use language that can promote 
education and knowledge over anger and hatred" (Pride Toronto, 2010). With this 
statement, Pride Toronto was both censoring and silencing specific political language, 
while at the same time deeming it hateful and once more outside the norms of civility that 
govern a multicultural society. 
Despite statements of support from various organizations for QuAIA, Pride 
Toronto moved to censor the term "Israeli apartheid" from all Pride events, including the 
Parade, Dyke March, and Trans March. Interestingly, QuAIA had not even applied yet to 
march in Pride. The Pride executive explained that no individuals were banned, just the 
term. The stated position of the Pride Toronto executive was that without banning the 
term apartheid Pride Toronto would not happen. D'Iorio, Pride co-chair at the time, 
explained: "corporate sponsors are threatening to pull funding, and banning the phrase 
'Israeli apartheid' is the best position PT organizers could take" (Dagostino, 2010). As 
members of the Pride Toronto executive announced their decision in a press conference 
outside the Pride Toronto offices, over one hundred QuAIA members and supporters 
gathered to protest the decision in a loud demonstration chanting "Whose pride? Our 
Pride!" 
Backlash Against Pride Toronto's Decision 
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After Pride Toronto announced its censorship decision, the founders of the 1981 
Toronto Lesbian and Gay Pride Day issued an open letter expressing solidarity with 
QuAIA. The 2010 grand marshal and honoured dyke both refused their appointments, 
and 21 former grand marshals, honoured dykes, and Pride Toronto award recipients 
returned their honours in protest. Pride Toronto had not counted on the backlash from its 
own supporters over such a decision. The Board was subjected to sustained pressure from 
the community to reverse its decision to ban the use of the term "Israeli apartheid." As 
described by QuAIA organizer Tim McCaskell: 
The community response was immediate and dramatic. The Pride Coalition for 
Free Speech (PCFS) was formed. May 21, a crowd of 100 demonstrated outside 
the morning press conference where Pride announced the banning. A few days 
later, 2010 Pride Grand Marshal, Alan Li and Honoured Dyke Jane Farrow 
refused to accept their positions. The co-chairs of the International Lesbian and 
Gay Association, invited to be the international grand marshals, likewise refused 
to take part. Twenty-three former Pride honorees returned their awards and 
presented the organization with an "Award of Shame." Blackness Yes, organizers 
of the perennially popular Blockorama, already furious with the pride board over 
its high handed treatment of the Black and Caribbean communities, expressed its 
solidarity. So did trans community members. A number of women organized 
Take Back the Dyke, an alternative to the official Dyke March, in protest. 
(Mccaskell, 2011) 
Dr Alan Li, who was Grand Marshal for the Parade, refused the post, explaining: 
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Pride's recent decision to ban the term "Israeli Apartheid" and thus prohibit 
the participation of the group Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from participating 
in Pride celebrations this year is a slap in the face to our history of diverse voices. 
Pride's choice to take pre-emptive step to censor our own communities' voices 
and concerns in response to political and corporate pressure shows a lack of 
backbone to stand up for principles of inclusiveness and anti-oppression. (2010) 
The moment for the Israel lobby, city officials, and funders to declare victory for 
ousting QuAIA from Pride did not last long. The very strong outcry from various queer 
organizations and individuals forced Pride Toronto to reverse its decision and not censor 
the term "Israeli apartheid" from the parade. In a QuAIA press release, Tim McCaskell 
explained: 
This is a victory for the Palestine solidarity movement, which has faced 
censorship and bullying tactics from the Israel lobby for far too long .... The 
Israel lobby learned a tough lesson today about our community's proud history of 
standing up to censorship and human rights abuses. (Queers Against Israeli 
Apartheid, 2010) 
Criticizing the Pride Toronto executive for reversing their decision to ban QuAIA, 
Gladstone explained to Toronto Star reporter Teotonio: "By reversing the decision 
(Pride) has gone from a place of inclusion and tolerance to one that supports hateful 
messaging and intolerance and it's supposed to be against that." Teotonio further reported 
Gladstone's admonition that "Pride events should be focused on gay issues, rather than 
being 'hijacked' by ·groups with other agendas" (Teotonio, 2010). Once again, the 
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language of tolerance was invoked to sanitize space from any messaging around Israeli 
apartheid, using the claim that such messaging is hateful. 
Pride Toronto was thus forced to reverse its censorship policy. In May 2010, the 
board resolution banning the term "Israeli apartheid" was rescinded. Instead, Pride 
Toronto required all participants to sign and abide by the City of Toronto's non-
discrimination policy. At the same time, Xtra! reported on May 23, 2010 that a motion 
had been passed to establish "a representative advisory panel of community leaders that 
will lead a broad-based community consultation process with diverse queer communities 
to recommend a set of strategic principles and a decision-making framework that will 
help shape future festivals." This consultation process resulted in a Community Advisory 
Panel (CAP) that finally provided 133 recommendations to Pride Toronto. However, the 
process was heavily critiqued. As Queer Ontario, a provincially based network 
committed to liberationist and sex positive principles, put it in their Pride Toronto 
Evaluation Report: 
considering that many targeted individuals never bothered to fill out the survey or 
to participate in the CAP's forums - whatever their reason - and considering that 
the CAP also incorporated the needs and interests of other governmental, 
lobbying, and corporate stakeholders during its consultations - those who do not 
necessarily constitute members of Toronto's LGBTQ "community" - we 
refused to give the report the credibility and authority the CAP was demanding 
from us. (Queer Ontario, 2011) 
City Continues on Defunding Track 
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In response to Pride's reversal, lawyer Martin Gladstone held a press conference 
together with representatives from the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canada-Israel 
Committee, the UJA Federation of Greater Toronto, and the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal 
Center; Toronto mayoral candidates Rocco Rossi, Giorgio Mammoliti, and Rob Ford 
were all present as well. At this event, Mammoliti announced "plans to introduce a new 
motion to city council in a bid to retroactively defund PT. Ford and Rossi said they 
support that move" {Dagostino, 2010). The campaign to silence and censor QuAIA thus 
became a campaign issue in the mayoral race, with each candidate vying to be the one 
who would work harder to ban QuAIA, all using the same logic that applying the epithet 
apartheid to Israel constituted hate speech and did not promote an atmosphere of 
tolerance. 
True to his word, Councillor Giorgio Mammoliti introduced a new motion during 
the Toronto City Council meeting that opened on July 6, 2010. The new motion to defund 
Pride asked that: 
1. City Council direct that funding for Pride Toronto be paid after the parade and 
be conditional upon Pride Toronto requiring all registered participants to comply 
with the City of Toronto's Anti-Discrimination Policy. 
2. City Council request the City Manager to advise Pride Toronto on what is 
required of them to meet the Policy. 
3. City Council request the City Manager to advise Pride Toronto whether the 
participation of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid and the signs or banners they 
carry contravenes the City's Anti-Discrimination Policy. 
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Up to this stage there had been no ruling whatsoever that QuAIA had contravened any 
policies, and, as indicated by the second part of the motion, all the calls to ban QuAIA 
had been made before the City Manager made any ruling on the issue of the policy and 
QuAIA's compliance with it. This motion from Giorgio Mammoliti, seconded by Rob 
Ford, which passed by 36-1 votes, was thus the first time city officials inquired into the 
actual question of QuAIA's compliance with anti-discrimination legislation, by 
instructing Joseph Pennachetti, the City Manager to produce a report on the question 
(Toronto City Council, 2010). 
However, at this point, the decision to ban the term Israeli apartheid had been 
reversed and not much could be done to prevent QuAIA from marching in Pride Parade 
2010. 
The reversal of the ban was a major victory for QuAIA following a long year of 
collaboration between Israel lobby groups, city councillors, corporate sponsors, and Pride 
Executive to ban the group from the parade. The mobilizations, coalition building, 
protests, and creative materials produced by the campaign had all worked to put pressure 
on the Pride Toronto executive, but also to reassert and take back Pride as a community 
affair, and not a corporate-run festival. 
The City Manager Report: "Israeli Apartheid" does not Contravene 
Anti-Discrimination Policy 
While the debate around QuAIA marching in Pride was ongoing, with politicians 
making demands that Pride should ensure QuAIA did not march again, the Pride Toronto 
board followed the CAP consultations mentioned earlier by instituting a new process for 
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conflict resolution through a disputes committee (Pride Toronto, 2012). On the provincial 
level, on March 03, 2011, Pride Toronto received $400,000 from the Celebrate Ontario 
grant, up $100,000 from the previous year (Houston, 2011 ). Due to this grant, Ontario 
Progressive Conservative MPP Peter Shurman introduced Bill 171, Prohibition Against 
Government Funding of the Promotion of Hatred Act, 2011, into the Ontario Legislature 
on March 28, 2011. 
In an interview with Marcus McCann for Xtra! on March 30, 2011, Shurman, the 
politician behind the resolution condemning Israeli Apartheid Week at the provincial 
parliament, explained: 
I've been working on this one for six months, and it flows from my Israeli 
Apartheid Week resolution of a year ago. To take it to the next step, I thought I 
would introduce legislation that says, "Hey, if you speak hate, it's going to be a 
problem." 
Importantly, he added: 
At this point, nobody at a university campus or at the Pride parade has been 
accused, much less found guilty, of hate speech. But there's a question in my 
mind, which is why I pursued this, which is how close to the boundary Israeli 
Apartheid Week or QuAIA comes to hate speech. (McCann, 2011) 
At this point, the Toronto city council had not yet decided on funding for 2011, 
and the motion of 2010 was still hanging over Pride Toronto. This prompted Pride's co-
chair for 2011, Francisco Alvarez, to explain in a Toronto Star article by Daniel Dale on 
April 14, 2011, titled "Pride and 'Israeli apartheid': A guide to the controversy," that: 
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This year's festival would likely proceed in significantly smaller form if council 
denied Pride both the grant money and the services. The coming years would be 
even more challenging ... because the city provides about a quarter of Pride's 
$1.6 million budget, the withdrawal of all support would create a large deficit that 
would threaten the organization's long-term existence. The withdrawal of only the 
grant money would be problematic ... but less of a mortal threat. 
All of these threats to funding were still made on the assumption that QuAIA' s presence 
contravened city policy (Dale, 2011 ). 
However, following the 2010 city council motion described in the previous 
section, City Manager Pennachetti issued his report on April 2, 2011, titled "Compliance 
with the City of Toronto's Anti-Discrimination Policy." As the debate about QuAIA's 
participation in Pride was raging for the fourth year in a row, with many allegations that 
its mere participation violated the anti-discrimination policy, the last blow to the 
silencing campaign came when the report stated clearly that: 
City staff have determined that the phrase "Israeli Apartheid" in and of itself does 
not violate the City's Anti-discrimination policy as it does not impede the 
provision of services and employment provided directly by Pride or the City to 
any group on any grounds provided for in the Policy. The City staff has carefully 
reviewed the matter of whether the participation of QuAIA violates the City's 
Anti-Discrimination Policy. To date, the phrase "Israeli Apartheid" has not been 
found to violate either the Criminal Code or the Human Rights Code (Ontario). 
However, a decision on the latter would have to be made by the Human Rights 
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Tribunal of Ontario. The City Staff has therefore concluded that the participation 
of QuAIA in the Pride Parade based solely on the phrase "Israeli Apartheid" does 
not violate the City's Anti-Discrimination Policy. The City also cannot therefore 
conclude that the use of term on signs or banners to identify QuAIA constitutes 
the promotion of hatred or seeks to incite discrimination contrary to the Code. 
(City of Toronto, 2011) 
Following the City Manager's report, which vindicated QuAIA, on April 15, 
2011, QuAIA removed the pretext for any further action against Pride by announcing that 
it would not march in the 2011 Pride Parade. The group had obviously been vindicated 
and it was clear that all attacks against them were sheer censorship tactics using the guise 
of anti-discrimination. In a news release days later, QuAIA said it had made the decision 
to hold independent Pride Week events outside of the festival so that Mayor Rob Ford 
would be denied a convenient pretext for withdrawing funding: "with the City report 
settling that debate, now is the time for us to move beyond the parade to build our 
community's response to Israeli apartheid" (Queers Against Israeli Apartheid, 2011). 
In lieu of their participation in the actual Parade, QuAIA dropped a 40 foot banner 
from above during the Pride Parade on July 3, 2011, in a very visible location for all 
marchers to see. The banner called for a boycott of LGBTQ tourism in Israel and read 
"Support Palestinian Queers, Boycott Israeli Tourism." Also, as part of their outreach and 
education efforts prior to Pride, QuAIA hosted writer and activist Sarah Schulman for a 




The involvement of Toronto's city officials in the silencing campaign against 
QuAIA is illustrative of how deeply normalized censorship is at the official level in 
Canada when it comes to Palestinian human rights and criticism of the Israeli state. At 
every stage of involvement in meetings, discussions, and even motions to silence QuAIA, 
there were no expressed concerns by city officials that the city might be trampling on 
freedom of expression. Rather, in the name of inclusivity, and by means of evidence 
organized by Israel lobbyists, city officials were willing to promote defunding an entire 
festival. 
This chapter has emphasized that this specific campaign to oust QuAIA from 
Pride must be contextualized within the broader politics of the silencing and erasure of 
the Palestinian narrative, the use of pinkwashing by the Israeli state, and most 
importantly, a white multicultural politics that protects a core culture of fragmented, 
corporatized identities recruited to a politics of serving and securing the status quo rather 
than challenging it. The use of the discourses of inclusivity to exclude QuAIA highlights 
that such liberal notions can never be abstracted from the specific relations of power in 
which they are embedded. 
There are very important lessons to draw out from QuAIA' s organized and 
creative efforts to challenge censorship against the group. Reaching out to various 
organizations and building a broad coalition to defend freedom of expression in Pride 
Toronto, producing video messages, utilizing Freedom of Information requests to 
uncover details of the silencing campaign, and strategically deciding at every step how 
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and where to intervene, all contributed to raising important challenges to the silencing 
campaign. QuAIA succeeded in showing that although such battles against censorship 
can be draining, with careful coalition building they can be won on the grounds of 
freedom of expression. Any space that is gained in this context for free expression is also 
space gained for the Palestine Solidarity Movement and for the Palestinian narrative. As 
Tim Mccaskell aptly put it: 
Before the events around Pride, it would be fair to say that many people in 
Toronto's network of queer communities knew very little about the notion of 
Israeli apartheid or, if they did, wouldn't have considered it to be any kind of a 
queer issue. Because of the controversy about our right to participate in Pride, 
however, the term "Israeli apartheid" became a household word in the 
community. For months the name of our organization featured prominently in 
both community and mainstream media. The issue was the topic of thousands of 
conversations. Riding on the wave of support for our right to be in Pride, the 
notion that Israel could be an apartheid state was no longer a marginal issue. 
(2011) 
In attacking the depoliticization, commercialization, and fragmentation of hitherto 
progressive political spaces such as Pride Toronto, QuAIA was able not only to partially 
safeguard the persistence and visibility of radical libratory politics and subjectivities on 
the streets of Toronto, but also to concretely alter public representations such as the 




Chapter 6. Challenging the Silencing Campaign: Counter-Narration and 
Anti-Racist Politics 
"From New York to Athens, from Madrid to Santiago, from Bahrain to Rome, these huge 
mobilizations provide a much needed reminder of something that Palestinians have 
always known - that another world, a dignifying one, is possible and ordinary people can 
create it" Statement by BDS National Committee (BNC Secretariat, 2011). 
"You have no betterfriend in the world than Canada, no stronger ally who will stand up 
[for you}. We won't stand behind you; we will stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel" 
Speech by John Baird, Canadian Foreign Minister (Keinon, 20 l 2a). 
This chapter begins by contextualizing current changes in Canada's official 
multicultural policy, then moves to addressing the specific racialized silencing discourses 
utilized against the Palestine Solidarity Movement by focusing on the findings of the 
Canadian Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA). Finally, this 
chapter concludes this study by pointing to the need to build an anti-racist politics of 
solidarity across social movements and communities, because silencing of dissent and 
state-sanctioned disciplinary mechanisms against specific social movements transcend 
the boundaries of one group and become a way of organizing society as a whole. 
Outside the Multicultural: Limits to "Tolerance" 
Although Canada's multicultural policy has always been debated, today the idea 
of "being multicultural" and "tolerant" is deeply intertwined with the Canadian national 
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narrative. As a matter of fact, most political speeches outlined in this dissertation do 
stress "our Canadian values of tolerance" even as they condemn and aim at silencing 
particular speech. This is exactly the paradox of Canada's official multicultural policy: it 
claims to be securing/promoting "diversity," while in essence it is increasingly promoting 
a unified Canadian identity-one that I have argued is not only grounded in white 
normativity, but that also adheres to a neoliberal logic and understanding of citizenship. 
This multicultural identity helps to accomplish two things: 1. construct a Canada 
that is different from the U.S. melting pot model; and 2. in some ways, more importantly, 
construct a Canadian nationalism that is imagined as "civilizationaly superior" for the 
tolerance it offers. In other words, multicultural policy is the terrain upon which national 
identity is displayed and constructed as cosmopolitan, while simultaneously not 
disrupting in a fundamental way the racial and/or economic hierarchies of the state 
nationally or internationally. This is not to say that the effects of multicultural polices are 
all negative, or that a retreat from multiculturalism back to exclusionary nationalisms 
need be the response, but simply that a serious anti-racist critique of the way 
multicultural polices have developed is necessary, and that political space must be 
opened up for critical and nuanced discussions beyond a "with or against" 
multiculturalism. 
As it stands, "Canadianness" is structured through a "core culture" (Mackey, 
2002) for all to aspire to belong to, while tropes of cultural difference may be displayed 
and celebrated only to enhance and prove the "tolerance" of the core culture. The limits 
of this "tolerance" are circumscribed by the core culture and maintained by the state; 
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hence "state multiculturalism is invested with the power to manage a range of differences 
that might prove potentially troubling in a hegemonic state's bid to retain its exclusive 
authorizing powers" (Walcott, 2011, p. 18). Far from being a neutral overseer of relations 
between various cultures and communities, the state holds the power to define and 
discipline communities. As Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism 
Jason Kenney explained in relation to cutting funding to the Canadian Arab Federation, 
We are proud of our long tradition of pluralism, respect for others, diversity and 
multiculturalism, but it does not mean that there are no limits. There are certain 
limits and they are defined by our deeper and best political values of respect for 
human dignity, the equality of men and women and of ordered liberty in our 
Parliamentary democracy. (Kenney, 2009c) 
These "limits" are applied most strictly to oppositional movements and discourses 
outside the "core culture." Oppositional movements find themselves marginalized and 
silenced through an ongoing process that racializes them as "extreme" and "outside the 
norms of civility," with "civility" offering "an ideological marker of those contrasting 
themselves as civil from those they take to deny the condition, or even its possibility" 
(Goldberg, 2008a, p. 36). This dissertation has focused on one such oppositional 
movement: the Palestine Solidarity Movement and the Boycotts, Divestments and 
Sanctions campaign. 
Rooted in a critique of liberal theories of the state and illustrating the Canadian 
state as a racial state embedded in neoliberal global hierarchies, this study has sought, 
through an analysis of several cases of censorship and silencing of the Palestine 
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Solidarity Movement, the "emblematic solidarity movement of our times" 
(Bhattacharyya, 2008, p. 42), to highlight the ways in which Palestinian narratives and 
solidarity are racialized and cast outside the Canadian multicultural. 
Social movement theory "despite being potentially of great relevance to 
organizing, has become an academic industry over the past thirty years and can tend 
toward overly theorized and abstract outputs, leading to many questioning its relevancy 
for movement activists" (Choudry, Hanley, & Shragge, 2012, p. 4). Thus, this study has 
attempted to fill a void in the literature, while also being relevant to the day-to-day work 
of oppositional social movements, by first, explaining moments of silencing as racial and 
racializing moments, and second, by interrogating the mechanisms upon which the 
silencing campaign of the Palestine Solidarity Movement operates. It thus focuses 
attention on the various ways that exclusion and censorship occur in a multicultural 
setting, and how anti-discrimination language associated with multiculturalism itself is 
appropriated to enact the silencing whereby notions of "tolerance" act to establish 
boundaries and markers of belonging. 
The increased marginalization of Muslim and Arab migrants in the United States 
and Canada has spawned a field of critical literature addressing Anti-Muslim/ Anti-Arab 
racism (Jamal & Naber, 2008; Razack, 2008; Salaita, 2006; Zine, 2012). Much of this 
literature has focused on the institutionalization of racism at the state level, and on a 
critique of the clash of civilizations paradigm that orders the securitization of 
state/community relations. This study works to expand this critical literature to include 
silencing and marginalization of Palestine solidarity activism-in particular, 
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understanding silencing as a key moment in the construction and maintenance of a racial 
project marking Arab Palestinian narratives and solidarity as outside of Canada's official 
multicultural tolerance. 
Both the growth of Palestine Solidarity activism in Canada and the ferocity of the 
silencing campaign against it necessitate a serious interrogation of silencing and erasure 
as moments embedded in a racial discourse inferiorizing Palestinians, while marking 
Israel as civilizationally superior for its liberal values. Indeed, as I have shown, to even 
question the fact that those liberal values apply only to a section of the population under 
Israel's control-just as liberal values applied only to whites in apartheid era South 
Africa (Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2011; White, 
2012)-is to be labeled "extreme" and anti-Semitic. 
Silencing and censorship of solidarity is therefore within the field of anti-racist 
inquiry, as it is a systematic and state-level approach to dealing with dissent in general 
and dissent when it comes to relations with Israel in particular. Unfortunately, the very 
nature of silencing critical inquiry on Palestine/Israel in the academy, exemplified in 
campaigns targeting specific academics and interfering in their tenure decisions, 33 has 
created an atmosphere whereby a self-imposed censorship keeps many from writing 
about Palestine. This trend is hopefully beginning to break with the shifting of the 
discourse outside the academy and thanks to the few courageous voices that persisted in 
breaking the taboo around discussions of Palestine in academic circles. 
33. For more, see Ar~b Studies Quarterly's special issue on Academic Freedom, Ideological 
Boundaries and Teaching of the Middle East, Vol 33, Numbers 3/4, Summer/Fall 2011. 
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Framing Canada's Official Multicultural Policy 
Looking through the literature on Canadian multiculturalism, it is easy to 
recognize that the term itself has been contested and its effectiveness as state policy has 
never been settled. While some hail it as a progressive break from exclusivist forms of 
identity and nationalism (Kymlicka, 1991, 1998; Taylor, 1992), it has also been criticized 
as a policy that does not enhance national belonging and that destroys a cohesive national 
identity (Bissoondath, 1994; Gwyn, 1995). From a critical perspective multiculturalism is 
analyzed as a nation-building policy (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Mackey, 2002), and 
discussed as an ideological and policy apparatus that obscures power relations and racism 
(Bannerji, 2000; Li, 1988; Thobani, 2007). This dissertation is situated within the critical 
literature on official multiculturalism, concurring with Mackay's argument that "specific 
forms of Canadian pluralism bolster 'unmarked whiteness' and help to affirm a dominant 
white Anglophone 'Canadian-Canadian' culture and nationalist program" (2002, p. 142). 
This critique is grounded first and foremost in the history of official multicultural 
policy within the context of a settler-colonial project initiated through acts of "conquest, 
genocide, slavery and the exploitation of the labor of people of color" (Razack, 2002, p. 
2). Although the official policy acts to obscure these facts and lays the groundwork for a 
national narrative that imagines a Canada that from its inception was a happy mosaic, as 
Walcott has explained, 
one cannot fully make sense of post 9/11 multiculturalism debates without taking 
into account the context of Wes tern global expansion over the last five hundred 
years, a period in which Europe reordered the globe under its own terms or ways 
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of knowing as the only legitimate way of being. (2011, p. 15) 
Thus, the analysis of multicultural policy is not divorced from history, the political 
economy of the state, or gendered/raced class formation. 
There has been an emphasis throughout this dissertation on connecting internal 
racial projects with imperial projects externally, and understanding that Canada's foreign 
policies, in support of Israel especially, reflect back onto communities within Canada. It 
is clear with the shift in the very objectives of the Canadian multicultural program that 
internal and external polices cannot be easily disentangled, and that Canada's role as a 
junior partner in a U.S.-led imperialism must be factored into all discussions on Canada 
as a multicultural state (Gordon, 2010; Klassen & Albo, 2013). 
Further, multiculturalism has not been a static policy; rather, it has changed in 
emphasis several times. As anti-racist movements weakened with the advent of neoliberal 
economics, multiculturalism itself became a neoliberal asset-rather than its stated aim to 
be a mechanism for marginalized communities to gain "recognition."34 As Gilbert 
argued, "multiculturalism became a competitive advantage in the discussion of North 
American free trade and integration and has been seen as a security risk since the events 
of September 11, 2001" (2007, p. 13). 
"Canadian Core Values" and Civilizational Camps 
In responding to a question regarding new regulations requiring women who wear 
the niqab to show their face at citizenship oath ceremonies, Canada's Minister of 
34. The term "recognition" is used to keep within the language of multiculturalism that promises 
"recognition" rather than social justice or equality. 
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Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Kenney stated, in a 2012 interview with 
The Globe and Mail: 
no one is obliged to take the citizenship oath. If they feel stronger about hiding 
their faces, they don't have to take the oath. In our citizenship guide, we talk 
about Canadian multiculturalism and the fact it doesn't extend to forced marriage, 
female genital mutilation, etc. We are sending a signal that certain barbaric 
practices are not welcome in Canada. There are certain legal limits and cultural 
norms about women in Canadian society. 
The linking of women wearing the niqab with "barbaric practices" illustrates a 
civilizational discourse and identifies how new documents, such as the citizenship guide, 
serve a specific purpose of defining belonging within a set of constructed liberal values. 
In response to a follow up question, Kenney added: "we shouldn't be shy in emphasizing 
core liberal values. If people choose to wear the niqab, that's their business. But I hope 
that little girls who grow up in Canada don't think it is an obligation." The new emphasis 
is on a rootedness in "core liberal values" and by extension a "core culture" set in the 
tradition of liberal values linked to the British monarchy. In a 2009 speech, Kenney noted 
that there must be a focus "on the political values that are grounded in our history, the 
values of liberal democracy rooted in British Parliamentary democracy that precisely 
have given us the space to accommodate such diversity." This link to British 
Parliamentary democracy as the reason for the very existence of diversity helps to erase, 
first and foremost, the fact that this liberal democracy was built through the destruction 
(both physical and cultural) of the indigenous peoples of North America, as well as 
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through waves of migration, from colonies or former colonies of the British empire, 
being used as cheap labour. In other words, the civilizational link to the British empire 
itself is rooted in a history of violence that not all celebrate as a positive tradition. 
This focus on integration and belonging, organized around a "core values" 
discourse embedded in liberal modernity, roots Canadian identity in a specific Western 
civilizational camp under the rubric of the clash of civilizations. It is necessary to 
remember that the clash of civilizations posited by Samuel Huntington was between the 
West and an Islamic civilization, with "civilizations" presented in ahistoric terms, as 
static and monolithic entities. If Canadian identity is constructed in line with this 
understanding of the world, then those of Muslim background who are citizens of the 
state are not protected by citizenship documents, nor by how much they attempt to 
integrate; they are constructed as always outside the confines of Western civilization. In 
other words, they are civilizationally inferior and suspect no matter what they do. 
The ordering of citizenship itself along civilizational lines and values is 
essentially a racialization process that demarcates the limits of belonging to anyone 
perceived outside the imagined civilizational borders-the concept of civilizational 
backwardness used to justify military interventions in the Middle East is in the same 
manner used to order state relations with internalized Others deemed to belong in the 
opposing civilization camp. This move to construct Canadian identity in terms of a set of 
values plays a role in the casting out of many oppositional discourses, with claims that 
they are outside of those values. One statement that Canadian officials kept repeating 
throughout the silencing campaign was the claim that events like Israeli Apartheid Week 
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and organizations such as the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House were not 
respectful of "Canadian values." 
"Crisis of Multiculturalism" Debates 
The shift towards an integrative multiculturalism in Canada, constructed around 
acceptance of a historical link with a British parliamentary tradition, highlights that the 
Canadian state is a racial state functioning through the structuring/ reinforcing of a racial 
hierarchy and increasingly oppressive immigration practices. Razack has pointed to 
Canada's "racialized structure of citizenship in which people of color, suspected of 
duplicity, must always be policed and kept at the margins of law and community" (2010, 
p. 89). This change towards an integrative multiculturalism also took place in an 
international climate where leaders of European states declared that "multiculturalism has 
failed" (Siebold, 2010) and professed the need for a "muscular liberalism" (Wright & 
Taylor, 2011 ). It is important to emphasize this international context as "racisms are no 
longer domestically driven, but take their impetus from an attempt to legitimize a deeply 
divided global order" (Kundani, 2007, p. 4). 
Debates about the failure or success of multiculturalism mainly revolve around 
how the West should deal with immigrants from a Muslim background: 
in the cacophony of voices that make up this new media-driven "integration 
debate", it is Muslims who are routinely singled out: it is their cultural difference 
that needs limits placed on it; it is they who must subsume their cultural heritage. 
(Kundani, 2007, p. 123) 
In Europe, for example, such debates take place around the banning of the burka in 
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France or the banning of minarets in Switzerland. Although there are very important 
differences between the European and North American debates on multicultural policy 
stemming from the different reasons for and types of migration to both areas, the 
discourses of such debates do intersect. In a 2010 report on the state of multiculturalism 
in Canada, Kymlicka explained that this crisis of multicultural policy that has "dominated 
the debate in Canada in the 2006-2008 period is the specter of backlash and retreat from 
multiculturalism," adding that "it is important to remember that Canada is not an island 
unto itself - it is part of an international community that has been struggling with issues 
of ethnic and racial diversity" (p. 11 ). 
Such "crisis" debates are set in civilizational terms constructing a Western 
civilization grounded in liberal values under an existential threat from migrants bringing 
in a value system that does not adhere to liberal democratic conceptions of freedom and 
equality. Women's rights and gay rights play a key role in these debates because they are 
utilized to set markers for the superiority of Western civilization, distinguishing it from 
the more "backward" traditions coming from the East. This helps to obscure real 
socioeconomic questions and issues with foreign policy that immigrants may face or seek 
to challenge, while presenting a static civilizational divide. The changes in Canadian 
policy echo changes in other Western states and aim to situate Canada as a full-fledged 
member in an imperial order that seeks to bring "democracy" to the rest of the world, by 
military force if necessary, while making use of its own liberal traditions to silence 
dissent. 
Debates around multiculturalism-its success, usefulness, and failure-tend to be 
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the public and legitimate form in which essentialized discourses of Muslim civilizational 
backwardness are carried forward. Rather than overtly stating that Muslims cannot 
integrate due to cultural differences, the discussion can be conducted in a more 
"civilized" manner if it is about a policy failure. Formulating discussions on racism in 
terms of multicultural policy failure helps to avoid addressing any legitimate grievances 
that Muslim/ Arab immigrants might have with Western states-it is easier to blame 
culture than to seriously interrogate social and economic policies that marginalize certain 
communities or imperial policies that justify military occupations. Underneath the 
rhetoric calling for a different type of multiculturalism (in the Canadian case) and/or 
making declarations of its failure (in the European case), lies a specific portrayal of an 
essentialized Muslim/Arab immigrant that must be made to learn a new value system; 
Palestinian solidarity in particular is imagined not only outside of this value system, but 
in opposition to it. 
Canada, Israel, and a "Shared Liberal Values" Paradigm 
The discourse of "values" is not simply used to cement a Canadian identity 
internally; it helps to set a structure for international alliances as well. For example, the 
discourse of common values is repeatedly deployed by state officials to mark a 
connection between Israel and Canada along with the common remark "Canada's values 
are Israel's values," thus reinforcing "the global immunity Israel receives for its 
membership in the camp of democratic states. This immunity enables Israel to continue 




This discourse is clearly played out in the silencing and censorship cases 
discussed throughout this dissertation. Liberal values are appropriated in the construction 
of a distinct Wes tern identity, where marking specific voices as being outside of "core 
values" marks them as outside the multicultural order altogether, unable to integrate or 
belong. This is not to say that the War on Terror, resonant with the clash-of-civilizations 
discourse, marks a completely new ideological connection between Canada and Israel. As 
Abu-Laban and Bakan (2009, p. 32) have argued, there has been an "international racial 
contract, which, since 1948, has assigned a common interest between the state of Israel 
and powerful international political allies, while absenting the Palestinians as both 
'nonwhite' and stateless." 
It is not a new phenomenon that Palestinians are conceived of as "bloodthirsty 
and warmongering, constantly harassing modem-day Israelites, debauched and lacking in 
liberal culture" (Goldberg, 2008b, p. 26). However, there has been an intensification of a 
dual process ofracialization: one that casts Palestinian narratives as "extreme," 
"terrorist," and "backward," while "whitening" Israeli narratives by allying them ever 
more closely to liberal traditions. The intensification has not occurred in the abstract; it 
directly ties Western military interventions in the region, under the framework of the War 
on Terror, to the start of the second Intifada and to Israel (along with its Western allies) 
needing to answer for ongoing human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Importantly, it also relates to the growth and effectiveness of global solidarity efforts with 
the Palestinian people. 
In other words, in a circular movement, the more Israel abuses Palestinians the 
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stronger the backlash against its policies becomes, and the more effective Palestine 
solidarity becomes in reaching a mass audience. This, in tum, pushes the silencing of 
such efforts as fear escalates in Israel that it is losing the diplomatic battle. Organizations 
like the Israeli think tank, the Reut Institute, solidify this fear by calling the Boycotts, 
Divestments and Sanctions campaign a "strategic threat" to Israel (The Reut Institute, 
2010). 
Rather than dealing with the root causes of a growing global movement in 
solidarity with Palestinian rights-the key questions of land, the right of return, military 
occupation, illegal settlement expansion, and water rights-the silencing campaign works 
to avoid factual discussions and debates on Israeli policies, insisting on marking Palestine 
solidarity itself outside of "Canadian values." As noted by Abu-Laban and Bakan, 
in light of the fact that serious debate about Israel's violent and illegal practices is 
frequently hampered by challenges about the motivations of analysts and the 
legitimacy of voice, there are barriers to simply beginning with analytical 
assumptions as is standard in a consideration of solidarity movements. (2009, p. 
31) 
The silencing campaign insinuates that the reason pro-Palestinian activists, 
academics, and/or supporters of Palestinian human rights in general are analyzing Israel's 
policies as a form of apartheid, staging demonstrations against the war in Lebanon, and 
daring to question Canada's policy towards Israel is that they themselves are "extreme" 
and "anti-Semitic," and do not understand Canada's values of tolerance-and, if they 
happen to be Jewish, then they are self-hating Jews. Salaita explained: 
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The notion of Jewishness disseminated by mainstream and rightwing Zionist 
groups [aims to] place Israel at the center of Jewish consciousness. Jews who 
decline are called "self-hating", which implies that they have lost their right to 
discuss Jewish sensibilities and that their claims to Jewish identity are superficial. 
Gentiles who criticize Israel are simply dismissed (with moralistic vigor) as 
incurable anti-Semites. (2006, p. 19) 
On the other hand, Palestine solidarity activism, in line with the above-mentioned 
racialized images of Palestinians, is more generally construed as 
driven by nothing but unproved hate and anger, incapable of a higher order of 
values, of deeper causation, of responsibility as a product of free choice. 
Palestinianization, like the projection of "Palestine" in short, is a state of passion, 
its only rationality purely instrumental, crudely calculated and cruelly calculating, 
consequential, awe-full. (Goldberg, 2008b, p. 36) 
Israel, for its part, has worked diligently to "teach its allies that the culture of those 
minorities is itself an attack on multicultural ideals. This is a culture that is absolute, 
deathly and genocidal. To allow it space and expression is to endanger 'our' way oflife" 
(Bhattacharyya, 2008, p. 56). 
Interestingly, for racialized communities the contradictions are all too obvious: 
Canadian identity, we learn in the new citizenship guide, is based on valuing the rule of 
law, yet Canadian citizens who happen to be Muslim can be "evicted" from the law 
(Razack, 2008). Freedom of speech is a Western value to be protected, as it is what 
supposedly sets liberal democracies apart from dictatorships the world over. Yet its limits 
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are always tested when it comes to using the term "apartheid" in relation to Israel, no 
matter how factual the arguments for the case that Israel indeed enacts apartheid policies; 
regardless of who is making them, they are described as "an attack on the mutual respect 
that holds our society together" (Ignatieff, 2009). 
All citizens are meant to be equal in liberal democracies-this is a fundamental 
rule that immigrants are meant to understand, especially that men and women are equal 
(as the new citizenship guide highlights); yet, if you are Muslim or Arab, a different set 
of rules applies to you and anti-terror legislation/racial profiling singles you out. These 
contradictions are encapsulated in this statement by Kenney regarding the funding cuts to 
the Canadian Arab Federation: 
People are free to express their views on foreign policy, on the Middle East, to 
differ with, this case, the policies of the Israeli government. They are free to say 
what they will within the bounds of our laws in Canada. But they shouldn't expect 
that, just because they claim to represent a particular ethno-cultural community, 
any idea, no matter how extreme, is going to be treated, in the framework of 
moral relativism, as a legitimate contribution to public discourse, and that 
organizations like that will receive public support. (2009c) 
In other words, you are free to say what you like; however, if we deem it to be "extreme" 
you are to be disciplined, and it will not be considered a "legitimate contribution to public 
discourse." Legitimate contributions are determined to be so by the state. This form of 
cultural racialization is an easy way to silence any criticism of state policies and cast out 
any group questioning the status quo, silencing dissent by delegitimizing it, rather than 
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logically arguing the facts (even as we are told logical argumentation by fact is a liberal 
tradition). The Canadian state can enact discipline and silence communities by casting 
them outside the core culture, outside Canadian values, and this is how the Canadian state 
has chosen to manage its relationship with the Palestine Solidarity Movement. 
A Focus on Silencing Palestine Solidarity Activism 
One of the key reasons a focus on the silencing campaign is important is that it 
helps in critically analyzing the construction of settler solidarities between Canada and 
Israel as settler colonies. As Krebs has argued: 
While economic and geopolitical ties are certainly important factors, the shared 
history of Canada and Israel as settler societies is crucial to understanding 
Canada's ongoing support for Israel. Simply put, both countries were founded on 
the forced displacement of Indigenous peoples and the theft of their lands and 
resources. And in both cases, these colonial processes continue to the present day. 
(2012) 
Krebs goes on to outline the similar policies of land theft, displacement, and endless 
negotiations between unequal partners as methods deployed by both Canada and Israel in 
dealing with the respective indigenous populations. This settler solidarity, however, is 
cemented even further with Israel's promotion as an ideal neoliberal economy, grounded 
largely in the production of new surveillance and urban warfare technologies (Zureik, 
Lyon, & Abu-Laban, 2010). Settler solidarity is thus grounded in histories of colonialism, 
as well as in ongoing processes of neoliberal accumulation and racialization at both 
international and national levels (with the two being interlinked). 
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A focus on the silencing campaign is crucial to explaining how Western 
complicity with Israeli policies functions on an internal state level (not only 
internationally). Israeli policies are maintained by the continuing erasure of Palestinian 
history and the silencing of pro-Palestinian advocacy wherever it takes place. Western 
states, far from being neutral in the conflict, act to silence criticism of their complicity. 
Israel's inclusion in the Western civilization camp requires the defense oflsrael's policies 
in international forums as well as the stifling of internal dissent. As Nadeau and Sears 
explained: "This silencing project echoes that of the Israeli state itself, which has 
systematically clamped down on all aspects of Palestinian life while trying to eliminate 
signs and memories of Palestinian existence" (2011, p. 1 ). 
The silencing campaign is thus placed within a specific racial project of the 
Canadian state as a settler colony, which has historically had a troubled relationship with 
"inside-outsiders" (Bannerji, 2000). Studying silencing of Palestinian narratives involves 
unsettling notions of Canadian tolerance and historicizing them in line with the silencing 
of other indigenous and racialized migrant narratives, while simultaneously highlighting 
the specificities of silencing in the case of Palestine solidarity. It also involves insisting 
throughout that understanding internal racial projects necessitates an understanding of 
settler-colonialism and its impacts on race, class, and gendered relations. 
The internal racial hierarchy is also dialectically connected to Canada's position 
within a neoliberal globalization that shifts state relations internationally and nationally. 
Importantly, this has implications beyond one community or group of activists. As 
Kundnani has argued, in the case of Britain, the '"war on terror' and the 'war on asylum' 
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are not just destructive of the human rights of Muslim and refugee communities but also 
serve to camouflage the transition to a globalized neoliberal economic order and a 
market-state model of politics" (2007a, p. 185). 
Using Multicultural Language as a Silencing Tool 
State control over discursive space does not always take place through overt 
coercive measures or legal mechanisms (although at times it does), but also through using 
the language of social justice and tolerant multicultural policy, enacted to delegitimize 
specific narratives before they even get a hearing. Analyzing the silencing campaign 
highlights the use of the official multicultural language of tolerance and inclusivity as a 
silencing tool, whereby the rights of some are protected by inclusion into a white-
multiculturalism, at the expense of editing out Palestinians and solidarity with them from 
the space of tolerance. 
In relation to the silencing campaign on campuses, Nadeau and Sears have 
clarified further how "civility" is used to cast Palestine solidarity outside the norms of 
respectful debate, asserting that, "at a general level, these principles seem completely 
worthy. Yet in application, they can be used to derail debate, silence advocacy and 
depoliticize campuses" (2010, p. 16). In the case of attempts to ban Queers Against 
Israeli Apartheid from marching in the Toronto Pride Parade, the argument came down to 
the notion that "we have to exclude you to be inclusive of others." Tolerance, on one 
hand, is a privilege offered to some, which brings them into a multicultural space, while 
lack of tolerance is asserted in order to silence certain others and their narratives. As 
Cairns and Ferguson noted in their work on the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to 
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Combat Anti-Semitism, "notwithstanding their illiberal character, these strategies draw 
upon the dominant left-liberal language of human rights and social justice in order to 
assert a pro-Israel politics that denies the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle" (2011, p. 
416). 
Legalizing Censorship: Inventing a New Anti-Semitism 
Naming the silencing campaign and its discourses is itself a counter-narration-a 
disruption of the official multicultural space that claims to espouse liberal values such as 
freedom of expression and tolerance, while casting Palestinian solidarity outside the 
bounds of such freedom. As the cases outlined throughout this study illustrate, there have 
been various discourses and mechanisms used to silence the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement, many of which overlap and reinforce one another. Also, softer methods are 
displayed in sync with more coercive methods, but all within the same framework and 
with the aim toward a similar outcome: silencing dissent against Canadian state policies 
towards Israel. 
The most potent and persistent accusation made by the silencing campaign is that 
the Palestine Solidarity Movement, and specifically the analysis of Israel as an apartheid 
state, are inherently anti-Semitic. They are so, it is explained, because they "single out" 
and "delegitimize" Israel and question its existence as a Jewish state. By equating the 
Israeli state with world-Jewry this accusation essentializes individual Jews as supporters 
of Israel. Even applying the categories of international law to Israel becomes a new form 
of anti-Semitism, one that targets, unlike the old anti-Semitism, not Jews as individuals, 
but rather their homeland. 
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Proceedings like the Canadian Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-
Semitism try in this vein to institutionalize such definitions of a new anti-Semitism. 
According to its final report, 
the CPCCA supports and adopts the European Union Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia Working Definition of Anti-Semitism for the purpose of 
this report and recommends that the Definition be adopted and promoted by the 
Government of Canada and law enforcement agencies .... [with this definition 
including that] anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be 
expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-
semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their 
property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. In 
addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a 
Jewish collectivity. (2011, p. 5) 
The London Declaration of the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-
Semitism, from which the CPCCA stems, pushed for "effective Hate Crime legislation" 
(ICCA, 2009, resolution 12) to address the "new anti-Semitism" (ICCA, 2009, resolution 
13). Unsurprisingly, the final CPCCA report stated that, "the Inquiry Panel has learned 
that the main and growing problem in Canada is what has been termed the 'new anti-
Semitism ', a form of political prejudice that finds expression in Islamism and certain 
radical leftist ideologies and discourse" (2011, p. 14 ). 
The CPCCA aimed to legalize the new definition. One of its recommendations, 
for example, specifically quoting Commissioner Julian Fantino of the Ontario Provincial 
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Police, was that Canada should establish "national standards for police services across the 
country so that we have a common understanding of what constitutes an anti-Semitic 
crime, together with consistent across-the-board mechanisms for data reporting and 
statistical analysis" (CPCCA, 2011, p. 24). The report also addressed state funding: 
recognizing the vulnerability of immigrant communities, we recommend that 
funding guidelines should be strengthened to withhold any form of government 
funding or other support for NGOs that preach hatred or anti-Semitism -
particularly those involved in integration and settlement of new Canadians where 
they may influence understanding of the responsibilities and obligations of 
Canadian citizenship. (CPCCA, 2011, p. 21) 
Such recommendations have very real implications; both the Canadian Arab 
Federation and Palestine House (discussed in Chapter 4) lost their funding for such 
settlement and English language programs. Therefore, the idea of a "new anti-Semitism" 
is not simply one that is being discussed in the abstract; in fact, there are moves and 
specific recommendations to institutionalize and legalize it, curtailing the space for the 
Palestine Solidarity Movement. Even if such reports do not yield specific results on a 
legislative level, the fact that they are titled "parliamentary" and have the blessing of 
elected officials is enough to be used as reference in further silencing the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement. 
Author Judith Butler aptly explained these definitions of anti-Semitism as a 
silencing tool: 
It is untrue, absurd, and painful for anyone to argue that those who formulate a 
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criticism of the State oflsrael is anti-Semitic or, if Jewish, self-hating. Such 
charges seek to demonize the person who is articulating a critical point of view 
and so disqualify the viewpoint in advance. It is a silencing tactic: this person is 
unspeakable, and whatever they speak is to be dismissed in advance or twisted in 
such a way that it negates the validity of the act of speech. The charge refuses to 
consider the view, debate its validity, consider its forms of evidence, and derive a 
sound conclusion on the basis of listening to reason. The charge is not only an 
attack on persons who hold views that some find objectionable, but it is an attack 
on reasonable exchange, on the very possibility of listening and speaking in a 
context where one might actually consider what another has to say. When one set 
of Jews labels another set of Jews "anti-Semitic", they are trying to monopolize 
the right to speak in the name of the Jews. So the allegation of anti-Semitism is 
actually a cover for an intra-Jewish quarrel. (2012) 
The language of a new anti-Semitism has been prominent in official political 
foreign policy speeches. At the Herzliya conference in 2012, for example, Canada's 
Foreign Minister John Baird commented on a "constant barrage of rhetorical 
demonization, double standards and delegitimization" targeting Israel. These are the 3 Ds 
identified on the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs website (formerly the Canadian 
Jewish Congress). The "Understanding Antisemitism" section asserts that a "simple way 
to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism is the '3-D test'"; 
this test is defined by the CUA as "demonization," "double standards," and 
"delegitimization" (CIJA, 2012). 
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In his Herzliya speech, Baird continued on to say: 
harnessing disparate anti- Semitic, anti-American and anti-Western ideologies, it 
[the new anti-Semitism] targets the Jewish people by targeting the Jewish 
homeland, Israel, as the source of injustice and conflict in the world, and uses, 
perversely, the language of human rights to do so. (2012a) 
Three important points can be drawn from Baird's statements: 1) the absolute conflation 
between the Jewish people and the state of Israel; 2) the seamless combination of anti-
Semitism with anti-American and anti-Westernism, as if it is all one and the same; and 3) 
the stress that it is within the language of human rights that the campaign criticizing 
Israel is conducted. Rather than an analysis of why the language of international law is 
appropriate, this allows for a dismissal of any claims to international law altogether. 
The idea of "singling out" Israel goes hand in hand with the redefinition of a new 
anti-Semitism, and with claims that the reason Israel is targeted for criticism is its Jewish 
character, while other states with worse human rights violations are not equally 
targeted-leading to the charge that there is a double standard at work. Former federal 
Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff, for example, argued that Israeli Apartheid Week went, 
"beyond reasonable criticism into demonization" because it "singles out one state, its 
citizens and its supporters for condemnation and exclusion, and it targets institutions and 
individuals because of what and who they are - Israeli and Jewish" (2009). The 
assumption is that Israel is not being targeted for its policies or actions, but because of 
who it supposedly represents. 
It is important to note that the framework for the BDS movement is an 
264 
international solidarity framework that does condemn violations of human rights 
wherever they occur (for example the Palestinian Boycott National Committee issued 
statements supporting the uprisings in the Arab World and the Occupy Movement 
internationally (BNC Secretariat, 2011 ). However, no single solidarity campaign can 
address every atrocity in the world, and the fact that violations occur in other places does 
not negate that Israel is committing them as well. As noted by Cairns and Ferguson on 
the notion of "singling out": "not only is it difficult to know how one can criticize Israel, 
or any state, without singling it out, but making an 'equal' case against multiple countries 
is impracticable. Political critique, mobilization, and change are rendered null and void" 
(2011, p. 425). To say that Israel is being singled out because it is a Jewish state is to 
negate the fact that there are legitimate critiques to be made about Israeli policy. 
A consideration to keep in mind regarding this "singling out" thesis is that it is the 
Canadian state that "singles out" Israel for preferential treatment. This makes it even 
more compelling for citizens of states like Canada to speak out about Israeli human rights 
violations, since Israel is considered an ally and supported by Canada diplomatically, 
economically, and militarily. In other words, there is a level of complicity and support of 
the way Israel conducts itself. It is Canadian officials who are quick to argue that they are 
not neutral on the question of Israel and will support it and stand "shoulder to shoulder." 
Much of the silencing campaign has sought to characterize any analysis of Israel 
as an apartheid state within the rubric of the "new anti-Semitism," claiming that the use 
of the term "apartheid" questions Israel's "right to exist" and negates "Jewish self-
determination." Ho~ever, Bakan has rightly argued that: 
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The claim that to identify the state of Israel as an apartheid state is anti-Semitic 
needs to be challenged. Anti-Semitism is a form ofracism that targets "Jews" --
an ambiguous category racialized to collectively ascribe common traits to those of 
Jewish faith, identity or culture. Israel, while a capitalist state in terms of its 
political economy, is ideologically a "Jewish state", but this is also a constructed 
claim. Unique in the world system, Israel claims to represent the interest of 
"Jews" in the region and in the global diaspora. (2011) 
While the Palestine Solidarity Movement frames the analysis of Israel as an 
apartheid state in terms of Israel's apartheid policies and exclusionary laws, rooting the 
analysis in international conventions such as the Apartheid Convention, the silencing 
campaign aims to specifically cement and protect Israel's existence as an "exclusively" 
Jewish state, a state that privileges one set of people and defines itself on the basis of one 
religious or ethnic group. This move to stop any debate over the "character" of the state, 
however, is framed in progressive notions of Jewish self-determination, while in reality it 
is designed to undermine the self-determination of another group, the Palestinians, who 
are the ones outside the protection of a state system. It is this understanding of the 
"existence of the Israeli state" that the redefinition of anti-Semitism is meant to protect 
against future debate and discussion. 
Generally speaking, however, discussions, debates, or questions about the very 
existence of a state system is common practice in the academy, considering that states are 
in themselves a modem political development emerging out of Europe. It would only be 
natural for discussion to take place regarding a state that wants to define itself along 
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ethno-racial or religious lines. To shut down the debate completely about the character of 
Israel is to silence any notions of co-existence that can be set on the basis of equality for 
all living in the region; debates on a binational or one secular democratic state, for 
example, as proposed by Ali Abunimah, are foreclosed (2007). 
The apartheid analysis indeed does not equate both sides of the conflict; it also 
explains the roots within the settler colonial project of Israel. But more importantly, it 
envisions forms of living beyond exclusionary nationalisms that privilege one group with 
the protection of self-determination, while denying it to the other. To place such analysis 
outside the bounds of discussion and limit any critique oflsrael's "character as a Jewish 
state" is an attempt to exceptionalize Israel and normalize its self-definition, thus 
imposing on the rest of the world a definition that, in reality, excludes millions of 
Palestinians (one million of whom are citizens of Israel). One has to simply ask: Did 
South Africa cease to exist when apartheid was dismantled? Can the Israeli state only 
exist if it practices apartheid against a segment of the population under its control? And, 
crucially, can we imagine another existence for the state that is inclusive and respectful of 
Palestinian rights? One does not need to agree that Israel practices apartheid, but to 
foreclose the discussion altogether and silence such critiques is a clear attack on freedom 
of expression. 
Supporters of the silencing campaign, however, are quick to argue that criticism 
of Israel is legitimate, and that it is calling into question the very existence of Israel that is 
not legitimate. But what is being called into question are Israel's apartheid policies, and 
its ongoing illegal occupation and displacement of Palestinians. As argued by Goldberg, 
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to criticize the government of Israel and its policies, even to criticize the partial 
grounds on which that state was founded, is not to criticize Jews as such, nor is it 
to place Jews anywhere and everywhere at risk, notwithstanding the spike in anti-
Semitic attacks in the likes of France. It is not even to place Jews in Israel at risk. 
Quite the contrary; it is to point out the way in which such policies and 
govemmentality manifest the very insecurity they claim to undo. (2008b, p. 29) 
These attempts to redefine anti-Semitism to limit the scope of debate and dissent 
have not gone unchallenged; they are mainly challenged through the ongoing organizing 
of the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Israeli Apartheid Week, for example, took place on 
216 campuses around the world in 2012. However, it is crucial to continually assess and 
counter the attempt to legislate and legalize such definitions of anti-Semitism aimed at 
narrowing the space (both discursively and physically) for the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement. Even if legislation does not follow straight away, reports that purport to be 
parliamentary are then quoted and used to legitimize further silencing as the discourse of 
a "new anti-Semitism" is normalized at the state level. The Palestine Solidarity 
Movement has largely been kept outside discussions of this so-called new anti-Semitism, 
while parliamentarians assert its existence; activists in the movement are rarely consulted 
or even questioned about their views. It is de facto decided. The CPCCA, for example, 
heard from no one involved in organizing Israeli Apartheid Week, yet had an entire 
section dedicated to the week in its final report (2011 ). 
Unfortunately, the marking of Palestinians and Palestine solidarity as "extreme," 
along with the chilling environment created by funding cuts and the discourse of anti-
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Semitism, has kept other progressive movements from taking a stand against such 
redefinitions. It is largely seen as an issue involving one or two communities, not as 
concerning other groups. This is partly the result of the breakdown of anti-racist 
solidarities and the fragmentation of various communities along ethnic lines all vying for 
state support. The Palestine Solidarity Movement faces an uphill battle explaining that 
such a narrowing down of debate on foreign policy does indeed affect all, because it 
curtails every citizen's ability to question/challenge foreign policy-not only those active 
in the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Moreover, such a redefinition has major 
implications on how the right to dissent itself can be legislated away and silenced as 
racist by the state. 
The Palestine Solidarity Movement continues to organize despite the conclusions 
of the CPCCA. However, more educational work needs to happen across movements and 
communities to explain that this reframing of anti-Semitism not only narrows the space 
for free speech and dissent for a few, but for all. As others have noted, these ideological 
redefinitions make it difficult to address real anti-Semitism as well. Salaita, for example, 
has asserted that conflation of Jews with Israel as a 
totalizing discourse not only precludes justice in the Near East, but also weakens 
legitimate claims of anti-Semitism because it amounts to crying wolf - those who 
have heard decent and intelligent people repeatedly called anti-Semitic for 
condemning Israel's ethnic cleaning become programmed into skepticism when 
the phrase anti-Semitism is uttered. (2006, p. 19) 
This push to redefine anti-Semitism clearly illustrates an attempt at containment of a 
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movement that the state defines as a problem. To try and classify a movement for 
Palestinian rights as racist is itself an admission that it is easier to legalize censorship 
against a movement rather than engage in debate. While supporters of the silencing 
campaign claim that boycotts do not support respectful dialogue, they are the ones 
shutting down dialogue by legislating censorship. 
Anti-Muslim and Anti-Arab Racism in the Silencing Campaign 
The silencing campaign, while attempting to redefine anti-Semitism as criticism 
of Israel, also relies upon common sense racist conceptions of Arabs as backward and 
terroristic. The rhetoric of "extremism" was utilized in every case of silencing examined 
in this study, and was especially prominent when it came to Arab ethnocultural 
organizations such as the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House. 
Looking at the CPCCA report, one can see how anti-Muslim and anti-Arab racism 
is central to the silencing campaign. The CPCCA final report stated, for example, that the 
"panel also heard that the twenty-first century has seen the rise of a new and concerning 
ideology, commonly referred to as Islamism, which is responsible for a substantial 
component of contemporary anti-Semitism" (2011, p. 18), adding that "witnesses 
testified that there is a small but prevalent minority in Canada who subscribe to the 
ideology of Islamism" (p. 19). This "Islamism" was described, according to the report, by 
Professor Robert S. Wistrich, as "the single, though not the only, major threat to the 
existence, physical and otherwise, of Jews today, but it is a much broader threat to 
Western society, to democratic norms, to civic culture" (p. 19). "Islamism" is explained 
as being "antithetical to Canadian values, advocating not only hatred for Jews, but also 
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the subjugation of women, and the justification of the killing of gay people" (p. 20). As 
argued earlier, civilizational markers and the proof of the superiority of liberalism 
increasingly references women's rights and gay rights, used to demarcate liberalism from 
external others whose threat consists in their "backward" attitudes toward these rights. 
However, the identity of this "small minority" who espouses this ill-defined "Islamism" 
is never provided. As Cairns and Ferguson have argued, "proponents of the CPCCA also 
deploy language that plays to Islamophobic sentiments as well as a fear of complexity 
and intellectual culture that 'others' those who criticize Israel as irrational, extreme, and 
violent" (2011, p. 416). 
The CPCCA report references the testimony by Dr. Fred Lowy, President 
Emeritus of Concordia University, who "argued that a very important reason for anti-
Semitism on Canadian campuses, is a group of politically committed Islamist students 
who essentially mobilize support from within the Muslim student community and then 
within the general activist community for political purposes" (2011, p. 20). But despite 
all this talk of a "minority that supports Islamism" and groups of "committed Islamist 
students" creating havoc and fear on Canadian campuses, the report goes on to admit that 
we agree with Dr. Lowy and Dr. Levy, that Jewish students on most Canadian 
campuses are safe and do not experience generalized anti-Semitism in their daily 
lives on campus. However, we also agree with Dr. Levy, in that administrators 
have a responsibility to act even if only 1 % of their population is affected. (p. 60) 
It is not a coincidence that the report relies on an "lslamist" threat and appeals to 
discourses that stigmatize Muslims as extreme and a danger to society, as not only is 
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there a "minority" out to get Jewish students, they are out to destroy "Western culture" 
and "Canadian values." Although, to couch this in non-racist language, there is always 
that added caveat of, "I don't mean all Muslims, or the Muslim religion, just the extreme 
ones." By relying on such explanations for what it calls "Islamism," the CPCCA report 
intends to, first, create fear of the Palestine Solidarity Movement and ostracize it, and 
second, make it seem like a marginal movement stemming from an "extreme" section of 
a community that does not adhere to Canadian values, rather than a popular movement 
combining individuals of all faiths and many atheists. 
Therefore, the struggle to maintain a space for free expression of the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement is centrally an anti-racist struggle against a silencing campaign 
framed in a clash of civilizations logic. There is much work to be done on the functioning 
of Anti-Muslim and Anti-Arab racism in the Canadian context, work that is necessary for 
countering the common sense racism that prevails across the political spectrum. Fear of 
targeting has made anti-racist alliances across movements difficult to forge; yet it is 
essential that oppositional movements take seriously the fact that silencing and 
censorship act to fortify a specific kind of "race thinking" (Razack, 2008) that structures 
relations across society, not only in relation to Muslims and Arabs. 
Balance, Dialogue, and the Constant Quest for Moderates 
While casting the Palestine Solidarity Movement as "extreme," and as outside of 
"civility" and "respectful norms," proponents of the silencing campaign propose that a 
"balanced" approach based on "dialogue" between communities is more appropriate. The 
dialogue is meant tb take place between "moderates" from both sides. Terms such as 
272 
balance and dialogue are appealing in an official multicultural atmosphere that promotes 
an idealized tolerance abstracted from power relations, reconceptualizing anti-racist and 
anti-colonial struggles in communal terms. The notion of balance, for example, speaks to 
the common misconception of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination as an 
endless historic conflict between religions, rather than a modem anti-colonial struggle. 
The quest for finding balance, despite the clear power imbalance on the ground 
between Israel and ,the Palestinians, is in essence a discursive silencing tool aimed at 
obfuscating the reality of Western support for the Israeli state. Terms like balance and 
dialogue have to be interrogated, just as do terms like tolerance and inclusiveness, 
because, abstracted from power relations and taken at face value, they seem neutral. As 
noted, however, by Sears and Nadeau, such "invitations to dialogue are grounded in sets 
of unarticulated assumptions about the character of conflict, particularly that two parties 
of relatively equal power must reconcile through putting aside emotion and interchanging 
on a rational basis" (2010, p. 17). Yet the parties involved in the conflict over the 
colonization of Palestine are not equal. Thus, these are calls for balance and dialogue that 
leave the power relations where they already essentially are, and that consist of support 
for the continuation of oppression. 
Interestingly, such calls for balance appear in relation to the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement, while Israel advocacy is normalized. For example, officials do not call for the 
Walk for Israel, a parade that takes up much of downtown Toronto, to be balanced. In 
any case, the application of this concept of balance in reality would mean that any time a 
Palestinian or a Palestinian Solidarity activist made a presentation, an equal number of 
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Israel supporters must be present to share their view. In relation to requests for balance 
from members of the York administration in the Mapping Modeless of Statehood and 
Paths to Peace conference, Masri wrote: 
The vagueness of the concept could be easily manipulated by external groups and 
administrators, who could reduce it to a head count of "who supports what" with 
complete disregard for the goals of the academic exercise and the context of the 
discussions. Following the same logic of these critics, at every conference on 
racism there should be participants who present the point of view of the Ku Klux 
Klan, and at every conference on political economy supporters of a market 
economy and supporters of a historical materialism approach should be 
represented in equal numbers. (2011, p. 17) 
In opposition to activism that questions the actions of the Canadian state, it is 
much more convenient to pose the issue in terms of two communities at odds with each 
other, with one side in particular even being at odds with Canadian values. In 
constructing and conceiving politics in communal terms, official multiculturalism helps 
to depoliticize activist narratives by communalizing them and proposing endless dialogue 
that does not address the real issues that the BDS movement aims to redress-namely, 
Israel's violations of international law and Canadian support for such violations. 
Notwithstanding the critique of an abstract notion of "dialogue" that draws false 
symmetry between Palestinians and Israel and exhibits confusion about the very nature of 
the conflict by framing it in religious rather than anti-colonial terms, the BDS campaign 
is not directed towards the Jewish community or Israel's supporters in Canada and does 
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not require a dialogue with them. The campaign is engaging with the Canadian state and 
its institutions, pushing them to not be complicit in Israeli human rights violations. It is 
not an issue of two equal communities having a dialogue; it is a question of a group of 
citizens pointing to Canadian state complicity in Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. 
One could say that dialogue can take place with the state; however, how can such 
dialogue take place when the state itself has very clearly taken one side of the conflict? 
The state itself is shutting down dialogue and debate by insisting that one viewpoint is 
outside of permissible discourse. 
As Palestinian activism is excluded, Israeli state policies are vigorously 
supported. While the state criticizes events like Israeli Apartheid Week for "lacking 
balance," it actually tips the balance in favour of Israel by supporting it in international 
forums and by silencing dissent internally. The language of balance and dialogue is very 
prominent in the silencing campaign because it works to cast the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement as "extremist." Therefore, an analysis of this particular discourse of silencing 
helps to constructively critique notions of balance and dialogue, replacing them with 
more nuanced understandings and language that disrupts the way power functions, 
centering imbalances of power as a starting point. This interrogation of the discourses of 
balance and dialogue is important across anti-racist movements. 
Anti-Racist Alliances vs. Settler Solidarities 
The cases outlined in this dissertation-from the attack on Israeli Apartheid 
Week, to the defunding of ethnocultural organizations and NGOs for their positions on 
Palestine, and finally, the attempts to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from 
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marching in Pride Toronto-have serious implications beyond the Palestine Solidarity 
Movement, especially in a context of ongoing debates framed in a "crisis" of 
multiculturalism discourse. 
Other social movements have begun to feel the brunt of funding cuts and 
discourses marginalizing their activism. For example, when asked about environmental 
groups getting government funding, Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper said: "If 
it's the case that we're spending on organizations that are doing things contrary to 
government policy, I think that is an inappropriate use of taxpayers' money and we'll 
look to eliminate it" (Caplan, 2012). Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty 
International Canada (English branch), explained that there has been a Campaign Against 
Advocacy and Dissent across Canada, and argued: 
What was at stake, I suggested, was the freedom and the ability of Canadians to 
vigorously advocate for the protection of human rights and other fundamental 
elements to social justice and a sustainable society - of all rights and concerns of 
all people - both here within Canada and abroad, and to do so without political 
interference, intimidation or manipulation. (2012). 
Anyone imagining that repression of dissent would remain within the boundaries of 
solidarity relating to Palestine need only look to the streets of Toronto during the G20 
protests to witness how the language of "extremism" is played out in the wider context to 
justify large police budgets and crackdowns on protests. The Office of the Independent 
Police Review issued a 300-page report about the police conduct during the G20 summit. 
Its director Gerry McNeilly explained: 
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What occun-ed over the course of the weekend resulted in the largest mass an-ests 
in Canadian history. These disturbances had a profound impact not only on the 
citizens of Toronto and Canada generally, but on public confidence in the police 
as well. (Seglins, 2012) 
However, the government refused to open any formal inquiry into the matter. 
Under these circumstances it is crucial to ask, as Kundnani does in the UK case: 
"is there, then, any basis for overcoming the legacy of communal identity politics through 
building new alliances, not in the sense of paper coalitions but at the level of genuine 
solidarities rooted in community-based activism?" (2007a, p. 184). Understanding 
official multicultural policy as one of the strategies used for racializing communities, 
driving wedges between them, and weakening social movements that cut across them, 
opens possibilities for the crucial (re )building of alliances and the much needed assertion 
of an anti-racist politics. 
When official multicultural policy enhances community leaderships that are 
defined more by their relationship to the state than by their base in the communities they 
claim to represent, anti-racist alliances must be forged at the grassroots level. The current 
moment necessitates an integrated solidarity framework whereby struggles for social 
justice take seriously the protection of liberal values like freedom of speech and civil 
liberties (which should never be taken for granted as they have themselves come about 
through struggle), as well as work towards alliance building between movements in a 
framework that understands the relations between settler-solidarities rooted in free market 
economics, racism, and military occupations. Such alliances should not replicate the 
277 
official multicultural model by seeking token representatives of community groups; 
rather, they must work to build communication across organizations on multiple levels. 
When settler solidarities are grounded in continued colonization, neoliberal 
economics, increased militarism, and securitized/racialized migration, anti-racist alliances 
must invert this paradigm and stand for the exact opposite. An understanding of how 
silencing and censorship operate as mechanisms of state control over discursive space 
allows oppositional movements to formulate such integrated responses that address issues 
of war, racism (including racialized poverty), and civil liberties. Moreover, an 
understanding of how state funding acts to restrict and discipline dissent points to a 
fundamental need for oppositional movements to discuss sustainability outside state 
structures. 
The key issue to grapple with in building anti-racist alliances and new 
sustainability models is how to advance this work from small activist circles to 
organizing wider, genuine alliances at a cross-community grassroots level-without 
falling into the trap of 
framing discussions and statements which rigidly adhere to the invocation of 
certain stock phrases and terms [that] run the risk of becoming ritualized 
assertions of a kind of stylized militancy that do not work toward building a 
broader base, and exclude or dismiss those who are not familiar with them, 
instead of seeking to build a critical social analysis drawing upon, and drawing in 
more and more people. (Choudry, Hanley, & Shragge, 2012, p. 3) 
Such alliances are admittedly difficult to forge when neoliberalism's insistence on 
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individualized and commodified social relations has permeated both social relations and 
culture, and in the context of inter-communal competition for state resources organized 
through multicultural policy. However, without such alliances it is difficult to conceive of 
any social justice struggle moving forward. As Krebs and Olwan have noted in relation to 
indigenous struggles and alliances with the Palestine Solidarity Movement, "failing to 
inform Palestine solidarity work in Canada with an understanding of native struggles is 
inherently detrimental, both to amassing effective support for the Palestinian struggle and 
to advancing liberation struggles within Canada for indigenous and non-indigenous 
people alike" (2012, p. 151 ). 
As the case of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid illustrates, building alliances 
between the Palestine Solidarity Movement and queer activists helps to strengthen both 
movements. As Morgensen recently noted, "increasingly, settler states appeal to gender 
and sexual diversity to secure their rule, in the era of state multiculturalism absorbing 
social differences so as to neutralise their capacity to disturb national unity" (2012, p. 
171). While "gay liberation" becomes a marker for civilized secular modernity, and 
highlighting homophobia among Muslim citizens is used as a tool for racializing them as 
inferior, Israel fosters an instrumental "gay friendly" image intended to "pinkwash" its 
violations of Palestinian human rights. Alliances across movements aid in deconstructing 
and countering any such crass instrumentalizations of queer politics that promote a 
homonationalist identity to aid in legitimizing and normalizing military occupations. As a 
counter to this, groups like Queers Against Israeli Apartheid have 
acted and continue to act in synergy with Defenders of the Land, a Canada-wide 
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network of non-native allies to indigenous decolonisation struggles. Their 
collaborations mutually reference links between the Indigenous Americas and 
Palestine. The forging of such ties is a crucial complement to calls for Indigenous 
American-Palestinian solidarity; but to form effectively, such ties must be directly 
responsible to both Palestinians and Indigenous Americans. (Morgensen, 2012, p. 
188) 
There is, however, no shortcut to forging anti-colonial, anti-racist alliances; these 
only come about through a process of continuous debate, self-reflection, and active 
engagement. Unfortunately, oppositional movements are immune from neither 
conceptions of individualism embedded in a neoliberal ideology, nor ahistorical identity 
politics elicited by official multicultural policy. This has meant that cross-movement 
conversations are difficult to hold without descending into divisive versions of identity 
politics that fetishize differences at the expense of solidarity, rather than discussing them 
in an ongoing process of learning from one another. 
Fundamentally, attempts at alliance building must be grounded in mutual respect 
and understanding that, by virtue of living in a settler colony that is also an imperialist 
state, organizers are implicated in different ways and at various levels in settlement and 
capitalism; but, it is only in acknowledging this and moving to work together in building 
broader movements beyond small circles of activists that the attack on dissent can be 
curtailed. All too often, differences on tactical questions and an aim for a "pure," 
"radical" politics divorced from the real lives of people tend to hinder movements. 
Making denunciations across groups tends to be the easier route to take, when compared 
280 
I 1· r 
to the difficult work of beginning longer-term education and dialogue about tactics and 
levels of implication in the colonial and racial project that is the Canadian state. 
As the state works to fragment society into individuals, political actors into 
apolitical communal groupings, and oppositional movements into NGOs reliant on state 
support and funding, movements must develop a counter-strategy. As the Palestinian 
Boycott National Committee statement issued in the wake of the mass mobilizations 
across city squares around the world in 2011 stated: 
Our aspirations overlap; our struggles converge. Our oppressors, whether greedy 
corporations or military occupations, are united in profiting from wars, pillage, 
environmental destruction, repression and impoverishment. We must unite in our 
common quest for freedoms, equal rights, social and economic justice, 
environmental sanity, and world peace. We can no longer afford to be splintered 
and divided; we can no longer ignore our obligations to join hands in the struggle 
against wars and corporate exploitation and for a human-friendly world 
community not a profit-maximizing jungle. (BNC Secretariat, 2011) 
Shifting the Paradigm: Palestine Solidarity Anti-Colonial and Anti-Racist 
It takes a significant amount of patience and persistence to do the educational 
work necessary to foster a wide understanding of the Palestinian people as a nation 
engaged in an anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle for self-determination, especially 
when state officials, mainstream media, and university administrations all work diligently 
to uphold a view that the issues of the Middle East are "complex with a long history." As 
Abu-Laban and Bakan argued regarding BDS specifically, the 
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effectiveness of such a civil society initiative, as a strategy of resistance and 
cross-border solidarity, can be usefully framed as an anti-racist movement that 
contests a post-second world war hegemonic construction of state ideology, in 
which Zionism plays a central role and serves to enforce a racial contract that 
hides the apartheid-like character of the state of Israel. (2009, p. 31) 
Putting forward an anti-colonial framework is in itself a counter-narration. Thus, 
organizing for action and solidarity in reference to the call for BDS from Palestinians 
helps give coherence to international efforts and grounds them in an anti-colonial 
framework. However, success depends also on grounding the organizing work in a 
broader understanding of struggles for social justice in both the Middle East region and 
inside Western states. 
To challenge the racism against and the silencing of the Palestinian narrative, 
solidarity efforts must themselves be decolonized as well. For example, all too often 
solidarity efforts rely on anti-Zionist Jewish speakers and/or academics who study the 
region as the "more objective" voices and who are more likely to be heard as 
spokespeople of the movement. For far too long the compass for international solidarity 
efforts was the soft Zionist or anti-Zionist left in Israel, rather than Palestinians. While 
anti-Zionist Jewish voices are crucial in the solidarity movement because they reclaim 
from the Israeli state the power over every individual Jewish voice and reclaim a Jewish 
history rooted in struggles for social justice, this cannot be done at the expense of 
silencing Palestinians. Otherwise, it is merely an inversion of the Zionist narrative and 
not a challenge to it. By the same token, while the mainstream media and political bodies 
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might find it more palatable to deal with non-Palestinians, this type of common sense 
racism must be countered across oppositional movements, not normalized by 
accommodating it. This is not to claim that there is one uniform Palestinian voice or that 
single individuals can claim to be the one authentic voice of all Palestinians, but simply 
that solidarity with Palestinians must at least be anti-racist and hold Palestinians as 
political actors-not victims seeking charity, but a people in struggle calling for 
solidarity and giving it in return. As Hanieh argued, 
Palestinians are not victims but a people in struggle. This struggle goes beyond 
the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: it is a central component of a 
broader regional fight. It is impossible to understand events in any country of the 
Middle East today without situating the national context within the single, 
coherent and unified offensive that the US and other imperialist states are waging 
against the peoples of the region. (2008) 
With all the changes across the Middle East, it is necessary to shift the paradigm 
and frame Palestine Solidarity in the tradition of other anti-colonial, anti-racist struggles 
and understand its significance within broader regional and international politics. This 
can effectively happen through sincere, decolonized, anti-racist alliances across social 
movements. 
The silencing campaign against the PSM is not a new departure in Canadian 
history. Indigenous sovereignty struggles, oppositional social movements, and racialized 
migrant communities have historically faced various forms of censorship put in place to 
undermine their work. Although the silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity 
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Movement has its own trajectory, understanding this silencing in the context of Canada's 
multicultural policy can help all oppositional social movements to begin to go beyond the 
routinized support for official multicultural policy, and begin to challenge its 
fragmentation and racialization of communities across ethnic lines, asserting a new anti-
colonial discourse based on social and economic justice rather than a "recognition" and 
"tolerance" that the state can dictate, manipulate, and sanction. To truly extend rights of 
social and racial justice to those outside the mainstream of Canadian society, it is 
necessary to resist the state's attempt to assimilate specific narratives, and 
its concomitant disciplining and silencing of others. Fundamentally, this must 
entail tackling the hierarchies of political and economic power that have long 
characterized Canadian society. Without substantive change to these relations of power, 
the dominant framing of multiculturalism will continue to act as a veil for the status quo, 
condemning those outside the mainstream to a position of permanent marginalization 
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